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Summary 
This thesis is a philosophical examination of the nature of explanatory competition 
between historical accounts. It is usual for a philosophy of explanation to attempt an 
analysis of explanation, singular. The focus of this work is on relations between two 
or more explanations. In particular, I investigate explanatory exclusion and 
explanatory importance. 
The methodology of the thesis is built upon a conception of descriptive philosophy. I 
believe that when attempting to philosophise about a practice such as history, we 
should pay detailed attention to existing good practice. To this end, I develop my 
conclusions in conjunction with an examination of eight differing explanations of the 
French Revolution. 
Explanatory exclusion should be analysed in terms of incompatibility between 
explanations. Explananda, explanans, or relevance claims may be incompatible. 
Exclusion of the last type requires a commitment to explanatory realism, which holds 
that explanatory relationships mirror appropriate ontic - paradigmatically, causal - 
relationships. There are different types of historical explanation, yet all make 
reference to the causal history of the French Revolution, and therefore are candidates 
for explanatory exclusion. Causal attribution is necessary for historical explanation, 
but not sufficient. Causes must also be described in the `correct' manner, and 
differing conceptions of `correctness' lead to division between `types' of explanation. 
Historical explanations may compete, even where they do not exclude. One 
significant dimension of competition concerns attribution of historical importance. In 
order to allow substantive explanatory competition over this feature, I develop a 
realist analysis of historical importance. A more important cause is one which made 
more of a difference to the effect. In explicating this counterfactual claim, I defend 
an account of counterfactual decidability based on the idea of counterfactuals as 
implied experiments. This account is shown to have advantages over traditional 
metalinguistic and possible worlds analyses of counterfactuals. 
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Introduction 
What is the relationship between multiple historical explanations? In most areas of 
historical scholarship we are faced with an array of different sorts of explanation: 
including, but not limited to, Marxist, economic, biographical, cultural, and 
intellectual. Deciding between these - even knowing whether we have to decide 
between them - can be extremely tricky. The task of this thesis is to investigate the 
notion of competition between historical explanations. Its distinctive feature is to 
focus not primarily on the question of what `explanation' (singular) should be taken to 
mean, but on the relations between two or more explanations. 
In particular, we want to know whether multiple historical explanations cumulatively 
enrich our understanding of the series of events being explained. Or is it the case that 
the acceptance of one explanation rules out acceptance of all others which have a 
similar target? Perhaps the situation is more equivocal, explanations `overlapping' in 
some sense; in which case, we need to specify the conditions for this circumstance. 
These are questions concerning explanatory exclusion, one dimension of explanatory 
competition in general. 
Even where explanations do not exclude one another (and perhaps also where they 
do), they can often be judged as better or worse. Are judgements of relative 
explanatory goodness limited to the claim that one explanation is factually more 
accurate than the other? If not, what further issues are relevant? Further, are such 
judgements of explanatory goodness anything more than the product of a particular 
historian's viewpoint, incapable of objective defence? In particular, what should we 
make of the virtue of focusing one's explanation on the historically important events? 
I believe that the above questions lead to highly practical difficulties for students of 
history in understanding historical progress, controversy and competition. My aims 
are both practical and theoretical: my hope is that, subsequent to reading this thesis, 
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the reader may be better able to comprehend the relationship between historical works 
with which they are familiar, and better able to comprehend the theoretical issues 
underpinning explanatory comparison. Philosophers of history have had very little to 
say directly on explanatory competition, but the issue seems to be one where the 
application of philosophical thinking can bring beneficial results. 
There is only one philosopher of history or the social sciences, that I know of, who 
has explicitly investigated the nature of relations between explanations in the above 
sense. Alan Garfinkel outlines the project thus: 
`... the first task we might set for a philosophy of explanation is that it give us some account 
of these conflicts [between explanations], complementarities, overlaps, and displacements, 
that it give, as it were, an elementary algebra of explanations. Its purpose would be to tell us 
when they can be added together and when they must be subtracted from one another. " 
There are, however, other areas of philosophical debate which tackle issues analogous 
to those of this thesis. I shall mention three. First, there is the long-standing debate 
between methodological individualism and methodological socialism, concerning the 
possibility of reducing sociology to psychology. The debate focuses, primarily, on 
the relationship between explanations at different ontological `levels': the social, and 
the psychological. The key question is whether explanations at one level exclude 
those at another, and if so, what the criteria are for favouring one over the other. 
Second, those debating the nature of mental causation raise very similar issues; 
indeed, in what follows, I shall draw on ideas developed in this philosophical field. 
The core question is whether causal neuro-physiological explanation excludes a 
genuinely mental explanation (in particular, one in terms of reasons) of the same act. 
For the physicalist, a physiological explanation seems to be available, in principle, for 
the explanation of any given action. Therefore, unless we can find space for mental 
explanation in addition to the physiological, a developed neuro-science will 
eventually make genuinely mental explanation redundant: presumably not an outcome 
we should accept lightly. 
1 Alan Garfinkel, Forms of Explanation: Rethinking the Questions in Social Theory (New Haven, 
London: Yale University Press, 1981), 4 
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A final analogue to the question of historical explanatory competition can be found in 
the philosophy of religion (it was, in fact, this form of the problem which first 
prompted my investigation of the analogous historiographical question). We can 
conceive of a physicalist argument against the existence of God, which we might call 
the `argument from alternative explanation'. Roughly, this would state that no matter 
what evidence there might appear to be for the existence of God, an alternative 
physicalist explanation for those same phenomena will always (in principle) be 
possible. Furthermore, it would be claimed that this physicalist explanation excludes 
the theistic one. To assess this argument would be to raise very similar issues to those 
of this thesis. 
Like many recent philosophers of history (and philosophers of science), I am 
concerned by the traditional detachment of philosophical analysis and descriptive 
knowledge of, in this case, historical practice. To remedy this, my approach is 
explicitly based upon a case study comprising eight historical explanations. In 
chapter one I provide the (meta-)philosophical background to this case study. I show 
why a strongly descriptive bias to philosophical enquiry is both desirable and 
necessary. The descriptive approach, however, raises a number of tricky questions, 
concerning the precise role that a case study should play in a philosophical enquiry. 
For the descriptive approach to be of real worth, the works selected for the case study 
should be both varied and historically influential. In addition, the philosophical 
treatment should not do violence to these works by treating them in too simple or 
homogenous a manner. Following these guidelines, in chapter two I introduce the 
eight quite different explanations of the French Revolution. In chapter three I 
complete the introductory work of Part I, in presentation of an overview of 
approaches to historical explanation. In a novel categorisation, I argue that theories of 
explanation should be understood as being erotetic, cognitive, ontic, linguistic or 
contrastive. My own approach draws on at least three of these elements. 
The core topic of Part II is explanatory exclusion. In chapter four I develop three 
fundamental principles of explanatory exclusion, which provide the basis for the 
remainder of the study. The material of chapter five extends the understanding and 
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application of these principles, through examination of the role of explanatory targets 
in shaping exclusion. A theory of contrastive explanation is best placed to aid 
understanding of explanatory targets, and how targets affect explanatory competition. 
In chapter six I take up the question of whether there are different types of explanation 
represented in the case study accounts, and to the extent that there are, how this 
affects explanatory exclusion and competition. In this chapter, I attempt to remain 
faithful to the widely varying content, style and theoretical approach of the different 
explanations; whilst arguing that they are commensurable, and therefore may be 
partially or fully exclusive. 
The material of Part III concerns explanatory competition over and above explanatory 
exclusion. Chapter seven begins with an overview of the nature of historical 
explanatory virtues, and their role in explanatory competition. The main focus of Part 
III, however, is on one particular explanatory virtue: importance. In chapter seven, I 
argue, in general, that we need a realist understanding of that term. The material of 
chapters eight and nine develops such an understanding in detail. The counterfactual 
model of causal importance developed would, if correct, entail that at least some, and 
possibly a great many, judgements of importance in history are objectively decidable. 
This would be one substantive way for one historical explanation to be better than 
another, over and above being more factually accurate. 
There is no dedicated final chapter for `conclusions'. Instead, I have collected the 
main findings of each of Part H and III at the end of those respective Parts. 
My philosophical approach is guided by two goals, which can, without care, lead to 
mutual tension. I want to provide a treatment of the key terms `explanatory 
exclusion', `competition', `target', `relevance', `explanatory type', `explanatory 
virtue', and `importance' which is satisfactory with respect to the practice of those 
historians I consider. But I also wish to provide substantive philosophical answers to 
the problem of explanatory competition, rejecting a relativism to which a thoroughly 
descriptive approach perhaps naturally leads. I hope that my conclusions can thereby 
be both relevant and useful to historians and students of history. 
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Part l 
Chapter One: Description and Prescription 
During the formative years of analytic philosophy of history, the topic appeared, 
somewhat perversely, to be a rather a-historical one. Taking its methodological lead 
from the logical positivist approach, the discipline was concerned with the conceptual 
analysis of concepts which it was thought were of relevance to historical study. 
Analysis, in this case, meant the task of listing the conditions under which the concept 
should properly be applied; conditions which are individually necessary, and jointly 
sufficient. In particular, such an approach was applied to the question of whether 
objectivity is possible in historical accounts, and whether historical explanation 
conforms to Hempel's Deductive-Nomological analysis (introduced in chapter three). 
Such a methodology is a-historical because it assumes a timeless concept of (for 
example) historical explanation. It is assumed that there is only one proper way to 
understand the concept: an assumption which encouraged a tendency for the analysis 
to appear quite unrelated to the practice of actual historical enquiry. Of course, 
conceptual analysis was never intended to be entirely divorced from historical 
practice, given that the criteria for applying the concept had to guarantee at least an 
approximate fit with the intuitive extension of the concept. However, I think it is fair 
to say that the examination of historians' work came a very poor second to conceptual 
investigation. 
Positivist-inspired philosophy of history certainly exhibited many virtues: of clarity, 
precision, and sometimes (as in Hempel's work) of providing fascinating suggestions 
which inspire further inquiry. Yet I would not be alone in tracing the cause of some 
of the main failings of analytic philosophy of history to the positivist approach. Most 
disturbingly, analytic philosophy of history has been almost universally ignored, 
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indeed derided as irrelevant, by working historians. Could this be due to the failure of 
philosophers of history to make their work connect in any meaningful way with 
historical practice? 
Of course, the positivist inspired approach is waning. In the philosophy of history, we 
can trace the gradual change back to the 1970s, and in some cases even earlier: 
William Dray, for example, has always been concerned with the detailed use of 
historical work in his philosophical discussion. I hope that the following study can be 
a further step in that journey from an abstract analytic philosophy of history to a 
philosophy of history which actively engages with historical practice: a `descriptive 
turn'. 
The evidence of a descriptive turn is also to be found in philosophy at large, and can 
there be traced further back (notably to the post-war Oxford school of Ordinary 
Language philosophy). Indeed, certain philosophical disciplines have already been 
revolutionised by a fresh descriptive approach to their subject matter. Kuhn and 
Lakatos, from the 1960s, stressed the importance of descriptive adequacy in 
philosophy of history's elder sibling, the philosophy of science. This movement 
became known as the `historical turn', due to the role of the history of science in 
providing a descriptive basis for the philosophy of science. Rawls' influential theory 
of justice (developed from 1971) started with the description of ethical intuition, and 
proceeded via a method of reflective equilibrium. More recently (1990), Edward 
Craig has argued for the importance of a rather different kind of descriptive approach 
as a way of advancing the analysis of knowledge: one which emphasises the need to 
examine the practical use of the concept under analysis. 
Yet, a descriptive turn is not currently overly popular amongst philosophers of 
history. The only recent attempt to examine historical explanation using an explicitly 
descriptive approach remains Raymond Martin's (1989) The Past Within Us 
1. 
Furthermore, whilst there have been attempts to pin down, in general, what exactly is 
Raymond Martin, The Past Within Us (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). It must, 
however, be said that the use of short case studies in philosophy of history is common practice, for 
example in the journal History and Theory 
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meant by `descriptive, or a posteriori, philosophising', none has provided us with a 
clear statement of the problems to be solved and possible solutions; not one that can 
be straightforwardly be applied to the philosophy of history, in any case. We need to 
know what is meant by `description' in this context, what precisely needs to be 
accounted for by the resultant philosophy, and how philosophy's distinctively 
normative, or prescriptive, role fits with the descriptive. This is the justification for 
the inclusion of the following extended methodological (in other words, meta- 
philosophical) discussion: apart from the necessity of establishing my own 
methodology, I believe the general questions raised have wide applicability, and yet 
have been under-researched. 
Why describe? 
The traditional methodology of the philosophy of science was brought to task by 
Kuhn in his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn believed that 
philosophers of science had not paid sufficient attention to the history of science. To 
the extent that historical data were used, it was 'mainly to answer questions posed by 
the unhistorical stereotype drawn from science texts'2. However, Kuhn argued that 
'History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a 
decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed'3 
In short, a decent philosophy of science had to be true to an accurate, non- 
stereotypical description of science, discovered through historical study. Kuhn points 
out that the history of science had commonly been used to exemplify theory; 
anecdotes and examples were selected in order to support the philosophical theory. 
But Kuhn wanted to incorporate the history of science in more fundamental ways 
2 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1962), 1 
3Ibid., 1 
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also: history could suggest philosophical approaches, and could be the judge of that 
philosophy. 
Kuhn's methodological revolution, one of the most striking aspects of Kuhn's work, 
appears to have had its desired effect. Lakatos certainly took the suggestion seriously; 
his work is peppered with detailed historical case study. In general, the history and 
philosophy of science now cannot be easily separated: no philosophy of science 
worthy of the name can get by without the detailed backing of a history of science. 
Just as Kuhn argued that the philosophy of science had to be more responsive to a rich 
and accurate history of science, I want to argue that the philosophy of history must be 
more responsive to a rich and accurate description of historical practice. In this 
section I will provide three reasons why I believe this. (An additional, more general, 
motivation is the previously mentioned desire to ensure that the philosophy of history 
is relevant to practising historians. ) I will then outline the methodological questions 
we face in making good on the aim of producing a descriptively adequate philosophy 
of history. 
Some knowledge of a practice is required even to speak of that practice: no 
philosophy of history is possible without knowing what `history' is, and one must 
know something of what historians do to be able to understand the concept `history'. 
This much is uncontentious: any theory of analysis requires that the philosophical 
understanding of key terms, such as `history', be not too far removed from common 
understanding. What is open to debate is the degree to which idealisation is 
permitted. My general principle will be to examine historical work on its own terms, 
before philosophical idealisation is considered. 
A descriptive approach entails two primary criteria, one positive and one negative. 
Each criterion also demonstrates a virtue of that approach. The positive is that a 
philosophy should account for features of practice which are both pervasive and 
philosophically important (in a sense which will be unpacked in the next section). 
Examining a practice in detail can lead to new and fruitful philosophical approaches. 
Kuhn's novel theories were achieved through the attempt to account for pervasive 
features of scientific practice which had been previously overlooked: the `puzzle- 
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solving' activity of normal science. In the philosophy of history, one source of the 
interest generated by Hayden White's theory of narrative is that it attempts to account 
for previously overlooked features of historical writing: the rhetoric and linguistic 
devices employed. 
The negative criterion states that where philosophy conflicts with existing good 
practice, then that philosophy should be challenged and, except in extremely unusual 
situations, rejected. This removes the support for `a priori' philosophising, making 
philosophy and methodology more relevant to the practice. The negative criterion 
entails that practice should be used, in some sense, as the data against which the 
philosophical theory may be measured. Spelling out how existing good practice may 
be identified, and in what sense it is the `data' of a resulting philosophy, will be the 
major task for the remainder of this chapter. 
A third advantage of such a descriptive approach derives from the fact that practice 
must be well described in order to be able to then properly criticise that practice. In 
particular, it is vital to note that we cannot comment on the rationality or justification 
of any given practice without knowing the aims of that practice. For, as Laudan 
pointed out4, rationality is, at the very least, concerned with the proper fit between 
means and ends. I shall have more to say concerning criticism within a descriptive 
philosophy towards the end of this chapter. 
The general form of question to be considered is how descriptive and prescriptive 
(normative) elements can be integrated into a philosophy. I sometimes frame the 
question in terms of the integration of descriptive and prescriptive into a methodology, 
a formulation I regard as equivalent. Whilst no philosophy is a complete 
methodology, in the sense of providing a complete `rule-book' to guide practice, a 
philosophy does provide the fundamental methodological basis for practice. 
To clarify the connections between the specific topic of this chapter and other 
`descriptive' philosophical approaches, it will be helpful to present a typology of 
A Larry Laudan, `Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism' (originally 1987) 
in Philosophy of Science, ed. David Papineau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 201 
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these approaches. In each case I provide (i) the object of description, (ii) the nature of 
the resulting philosophy, (iii) an example of such an approach, and (iv) a brief 
commentary. 
1. 
Resulting philosophy: Value theory; or analysis of such `common' 
terms as `knowledge' 
Example: Rawls' theory of justice 
Descriptive object: Intuitions 
The philosophical aim is usually taken to be the provision of rules, which fit the 
extension of the concept as defined by intuition. For example, we have an 
intuitive idea of which patterns of economic distribution are just, which unjust: 
philosophical rules should then be formulated so as to capture these intuitions. 
The crucial difference between this and the following types is that the description 
does not focus on elite or specialised practice, but on intuitions which are 
supposed to be common (at least to the `reflective' intuition). 
2. Descriptive object: History of the discipline 
Resulting philosophy: 
Example: 
Methodology of that discipline 
Kuhn's philosophy of science 
For the philosophy of science, the history of science is used as the object of 
description, due to the fact that the philosophy of science is primarily concerned 
with questions of theory change over time. For example: in what does the 
progress of science consist in? What are the relations between scientific theories, 
one of which supplants the other? To answer these questions descriptively 
requires a knowledge of the historical development of the practice. 
Il 
3. Descriptive object: The practice of the discipline 
Resulting philosophy: 
Example: 
3a. 
Methodology of that discipline 
Martin's philosophy of history 
Similarly to type (1), practice is taken to provide the extension which 
philosophical rules must elucidate. It is important to make clear that `practice', in 
this sense, should be taken as a shorthand for `norms or intuitions which motivate 
that practice'. For what is described cannot literally be practice itself (the series 
of physical movements, or the output of words on a page); philosophical 
description is concerned with normative guidance. 
The practice of a discipline may be used to provide an analysis of concepts, such 
as `explanation', in addition to providing a deep methodology. I shall say more in 
the final section of the relationship between conceptual analysis and methodology; 
contrary to Martins, I do regard this as a close relationship. 
My own approach is a variation of type (3): the use of a description of a practice to 
guide both the methodology of that practice, and analysis of relevant concepts. A 
possible difference concerns the fact that the focus of this thesis is upon relations 
between explanations; in that sense, my approach bears similarity to type (2). 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to a careful unpacking of the three main 
aspects of a descriptive approach: positively accounting for practice, negatively being 
constrained by that practice, and criticising that practice internally. We need to tackle 
such questions as: 'What is a good philosophical description of historical practice? 
How does a `philosophical' description differ from, say, a historiographic or 
bibliographic description? What sorts of historical practice, and what aspects of that 
practice, should be philosophically described? What does it mean to allow a 
description to be the judge of a philosophical theory? Can we make room for `bad' 
practice in the context of a descriptive philosophical approach? 
5 In particular: Martin, The Past Within 
Us, 24-25 
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These are weighty questions, and deserve to be examined as much for their own 
interest as to ground the present work. We can make use of a variety of notions in 
tackling the above concerns: primarily Lakatos' `Rational Reconstruction'; Goodman 
and Rawls' `Reflective Equilibrium'; and Wittgenstein's `family resemblance'. A 
subsidiary aim of this chapter will be to examine these notions, and ask of each how 
precisely they can aid our meta-philosophical questions. 
Lakatos' theory of Rational Reconstruction 
`Philosophy without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of 
science is blind'6 
I shall first use a critical description of Lakatos' theory of Rational Reconstruction 
(henceforth abbreviated RR) to approach the above questions. RR is a meta- 
philosophical theory, the purpose of which is to make sense of a descriptive approach 
to philosophy of science (an approach of type (2) in the categorisation of the previous 
section). 
I shall treat Lakatos' question: `how should philosophy of science stand in relation to 
the history of science? ' as structurally equivalent to my methodological question: 
`how should philosophy of history stand in relation to the practice of history? ' In 
what follows, I shall frequently use the term practice to designate scientific or 
historical practice, as discovered through examining the works directly, or through 
examining the history of that discipline. Lakatos' RR aims to provide an answer both 
to the question of what a philosophical description amounts to, and to the problem of 
how philosophies (or methodologies) can be judged on descriptive grounds. 
6 Imre Lakatos, 'History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions' in tfethod and Appraisal in the 
Physical Sciences, ed. Colin Howson (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 1 
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What should a philosophy (of any given practice) be concerned with? The aspects of 
a practice can be readily divided into those that are internal, the features which a 
philosophy should concern itself with, and those which are external to philosophical 
concern. 
For example, certain features of historical scholarship simply should not require 
philosophical attention: no attention need be given to the index layout of the historical 
study, neither to the preface, the length of the book, or the font type. More 
contentiously, such features as the ordering of the chapters, the language in which it is 
written, and metaphors used might also be regarded as outside philosophical attention. 
Consider another example: the philosophical examination of the historical 
development of science. In this case, changes in research funding resulting from a 
change in government, chance discoveries of new species, and resignations of key 
scientists might all be thought of as philosophically external. 
On the other hand, internal aspects include evidential relations between observation 
and theory, explanatory relations between explanans and explanandum, and the 
relation between value judgements and factual judgements: these are the aspects of 
scientific or historical practice which are of proper philosophical interest. A 
philosophy which does not describe a practice using such internal concepts is judged 
not to be incorrect, but to have missed the point of what it is describing. To describe 
the history of science without using the `internal' language of evidential support, 
theory change, falsification and verification, would be to do just this. Is there a 
general criterion which could distinguish between internal and external aspects? An 
approximate answer would be that internal features relate to the rationality of the 
practice. This makes sense, since it is generally agreed that the unique 
feature of 
philosophy as a whole is its focus on rationality or normativity. 
Lakatos' realisation was that the division between what is internal and what 
is 
external is dependent on the particular philosophy that 
is used to make sense of the 
practice in question. In other words, the 
demarcation is theory-dependent, where 
`theory' in this context means `philosophical theory'. It is, therefore, the case that 
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judgements concerning the rationality of the practice in question are also theory- 
dependent. 
The notion of the `context of discovery', used in the philosophy of science, provides 
an example of this theory dependency. ('Context of discovery' refers to the actual 
development of a scientific theory, and should be understood by contrast with `the 
context of justification': the extent to which a theory can be rationally justified or 
refuted. ) Whilst all philosophies would aim to tackle the question of justification, 
whether the context of discovery is also of philosophical interest varies between 
philosophical theories. The inductivist maintains that where a scientific theory 
actually comes from is most important: only theories which are warranted by the 
proper support of pre-existing data should be asserted. The falsificationist gives the 
opposite answer: how a theory is arrived at is of no philosophical interest whatsoever. 
What matters is only how that theory is subsequently tested, and therefore justified. 
Examples are not hard to find in the philosophy of history. If the philosophy states 
that explanation is a matter of providing general laws, or even of citing causes, then it 
is natural to suppose that the way these laws or causes are presented will not be of any 
philosophical interest. From this perspective, there is a clear split between the form of 
a historical account, which is philosophically irrelevant, and the content of the 
historical explanation (laws and causes), which is philosophically relevant and hence 
internal. Hayden White's theory of historical explanation through narrative 
emplotment (discussed in chapter three) takes the opposite perspective. To White, the 
form of the narrative - the way it is written - provides the type of explanation. 
`Form' is therefore philosophically vital for White, and must be seen as an internal 
aspect of the historical practice. The way a narrative is constructed, the language 
used, and the metaphorical and other linguistic devices introduced are all of 
philosophical interest and importance. 
Lakatos' meta-theory of rational reconstruction follows from the distinction between 
the internal and external elements of a practice. As we have seen, each methodology 
(philosophy) gives rise to a particular type of description. The philosophy demarcates 
the internal features of a practice, description of which provides the conceptual 
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backbone. For example, the core of a falsificationist history of science would consist 
of a history in terms of a series of scientific theories. It would assess how risky those 
theories were in relation to the background theory of the time, and it would describe 
tests of those theories and how the theories fared. A falsificationist philosophy of 
science therefore produces a certain description of scientific practice. 
Such a philosophical description would be a `rational reconstruction'. It represents an 
idealised history of the subject, had the methodology been perfectly carried out, using 
only what is internal7. Despite the whiff of historical anachronism, Lakatos argues 
that a rational reconstruction is not all that different from any description, for the 
reason that all description - whether `rational reconstruction' or otherwise - requires 
the interpretative backing of theory. 
'History without some bias is impossible ... The bias, of course, may be obscured by an 
eclectic variation of theories or by theoretical confusion: but neither eclecticism nor confusion 
amounts to an a-theoretical outlook's 
The purpose of producing rational reconstructions is that these can then be tested, to 
see `how actual history "misbehaved" in the light of its rational reconstruction'9. This 
suggests two requirements. Firstly, that the rational reconstruction (and, therefore, 
philosophy) be empirically adequate. The relevant - internal - elements of the 
practice are to be treated literally as data, to be explained and accounted for by the 
philosophy. The second criterion distinguishes a normative-philosophical study from 
any other (biographical, sociological) study: philosophies should reconstruct scientific 
activity so that its rationality is apparent. This is what is meant, then, by a descriptive 
philosophy: one which describes practice accurately, and which does so in such a way 
as to make clear its rationality. 
7 There is an ambiguity in this statement, as there is in Lakatos' treatment. The weaker reading would 
demand that a rational reconstruction avoid contradicting internal elements; though it may also include 
external elements. The stronger reading would demand that a rational reconstruction use only internal 
elements. The weaker reading seems more plausible, for the reason that some external elements are 
necessary in a practice, even if no particular external feature is necessary. After all, the scientific 
theory must be arrived at somehow, the explanation must be presented in some form; even if it makes 
no philosophical difference which. 
8Ibid. 
, 19 
9Ibid., 18 
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Internality and rationality 
Lakatos' RR introduces two ideas which should be retained in some form. The first 
idea is that a practice can be divided into internal and external aspects, dependent 
upon the philosophy used. Only the internal need be philosophically accounted for. 
The second idea is that rational reconstructions should fit practice as far as possible, 
thereby providing a rational, yet descriptively adequate, account of the practice. 
However, Lakatos' insistence that `internal' and `rational' can be entirely specified 
according to the particular philosophy used, leads to serious problems for a 
descriptive approach. I will argue that substantive modification of Lakatos' version 
of RR is necessary, if we are to follow the general intuitions which motivate a 
descriptive philosophical approach. There are four problems with RR, as it stands. 
If the demarcation between internal and external is entirely dependent on the 
philosophy adopted, then there will be no room for a positive standard of descriptive 
adequacy. The descriptive standard will be, to some extent, self-confirming. For 
whilst, according to Lakatos' RR, it is possible to criticise a philosophy on the basis 
that it contradicts internal elements of practice, it is not possible to criticise a 
philosophy on the basis that it fails to account for internal elements. What a 
philosophy fails to account for is, for Lakatos, necessarily external. I would claim 
that it is possible to judge a philosophical theory to be inadequate on the basis of its 
failure to account for features of the practice which should be of genuine 
philosophical relevance; yet such a demand is, for Lakatos, simply confused. My 
positive criterion, suggested previously, has no place in Lakatos' RR1° 
Very much related is the problem that positive derivation has no place in Lakatos' 
RR. A genuinely descriptive philosophy, of the sort adopted by Kuhn (and attempted 
in this thesis), is descriptive not only in justification, but also in derivation. By this I 
mean that a descriptive philosophy should develop philosophical questions, problems 
10 We might add that whilst the rational reconstruction is overly theory-dependent, Lakatos' concept of 
`actual history', against which the reconstruction is tested, seems naively theory-independent. In 
particular, it jars with Lakatos' claim (quoted previously) that `history without some bias is 
impossible'. 
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and theories from an appreciation of the existing practice. Practice should be allowed 
to suggest and guide philosophy, as well as to judge it: indeed, this is the most 
conspicuous feature of the descriptive approaches listed previously (Kuhn, Rawls, 
White, Craig). In Lakatos' RR, a philosophy is arrived at a priori, is used to fashion a 
description in its image, and only then is confronted with the evidence. 
The third criticism derives from Lakatos' demand that a good philosophy demonstrate 
the rationality of the practice in question. This demand is ambiguous: it could mean 
that a philosophy should demonstrate the rationality that the practice has, or that a 
philosophy should demonstrate that the practice has rationality. Due to his insistence 
that the given philosophy is sufficient to determine what is internal and rational, 
Lakatos adopts the latter reading. 
The problem with this reading can be illustrated by considering Kuhn's philosophy of 
science. Kuhn's idea of science, in brief, was that theory change had more to do with 
the scientists' change in their way of seeing the world, than in a rational 
demonstration that the later theory was better than the first. Precisely because Kuhn's 
theory did not demonstrate the rationality of the scientific enterprise, Lakatos deemed 
Kuhn's ideas to be most interesting, but concerned with `social psychology', not 
philosophy. " Yet Kuhn's work does have philosophical relevance: it is, after all, 
concerned with the core philosophical problems of theory change, and the rational 
justification of those changes. Simply because Kuhn gives a negative answer to the 
question of the rationality of scientific change should not rule him out of the game. 
Hence Feyerabend's most insistent criticism of Lakatos' theory of Rational 
Reconstruction: that Lakatos has already decided, a priori, that the scientific 
enterprise should be reconstructed rationally, whilst other activities should not 
(Feyerabend's favourite examples are `pseudo-sciences' such as Marxism, black 
magic, and astrology). In this respect also, the consequences of Lakatos' RR seem 
profoundly non-descriptive. 
tt Imre Lakatos, `Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes' in Criticism 
and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1970), 115,178 
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In fact, there are episodes even of `science proper' where Lakatos believes that the 
practice should not be rationally reconstructed; in other words, where the judgements 
of normative philosophy should over-ride the judgement delivered by an examination 
of practice. This may happen where that practice is a `degenerating tradition' or `a 
bad new tradition'. Lakatos' example of a `degenerating tradition' is of certain facets 
of modem particle physics; his example of `a bad new tradition' being `some of the 
main schools of modern sociology, psychology, and social psychology' 12. Whilst it 
certainly does appear sensible to allow that philosophies should not always bow to 
whatever happens to go on in practice, given Lakatos' theory so far there appears little 
space for such a move. What is needed is a principled reason why a philosophy 
should sometimes be judged according to its fit with practice, whilst in other cases, it 
should be praised for condemning a practice. In other words, we need to have a closer 
look at those practices which are worth describing rationally, and those which should 
be rejected. 
The final criticism is that, contrary to Lakatos, particular philosophies are insufficient 
to define what is internal and rational in a practice, because general conceptions of 
rationality are also necessary. Lakatos claims that a philosophy should demonstrate 
that (most) of the existing practice is rational, or justified. Yet, this demand is 
undermined by the realisation that the terms `rational' and `justified' are vague 
enough to be, without further specification, of little use. 
`Rationality' may be taken as an instrumental term, such that it is sufficient to 
describe a rational action as one which is taken in accordance with aims and 
background beliefs and theory. In particular, an instrumental reading would not 
distinguish between proper or improper goals: a scientist who aimed at simply 
following a productive and stable career (Kuhn's `normal scientist'! ) could be 
perfectly rational. If we were to adopt such a notion of rationality, then a historical 
account which proceeded by charting a scientist's/ historian's reasons for acting could 
be deemed a `rational reconstruction'; as could a theory such as Kuhn's. 
12 Lakatos, `History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions', 36 
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Yet this way of looking at a practice is one which Lakatos wanted clearly to contrast 
with the philosophical standpoint, since it focuses on the apparently `external' 
elements of a practice. On the other hand, `acting rationally' may be considered a 
more demanding ascription, involving not just instrumental rationality, but the 
designation of proper goals or ends (for example, the goal of having one's beliefs 
properly justified by the evidence). Further, the choice will not be simply between 
one notion or the other, but will allow of an answer on a spectrum between extremes. 
Similarly, the notion of a `justified practice' is one which may be interpreted in a 
more or less demanding way. Rational reconstruction amounts to the demand that a 
practice be presented as `justified'; but we can ask: justified according to the 
practitioner's beliefs and theory, or according to the standards we hold to be correct? 
Here, too, a range of meanings of `justified' is conceivable: from the extreme of only 
using our standards to justify a practice; to the other of allowing any beliefs of the 
agent to be taken as providing justificatory basis, including those which may appear 
bizarre or which were produced as a result of a-rational experience, say, childhood 
events. In this case, there would be no basis for the clear divide between 
philosophical questioning of a subject and intellectual history which someone such as 
Lakatos would desire. 
It must be said that Lakatos was aware of the dependence of RR upon a particular 
conception of rationality' 3. The problem, however, is that the choice between general 
conceptions of rationality can not be justified in terms of RR. In addition, Lakatos' 
own general conception weakens the desired descriptive basis for philosophy. 
I would like to make space for a notion of positive descriptive adequacy by qualifying 
Lakatos' derivation of the internal/ external demarcation as resulting entirely from the 
philosophy `under test'. Lakatos' RR can make sense of the negative criterion that 
philosophies should not contradict those elements of a practice which are relevant 
(internal). But the insistence that the philosophy in question entirely determines both 
which elements are internal, and how these elements are to 
be rationally accounted 
13 See Lakatos, `Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', 
34, where he 
comments on Kuhn's 'poor theory of rationality' 
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for, is unmotivated. A methodology for a more comprehensively descriptive 
philosophy requires that we reject this insistence. 
I would suggest, instead, that the content of `internal' and `rational' is derived from 
three sources. Firstly, the meaning is partly dependent upon the philosophy in 
question, which brings to the study its own conception of what is essential to a 
practice. The examples provided in the previous section demonstrate that Lakatos is 
at least partially correct in highlighting this dependence. 
Secondly, the meaning is partly dependent upon wider conceptions of `rationality', 
which may be more instrumental, or more substantive. I will subsequently argue that 
a descriptive approach fits better with a more instrumental understanding. But note 
that no understanding of `rationality' is entirely without substance. Even the demand 
that one act in best accordance with one's own beliefs and desires is a substantive 
requirement, though it is much more permissive than other possible conceptions of 
rationality. 
Finally, the meaning can be partly derived from the practice itself. What is internal, 
and what is rational, can be regarded as immanent (the antonym of transcendental) 
features of the practice. If it is possible to defend this claim, we are able to make 
sense of the possibility of judging philosophies to the extent that they fail to account 
for internal features: the positive criterion of descriptive adequacy. 
The immanent sense of rationality may seem the most difficult to justify. In the next 
section I attempt to do just this, using the idea of Reflective Equilibrium (RE). 
Specifically, I aim to use RE to supplement RR in three ways. We need to know 
which practices should be rationally accountable; what descriptive development of 
philosophy amounts to; and how criticism should proceed from a descriptive 
approach. I shall begin with the question of how to identify `good practice'. 
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`Good practice': Reflective Equilibrium 
What sort of practice should be used as a descriptive basis for our subsequent 
philosophising? The question has some bite because (presumably) all would 
recognise that there exists bad practice, which should not be allowed to inform 
philosophy. Equivalently, we only want to pay heed to `good' or `best' practice. 
How are the terms within scare quotes to be fleshed out? We can approach the 
answer by first considering answers which lead nowhere good. Such answers are 
either empty, prejudiced, or tacitly normative. 
First, the empty approach. I hope that it won't be thought too unfair to illustrate this 
with reference to Martin's position in `The Past Within Us' (given that Martin's 
actual use of history as case study seems to follow roughly the approach I will 
subsequently recommend): 
`... it would be just as surprising if the ways in which explanations are actually defended in 
the best historical work are not fairly close to the ways in which they should be defended. 
The best historical work, after all, is done by the best historians. And the best historians are 
those who are most competent to write history. ' 14 
All well and good, but until we give some substance to `best' - or even give some 
practical idea how to find the `best' historical work or historians - the above statement 
is vacuous. To give this content we could plausibly turn in one of two directions. We 
could identify the `best' historians with the `elite' historians - those who have 
achieved a high standing within the discipline, have been widely read and cited, or 
can be said to match other similar sociological criteria. Lakatos' demarcation is 
(usually) founded on such considerations: `if a demarcation criterion [between science 
and non-science] is inconsistent with the `basic' appraisals of the scientific elite, it 
should be rejected' 15 
14 Martin, The Past Within Us, 28 
15 Lakatos, `History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions', 23. It should be noted that Lakatos 
goes on to disagree with this statement; 
but only to soften the idea by dispensing with a rigid 
understanding of `rejection'. The use of scientific elite opinions as 
'data' is retained. 
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This, then, is the second approach, the prejudiced approach. For the concern with this 
approach is obvious - why should we assume that the best history is done by the 
historians who have achieved high standing within the historical community? To use 
Feyerabend's colourful criticism of Lakatos: `all he can say in favour of these 
[methodological] rules is that the elite of some enterprise he loves sometimes sticks to 
the rules' 16. What is needed, it seems, is a justification of the identity claimed 
between `best' history and `most sociologically successful' history. 
Yet in providing such a justification, we reach the third answer - the tacitly 
normative. For, if we can provide reasons why we should pay heed to some historians 
and not others - where `reasons' means the following of certain good methodological 
practices - we thereby render a descriptive approach unnecessary. If we already 
know the standard by which to judge history as `good' or `bad', why not stick to 
traditional `a priori' philosophising, and dispense with the charade of deriving (in any 
sense) philosophy from description of practice? 
We need a way of demarcating between works which derives from features which can 
plausibly be seen to point to the `best' works, but which does not in so doing render 
the descriptive approach irrelevant. The method of reflective equilibrium meets this 
aim, since the key virtue of a practice is that it is `reflective'; a property referring to 
the derivation of the practice, which therefore does not pre judge the normative 
content of that practice. 
The notion of reflective equilibrium was introduced by Goodman17 but was more 
extensively exemplified in Rawls' work'8. Rawls' starting point for political theory 
is 
that of `widely accepted but weak' premises. The purpose of Rawls' well known `veil 
of ignorance' is as a means to extract ethical intuitions. (The `veil of ignorance' 
disallows knowledge of yourself and your natural abilities, your position in society, 
16 Paul Feyerabend, `On the Critique of Scientific Reason', in Method and Appraisal in the 
Physical 
Sciences, ed. Howson, 315. (The `sometimes' in this statement stems 
from the qualification pointed 
out in the previous footnote. ) 
17 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1983; 
originally 1954), 63-64 
18 John Rawls, A Theory' of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), 18-19,41-46 
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your sex, race, nationality, and individual tastes, in choosing a social ethics. ) These 
intuitions should be logically developed (in conjunction with background theory) to 
yield a significant set of principles; if this is impossible, `equally reasonable' premises 
should be selected to allow the principles to be derived. The principles, once 
developed, should then be tested against intuitive response. If we have no contrary 
intuitions, or if those intuitions are contradictory or confused, then the principles 
should be accepted as a good guide to the subject. However, where the intuitions do 
conflict, we have a more interesting situation: we must seek reflective equilibrium. 
In this case, Rawls' important realisation is that the situation we face is not simply 
that of a clash between basic intuition and developed theory. Rather, the aim is to 
arrive at a more considered intuition; an intuition tested through consideration of the 
competing principles, hence `reflective'. If our reflective intuition remains contrary 
to the theory, then intuition should prevail. However, if the intuition is, on reflection, 
found to be naive, then this is clearly an advance. (It should be added that it is ideal at 
this point to find reasons as to why we initially found the intuition powerful. ) Thus, 
under a methodology of `wide reflective equilibrium' we start with intuition (and 
background theory); but by the end point it is possible that any of intuition, norms, or 
background theory be revised. 
Diagrammatically: 
(i)Intuitions 
(iii)Principles Conflict with Make intuition Revise i, ii or iii 
(ii)Equally reasonable" 
-intuitions? 
reflective 
premises (background theory) 
The concept of reflective equilibrium provides an answer to the question of which 
historical works should be descriptively respected as a normative guide. Historical 
works should be subjected to reflection: such that the principles 
informing these 
works be taken as starting point, but maybe altered through reflective criticism' 
9. 
19 Whilst the demand to investigate only reflective intuition and practice provides a philosophical 
answer to the demand for a descriptive starting point, 
it must be admitted that as a complete practical 
solution, it falls some way short. After all, there are a 
lot of historical explanations to choose from - 
even `reflective' ones! In practice, 
I believe that we have to adopt something of the prejudiced 
approach, as I make clear in chapter two. 
However, there is still a difference between Lakatos' 
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I wish to stress two pertinent differences between Rawls' use of reflective equilibrium 
and the use to which I will seek to put it in providing a method for the philosophy of 
history (or, indeed, for the philosophy of science). First, isn't it the case that all 
historical works are already reflective, in a way that everyday moral intuitions are 
not? To some extent, this depends on what we mean by `being reflective'; and that is 
the topic of the following section. 
However, surely very little historical work, in contrast to ethical intuition, fails to 
meet the standards Rawls sets for initial intuition: that we should not include `those 
judgements made with hesitation, or in which we have little confidence. Similarly, 
those given when upset or frightened, or when we stand to gain one way or the other 
can be left aside'20. This is a difference deriving from the nature of the philosophical 
subject matter: in the earlier typology: type (3) or (2), rather than type (1). As a 
consideration of the suitability of RE, though, this consideration only seems to 
strengthen the belief that historical practice should guide philosophy. 
Second, what is the precise nature of the starting point to the process of reflective 
equilibrium? Should we take one starting point: a basic, broad agreement of historical 
intuitions? Or allow many starting points, and therefore potentially different paths to 
reflective equilibrium, which may be inconsistent with each other? In other words, 
will there be a reflective equilibrium? 
Whilst it is not feasible to take each individual historical explanation as a separate 
starting point, I do wish to allow that the direction taken by the process of reflective 
equilibrium can vary according to differences in historical practice. There may not be 
a single reflective equilibrium; a possibility which I believe a descriptive approach 
must at least allow. 
Gordon Graham also takes the method of reflective equilibrium to be central to his 
philosophical examination of historical explanation, yet adopts the 
idea that there 
should be a single starting point, and hence a single reflective equilibrium. 
Graham 
descriptive starting point and my own: I cannot investigate practice beyond the 'elite' 
due to lack of 
time and space; Lakatos would not investigate practice 
beyond the `elite' on principle. 
20 Ibid., 42 
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takes more literally Rawls' concern with `widely accepted but weak' starting 
premises. As a result, Graham works with a universal, yet very weak, notion of 
`historical explanation': simply that historical explanation of an `event or state of 
2 affairs is to give its history'1. 
Two convictions lead me to question an approach like Graham's. First, I am 
concerned that the subtleties of actual historical writing, the capturing of which 
provides one of the major motivations for initially adopting a descriptive approach, 
will be lost if we are to focus purely on `widely accepted but weak' intuitions. 
Second, interpreting `reflection' as immanent criticism raises the possibility (even, 
perhaps, the probability) that reflection will not lead to a single end point. I shall 
expand on this interpretation in the following section. We should be open to the 
empirical possibility that practice and intuition may not converge. Stich, for example, 
attempts just such an empirical demonstration 22. He argues that the notion of 
descriptive conceptual analysis which assumes `that our own case is typical and so 
23 [we] can generalise from it to others' is empirically false. 
What is it to be reflective? 
In defending a descriptive approach which relies on reflective equilibrium, it is 
important to know what `reflection' amounts to in this context. For Rawls' purposes, 
it is plausible that he simply demand that intuition should be `confronted' with wider 
theory. But for a more complex practice such as history, we need to say more. 
21 Gordon Graham, Historical Explanation Reconsidered (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1983), 43 
22 Stephen Stich, 'Non-nativity and Epistemic Intuitions', presented to the University of 
Sheffield 
Philosophy Department Seminar on 26/4/02. See also Stephen Stich and Jonathan 
M. Weinberg, 
`Jackson's Empirical Assumptions' in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 62 (3) (2001): 637- 
643 
23 Stich and Weinberg, 640 
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My short answer is that `reflective history' means `history criticised immanently'. 
The method of immanent criticism is to import very little to the position under 
criticism, using instead only the material already present. (I would use the more 
common phrase `internal criticism', were it not for the fact that this term has already 
been used in a different sense previously. ) Criticising a position in this manner is 
commonly thought of as a virtue: a more effective criticism of a position is one which 
demonstrates some inconsistency, a less effective criticism one which simply 
overrules the position according to some external standard. For example, to criticise a 
utilitarian theory of morality by attempting to demonstrate that the theory cannot 
deliver what it promises is more persuasive than simply confronting utilitarianism 
with an alternative moral theory. Plato's dialogues are a classic example of immanent 
criticism; but here I intend to use two different examples to better exemplify the 
notion. 
Hegel's dialectical method has been described by McCarney as a process of 
reflection: `The basic form of such thinking is reflection. ... Intellectual reflection 
bounces thought, as it were, off its object and back into the self 24 Hegel's 
philosophical criticism always begins from a concrete position, usually one which is 
intended to represent actual positions taken by past thinkers. This `reflective method' 
of philosophising about history is well exemplified by Hegel's criticism of historical 
method in his Philosophy of World History25. In this section Hegel considers six 
historical methodologies, the last of which, Philosophical History, he adopts as his 
own. Whether or not Hegel succeeds in implementing a method of immanent 
criticism, the attempt is instructive. The criticism of each position begins with a 
description, and challenges each according to the aims and background theory of that 
position. 
One example of these critiques concerns the type of history Hegel calls `reflective 
universal'. This mode of history appears in Hegel's account as a result of criticism of 
`original' history, exemplified in the writings of Herodotus and Thucydides. Hegel 
24 Joseph McCarney, Hegel on History (London: Routledge, 2000), 86 
25 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, trans. Leo 
Rauch 
(Hackett, 1995; originally 1840), 3-11 
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claims that `original' history was unduly limited to narration of events linked to the 
writer's own personal experience. Hegel's criticism of `reflective universal' history is 
that such universal history misses the particularity, vitality, of the events which it 
describes. It attempts to be universal, yet must `make do with summaries and 
abridgements' 26. `Reflective universal' history therefore fails to meet its own 
standards, and must be developed, as Hegel goes on to do. 
Laudan's philosophy of science demonstrates the method of immanent criticism in a 
more basic and straightforward way. One of Laudan's objections to Lakatos' 
Rational Reconstruction is that the idea of reconstructing a practice such that it is 
rational makes no sense without a knowledge of the aims and background beliefs of 
the practitioners. As we have seen, the weakest sense of `acting rationally' is the 
instrumental sense, where to act rationally is to act in accordance with one's aims and 
relevant beliefs. Stronger senses may add further requirements, but even with an 
instrumental understanding, knowledge of aims and background beliefs of a practice 
are necessary to be able to criticise that practice. 
Laudan's methodology amounts to a method of immanent criticism which takes 
seriously the practitioners' aims and background theories. Methodological rules are 
to be framed not categorically - `one ought to construct explanations of type x', but 
hypothetically - `if one's aim is y, then one ought to construct explanations of type x'. 
It has been my intention to delimit the types of practice which are of philosophical 
importance by equating `philosophical importance' to the property of `being 
reflective'. In the case of a complex practice such as history, I have argued that 
`reflection' can only mean immanent criticism; criticism using the relevant 
background of the practice itself. Of course, the nature of `immanent criticism', and 
`reflective development', cannot be entirely specified in advance of actually 
attempting the method in practice; but I hope the above examples 
have at least given a 
flavour of the sort of method which I envisage. 
26 Ibid., 7 
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As a final note on immanent criticism, I want to return to my original statement of the 
position; in particular, the claim that in immanent criticism we import `very little' to 
the position under criticism, relying primarily on elements already present. To see 
that any form of criticism must import something to the position being critiqued, 
consider two examples. An understanding of logical contradiction, and the 
presumption that any position which gives rise to self-contradiction should be 
modified, is perhaps the most basic assumption which must be made. Somewhat 
more demanding is the requirement that a practice be capable of being justified in 
some sense. As has been pointed out, even a weak notion of justification is to some 
extent substantive, and may therefore require the import of ideas foreign to the 
practice being criticised. 
The question of what should be used to criticise a practice is equivalent to the issue, 
previously raised, of what we are to use in order to understand `rationality' of 
practice. In answer to that question, I established the need for three different sources: 
philosophy-dependent, immanent, and general conceptions. The introduction of 
reflective equilibrium has allowed us to see how the immanent can be given priority, 
and can function effectively in the context of a descriptive philosophy. However, the 
bottom line is that the other sources are necessary; a purely immanent approach is not 
possible. How we are to precisely juggle these different sources cannot, of course, be 
precisely legislated. It is sufficient to follow the vague requirement that immanent 
development and criticism be preferred, where possible and where reasonable. 
We can now summarise the ways that RE can be used to answer the concerns over 
RR, raised in the previous section. In the process of reflective equilibrium our 
starting point is given: that of existing practice or intuition. There is, therefore, no 
place for the dubious notion of an unbiased description (Lakatos' `actual 
history'). 
The major requirement of RE is that philosophical development proceeds 
from 
existing practice or intuition; in the case of philosophy of 
history, this means existing 
historical practice, historical theory and the concerns which are already present 
in the 
work of the historians. This allows for the area of philosophical concern 
(the 
`internal') to be partly given by existing practice; and only partly 
by the particular 
philosophical approach adopted. It also means, as a matter of course, 
that the 
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development of the resulting philosophy is in accordance with a positive criterion of 
descriptive adequacy. 
Perhaps most importantly, RE provides an answer as to when practice should be used 
to guide philosophy, and when the reverse is true. Practice which is reflective should 
be rationally reconstructed, and used to test the philosophy. Being reflective means 
being subjected to internal criticism; therefore the proper place of criticism in a 
descriptive philosophy is also delineated27. Historical practice should be investigated 
according to its own aims and theoretical practice (which may differ between 
historians), and should be seen as `justified' to the extent that a coherent account can 
be given for the methods in use. There need be no demand that such practice conform 
to further standards not implicit in the practice itself. 
Conceptual analysis 
In this final section I want to connect the meta-methodology developed above with 
debate concerning the nature of philosophical analysis. Whilst at the start of the 
chapter I used the analytic approach of the positivists as the foil to my preferred 
`descriptive approach', analysis clearly has some place in any philosophy. In 
addition, the analysis of concepts used in a practice such as history is tightly related to 
assessment of the methodology of that practice. I will first argue for this latter claim 
by criticising Martin's argument to the contrary; I will then draw on a Wittgenstinian 
theory of philosophical analysis in order to complete the development of my own 
methodological position. 
27 In fact, Feyerabend suggests, a little cryptically, that he would 
be prepared to accept a theory of 
rational reconstruction modified in such a way: 
`these judgements [of the rationality of scientific 
, 
practice] may be retained if we adopt a 
different theory of rationality, for example Hegel's': 
Feyerabend, `On the Critique of Scientific Reason', 327 
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As I do, Martin wishes to develop and apply a descriptive approach to the philosophy 
of history. Yet, unlike me, Martin claims that it is possible to develop such a (meta-) 
methodology whilst agreeing with the positivist analysis of historical concepts. In 
particular, Martin accepts the positivist Deductive-Nomological (D-N) account of 
explanation in history, whilst stating that the acceptance of this analysis makes little 
difference to the kind of descriptive philosophy he (and I) favour28. (The important 
feature of the D-N analysis for the present discussion is that a D-N explanation 
provides a set of conditions sufficient for the occurrence of the event to be explained. ) 
Yet Martin's subsequent investigation belies this claim. The negative claim derived 
from Martin's application of a descriptive meta-methodology is that (contrary to the 
D-N model) historians do not attempt to provide sufficient conditions for the 
occurrence of a historical event: for all realise the practical impossibility of such a 
task. Martin's positive claim is that historians argue for explanations (primarily) by 
showing one explanation to provide a more nearly sufficient set of conditions than 
another29. 
Thus we could say that a historical methodology arrived at by Martin's descriptive 
approach would demand roughly that `historians should develop explanations which 
are comprised of a more complete sufficient set of conditions than are rival 
explanations of the same event'. The similarity to the D-N account is obvious; since 
the standard provided by the D-N account is retained, explanations are assessed to the 
extent that they reach the goal of providing a sufficient explanation. This close 
connection between historical method and analysis of historical concepts naturally 
follows from Martin's (non-descriptive) belief in the correctness of the D-N account 
as an analysis of `explanation', since any methodology of explanation must take 
account of what `explanation' really is. 
Thus Martin's a priori acceptance of one particular analysis of `explanation', the D-N 
analysis, has a major effect on the subsequent attempt to develop a descriptively 
adequate historical methodology. Martin's approach is 
insufficiently radical: we 
cannot afford to treat the process of analysis in a non-descriptive, a-historical manner, 
28 Martin, The Past Within Us, 127-128 
29 Ibid., 40 
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on pain of rendering the remaining descriptive philosophy inconsequential. If we 
were to follow Martin's approach, the descriptive basis of philosophy could tweak 
practical suggestions, but would be barred from the investigation of deeper and more 
fundamental norms. 
The `standard' method (by which I mean the `reductive analysis' exemplified in the 
work of Russell, Carnap, and Hempel) for analysing any given concept has been to list 
situations which intuitively satisfy the concept, and those which intuitively do not. A 
set of conditions is then formulated, which are individually necessary, and jointly 
sufficient for the application of the concept, such that the intuitive decisions are 
adhered to. The extent to which all intuitive examples should be so captured varies 
according to how disputed our intuitions are, and the premium which matching 
intuition is given compared to other analytical virtues such as simplicity and 
coherence. 
In relation to this characterisation, one feature suggested by my account of philosophy 
developed in this chapter would be to place a premium on matching intuition, even 
where that intuition is divergent. Another is that we should pay more attention to the 
development of conceptual analyses, such that they be tied to practical use, as in the 
process of reflective equilibrium. The `standard' model of analysis allows description 
to be relevant only in a negative sense: as a test which may or may not `falsify' the 
analysis. It is in a similar position, therefore, to Lakatos' RR; and I would repeat my 
injunction that development, as well as justification, should be descriptively based. 
My primary focus in what follows is, however, the following presupposition of the 
`standard' model: the denial that there can be multiple analyses of a single concept. 
The idea that the analysis of the concept should be carried out in accordance with the 
philosophical aims of the analyser, not necessarily equivalent to those of the 
language 
user/ practitioner, leads naturally to this opinion. 
As I suggested with regard to Graham's interpretation of reflective equilibrium, 
I 
think it likely that the analysis of a practice - and related, of a complex term 
featuring 
within that practice - will not find a single end point. 
`Historical explanation' will be 
the concept most central to this thesis. 
Given the variety of ways that terms such as 
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this are used, the restriction that there should only be one set of conditions which 
exhaustively apply looks dubious (though, to repeat, whether there is unity or plurality 
can only be discovered through descriptive examination, not a priori. ) 
A related point concerning analysis specifically should be mentioned at this point. 
Necessity and sufficiency should be seen as extremes in our analysis, rather than 
being the only criteria that can feature in the analysis of a concept. Craig makes this 
point in envisaging the possibility that belief is a `major component' in the analysis of 
knowledge, but not a necessary condition. Under the `standard' model, Craig 
complained that 
`the conceptual accountant ... can try to talk about it [belief], just so long as the audience is 
prepared to listen to such periphera, as of something which very often accompanies 
knowledge. But when he is asked for the real outcome of the business, the analysis, anything 
not strictly a necessary condition vanishes without trace. '3o 
I agree with Craig that such a restriction is implausible and unhelpful. 
Though I am content that a descriptive philosophy sanctions the possibility of 
multiplicity in conceptual analysis, there is a danger in this possibility. What is 
needed is a means of analysis which allows us to group multiple applications of, say, 
`explanation'; such that, though they are not covered by a single set of criteria, there 
is a more than `accidental' relationship which obtains between those applications. 
What we don't want are multiple applications to be linked simply, by, for example 
punning. Different senses of `explanation' must be analytically connected in a way 
that different senses of `party' (political party, birthday party, parties to a contract) are 
not. 
I believe the best model we have in the philosophical literature comes from 
Wittgenstein and his idea of `family resemblance'. The essence of the idea 
is that, for 
many complex concepts, there is no fixed set of criteria to capture the extension 
(application) of that concept. Instead, overlapping sets of criteria must 
be used. 
Diagrammatically: 
30 Edward Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), 14 
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abc 
4_ Applications 
AD BC AC 4- Features relevant to analysis 
Applications a, b and c all fall under the description of being examples of concept X. 
Yet the uses of the concept have no feature common to them all: there is therefore no 
essence to the concept. The uses are, however, similar; they share enough properties 
to be considered `of the same family'. 
Wittgenstein's core idea is simple, but has radical consequences. I take its chief 
advantage to be its ability to dispense with the need for a fixed set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions; yet, through the notion of similarity, its ability to show how 
different uses of the same concept can be linked in a tighter way than just punning. 
Wittgenstein describes the relation between different uses of the same term as 
exemplifying `a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: 
sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail'31. 
Concerns raised in the literature over the idea of family resemblance centre on 
specifying precisely how Wittgenstein's theory avoids the danger of collapsing into 
disjuntivism. In the terms of our simple example: why isn't the analysis of concept X 
simply the disjunctive `X = AB or BC or AC'? Whilst Pelczar32 and Bellaimey33 
differ somewhat in their answers, both agree that the key to understanding the nature 
of family resemblance must lie not only in an appreciation of similarity, but also in 
attending to the way in which the concepts are used. In particular, Pelczar argues that 
the distinctiveness of family resemblance concepts lies in the fact that the application 
of these concepts is semantically open. This means that discretion is permitted in 
applying family resemblance concept X, such that over time the application of X is 
widened to encompass different items. X's extension is widened by language users in 
ways not determined by the previous use of the concept to other situations which are 
deemed similar in a respect relevant to previous uses. 
31 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), section 66 
32 Michael Pelczar, `Wittgenstinian Semantics' in Nous 34 (4) (2000): 483-516 
33 James E. Bellaimey, 'Family Resemblances and the Problem of the Under-determination of 
Extension' in Philosophical Investigations 13 (J) (1990): 31-43 
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Family resemblance allows us to understand a conceptual analysis which leads to 
related but non-identical final analyses. It allows multiplicity of analysis without that 
thereby implying simple disjunction. The way that this is achieved relies on similariti, 
of application and use of concept; the latter notion provides a strong link with my 
previous remarks concerning the development of a methodology using reflective 
equilibrium. To repeat: philosophy as (deep) methodology, and philosophy as 
conceptual analysis, are two sides of the same coin; we should expect similar 
considerations to apply to each. 
Practical Conclusions 
I wish to draw together the issues discussed in this chapter by summarising the 
practical consequences for the subsequent study, and for philosophy of history in 
general, in terms of four broad points. 
The initial intuition was that philosophies of history should be judged according to 
two criteria. The positive is that pervasive and philosophically important (`internal') 
features of a practice should be accounted for, by investigating the rationality of those 
features. The negative is that where the philosophy conflicts with existing good 
practice, it should be revised. Each of these contributes to making precise the demand 
that a philosophy `fit' with historical practice. In this thesis, these criteria will be 
used in order to discern the nature of explanatory exclusion (chapter four), explananda 
(chapter five), explanatory theory (chapter six), and historical importance (chapter 
seven). It is vital to use rich, full examples of historical practice, so as not to miss out 
interesting or pervasive features. 
Secondly, we have learnt from Lakatos' division between internal and external 
elements of a practice that not all aspects of historical practice need be 
philosophically accounted for. Where the divide 
is placed is, in part, dependent upon 
the philosophy used. However, I argued that what 
is treated as `internal' cannot be 
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entirely theory dependent; indeed, the positive criterion conflicts with such a notion of 
extreme theory dependence, as we have seen. What is internal is partly given by the 
pre-existing concerns of the practioners': their theories, problems and questions may 
guide philosophical interest. Indeed, in a thorough-going descriptive approach, it may 
be argued that the latter meaning of `internal' should be given precedence over the 
former. 
Thirdly, I have argued for the importance of only considering reflective practice; in 
other words, that practice which has been subjected to immanent or internal criticism. 
This is how `good practice' is to be understood. In addition, we can see that criticism 
of practice should begin from a position which tolerates the underpinning 
methodology: a case of `innocent until proved guilty'. Subsequent criticism should 
import as little to the position being criticised as is reasonable. 
Finally, I have pointed out that the fate of methodologies of history and of analyses of 
concepts used in historical writing are inter-twined. Analysis, like the development 
of a methodology for history, must proceed from descriptive and pluralist 
assumptions. Indeed, the subject matter of this thesis can be put in two ways: as an 
investigation into the practice of explanatory improvement and competition in 
historical writing, or as the analysis of the concept of `explanatory competition 
between historical explanations'. 
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Chapter Two: Histories of the French Revolution 
To supplement the meta-philosophical investigation carried out in chapter one, I shall 
in this section consider more practical questions. How were the historical works for 
the case study selected? What exactly will I be looking for in these works, and what 
role will they play? After answering these questions, the bulk of this chapter consists 
of an overview of the historical explanations selected. It is unlikely that the reader 
will have much, if any, knowledge of the historical works in question; some basic 
introduction to each is essential in order to fully understand the uses to which they 
will be put. 
Selection and role of case studies 
My overall task is to examine relations of competition between different historical 
explanations. It clearly makes sense to choose explanations which have similar 
targets; for it is such explanations that, in practice, we are eager to compare and rank. 
The origins of the French Revolution was selected as such a topic for two reasons. 
Firstly, as one of the most discussed questions in the history of historical writing, an 
enormous range of historical approaches, theoretical positions and modes of 
explanation can be found in the literature. In no other historical field is the question 
`how should we compare all these proffered explanations? ' as obvious, or as pressing. 
Secondly, there is the simple reason that I already had an acquaintance with the topic 
from my time as a history student. 
So how were the particular histories of the French Revolution selected? 
I tackled this 
question philosophically in chapter one, though I also noted there that no selection can 
be defended entirely objectively. I do not attempt a statistical stud}, of a wide range 
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of histories; for it is my belief that the importance of the explanations is frequently in 
their details. Instead I have selected only eight explanations; a number which can 
hardly be claimed to be fully representative of the thousands of books and articles 
which have been published in the two-hundred-plus years since the Revolution. 
Inevitably my selection in part reflects my interests, which books I have been 
introduced to, which happen to have caught my attention, and so forth. 
Excuses notwithstanding, I have attempted to follow two flexible criteria in the 
selection of historical explanations. The first is that the works selected should be well 
respected by the contemporary writers' historical peers, or by subsequent historians, 
as appropriate. In general, all the works have had a broad influence on historical 
scholarship. The reason for this restriction is to ensure that my conclusions 
themselves have the broadest possible interest and pertinence. 
The second criterion is that the explanations be, to some extent, representative of the 
array of approaches to the French Revolution adopted by historians. Thus, I have 
included approaches which emphasise the social, political, geo-political, intellectual 
and cultural strands of French Revolutionary origins. I have included writers who 
emphasise the deep causes of the Revolution, and others who attack the idea that the 
Revolution has such structural underpinnings. The approaches range from the (social) 
scientific to those which disavow any kind of scientific search for causes or laws. My 
hope is that, for any influential approach to the origins of the French Revolution 
which has been adopted, there is an explanation considered here which is a not too 
distant relation. 
One criterion I have not tried to consciously employ is that the explanations given 
well exemplify the philosophical points I wish to make. It is clear that I could have 
found works which better demonstrated, say, the use of contrast (chapter five), or 
counterfactuals (chapters eight and nine). But that would have been to mistake the 
purpose of this exercise purely as one of exemplification; a restriction which runs 
counter to my methodological motivation (and my argument of chapter one). I 
endeavoured to select works without first ascertaining whether their theoretical 
background fitted neatly with my own. Instead, where clear exemplification is 
needed, I have not hesitated to turn to examples outside my eight case studies. 
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One final point: the topic of my case-studies are explanations; not historians, nor 
books. (Although, of course, you can't find historical explanations without historians 
to think of them. ) For this reason, I make no attempt to deal with the entirety of a 
particular historical work; I focus only on what is relevant to interpret the particular 
explanation. 
The aim of the following descriptions is simply to introduce the historical works to 
the reader. The way they are described in this chapter may, therefore, not be 
equivalent to the more considered and detailed treatment of those explanations in the 
remainder of the thesis. In this chapter, terms such as law, cause, target, contrast, 
counterfactual, intention, important will be used purely heuristically, and without 
further analysis. In later chapters the roles will be, at times, reversed: an appreciation 
of historical practice will be used to shape understanding of the above concepts. 
With this in mind, it is natural to focus on the following three features of each 
explanation, which initially seem of particular relevance in understanding explanatory 
competition: 
" What the historian attempts to explain: the explanandum 
" What does the explaining: the explanans 
" The theory (explicit to varying degrees) at work behind the given explanation; 
what kind of explanation it is, and (if possible) why an explanation of that 
kind is 
given 
The terms explanans and explanandum were first 
introduced by Hempel. Whilst it 
could be argued that a strict application of these terms should 
be restricted to an 
inferential ('explanation as argument') theory of the sort provided 
by Hempel, I shall 
use the terms more generally to refer 
(respectively) to those things (whatever they are) 
which do the explaining, and that thing 
(whatever it is) it'hich is explained' 
da, 
1A complication arises 
from the fact that whilst the pthe same 
term 
nfor 
singular 
and 
plural. 
ýere is no 
satisfactory plural of explanans; 
I shall therefore 
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Georges Lefebvre 
Lefebvre was well known as a historian of the details; the author of a number of 
regional micro-studies, a patient collector of primary source material, a hard working 
student of the archives. Yet the most distinctive aspect of his explanation is its 
overarching simplicity. The core of Lefebvre's explanation of the French Revolution 
is the application of a Marxist law of history: that legal and political power follow 
economic power. 
`These groups [the nobility and clergy] preserved the highest rank in the legal structure of the 
country, but in reality economic power, personal abilities and confidence in the future had 
passed largely to the bourgeoisie. Such a discrepancy never lasts forever. The Revolution of 
1789 restored the harmony between fact and law. '2 
Lefebvre's belief in the primacy of economic-social conditions is indicated not only 
by his application of the Marxist law, but in his choice of wording. The legal 
structure is a fiction compared to the `reality' of economic power. The Marxist idea 
that intellectual changes are epiphenomena is readily assented to: `[The bourgeoisie] 
had developed a new ideology which the "philosophers" and "economists" of the time 
'3 had simply put into definite form. 
This explanation provides, for Lefebvre, the `ultimate cause' of the French 
Revolution. Yet an explanation must do more: `this deeper cause of the French 
Revolution does not explain all its distinctive features'4. To make sense of 
`distinctive', Lefebvre uses contrasting events: political revolutions in England, and 
nineteenth century `transformations' on the continent. The differences between the 
French Revolution and these contrasts provide the two main `distinctive features': that 
the Revolution was violent, and that it took the form of a liberation of `the people' 
(the Third Estate) by the people. The cause of these features is as simply and clearly 
put as the fundamental cause: it is `the collapse of the central power', in the 
form of 
2 Georges Lefebvre, The Coming of the French Revolution, trans. R. R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1947), 2 
3 Ibid., 2 
4 Ibid., 2 
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the King's convocation of the Estates-General (an ancient, supposedly representative, 
body divided according to the three orders: clergy, nobility, and commoners). 
It is a minor mystery of Lefebvre's work that although the key features of the 
explanation are given succinctly in the first three pages, the remainder of the book 
appears to follow a very different course. The work adopts a loose narrative structure; 
tracing the four acts of revolution, each organised around a particular social class - 
the aristocracy, bourgeoisie, working class, and peasantry. There is clear continuity in 
Lefebvre's belief in the primacy of the socio-economic. Yet the introduction and 
main body can be seen as misaligned; Eisenstein complained that whilst the narrative 
encourages the belief that all classes had a role to play in bringing about revolution, 
only the bourgeois' actions are mentioned as part of the `ultimate cause'5. Further, 
this ultimate cause is not subsequently defended; indeed, it is barely mentioned 
outside the introduction. There is a suspicion that Lefebvre's Marxist explanation 
hovers, unsupported, over the detail of the text. 
The explanatory style of Lefebvre's narrative is quite standard. It consists of - the 
introduction notwithstanding -a careful examination of motives, punctuated by 
`cross-sectional' analyses of the revolutionary `actors': the socio-economic groups. 
Lefebvre's narrative, as with all narratives, can be seen as a detailed explanation in its 
own right. As such, it would be impossible to attempt to summarise the whole here; 
more productive is to focus on Lefebvre's narrative at one key point (as defined 
above) in the narrative: the bourgeois revolution. Lefebvre's thesis is that the 
bourgeois found their path (in particular, towards social privilege) blocked by the 
nobility. This prompted the abandonment of the idea of distinction by birth, and the 
promotion of freedom of science and commerce. 
Concerns have been raised over Lefebvre's concept of `bourgeoisie' as it features in 
this explanation. Lefebvre is pulled between the recognition of the complicated and 
diverse nature of what he called the eighteenth-century bourgeois, and the explanatory 
need to provide a social group unified in circumstance and attitude. 
It is a tension 
5 Elizabeth Eisenstein, `Who Intervened in 1788? A 
Commentary on "The Coming of the French 
Revolution"' in American Historical Review 71(1) 
(1965): 77-103 
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exploited by many subsequent historians critical of Lefebvre; Cobban (another of the 
eight historians considered here) included. Bearing in mind the explanation given, the 
essential features of the bourgeoisie can be supposed to be their aspiration to nobility, 
economic behaviour, and belief in enlightenment ideals such as freedom of science 
and commerce. Yet the applicability of precisely these features has been strongly 
criticised, both by pointing out the differences within the `bourgeois' in these 
respects, and by arguing that these respects are insufficient to distinguish between 
elite `bourgeois' and elite nobility. Further, much of the criticism can be (and was) 
made using Lefebvre's own data and observations! 
Lefebvre's work cemented an orthodoxy concerning the origins of the French 
Revolution which lasted perhaps twenty years (until the 1960s) -a long time in such 
an active field of historical scholarship. By emphasising four different aspects of 
revolutionary origins, Lefebvre made his writing amenable to a wide range of 
historians. In the preface to The Coming of the French Revolution, R. R. Palmer 
claims that `[Lefebvre's] writings have been as little subject to controversy as any on 
the French Revolution can be, and have been generally praised by all schools of 
thought on the subject'6. Lefebvre's position as a distinguished Chair of French 
Revolution Studies, and as editor of Annales historiques de la Revolution Francais for 
30 years gave him a personal influence over wider scholarship. Yet despite 
complaints such as that `it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the orthodox theory 
of the Revolution has now assumed some of the characteristics of a religious belief' , 
Lefebvre cannot be accused of instituting such a closed paradigm. Even his 
opponents (including Cobban) praise him for including in his historical studies an 
extremely broad range of facts which might be considered relevant, whether or not 
these facts confirmed his overall theories. 
6 Lefebvre, vi 
7 Alfred Cobban, The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964), 10-11 
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Alfred Cobban 
Cobban was one of three prominent historians in the 1950s-60s to first reject the 
orthodox Marxist approach best exemplified by Lefebvre's writing (the others being 
Richard Cobb and George Taylor). Their criticism was to come to convince the vast 
majority of French Revolution historians. However, the reaction to Cobban's own 
explanation has been less favourable. It is an explanation as thoroughly based on 
social categories as is Lefebvre's: whilst the Revolution is `essentially' a political 
event, `behind the political regime there is always the social structure, which is in a 
sense more fundamental and is certainly much more difficult to change. '8. Indeed, 
Lefebvre's social categories are used by Cobban, though Cobban is critical of 
Lefebvre's understanding of these categories, and is happy to alter the meaning of the 
terms. 
Cobban's work is `an interpretation'. By this he means that he wishes to answer a 
`series of specific historical problems, and ask such questions as: what are the facts of the so- 
called bourgeois revolution, and in particular who were the bourgeois? What was the 
feudalism which they are supposed to have overthrown? How was the bourgeois revolution 
related to the revolt of the peasantry? This raises the problem of the relationship of town and 
country. Again, what part was played in the revolutionary situation by the lower social 
elements? This broadly raises the problem of the relation of rich and poor. '9 
Cobban sees his task as primarily one of a critical description. In particular: the 
description of the nature of social divisions (especially an examination of 
`bourgeoisie'), description of the rural economic system (`feudalism'), description of 
motivations in inciting revolution (for - or against - capitalism), description of the 
economic effects of the Revolution. In short, Cobban aims to say what the Revolution 
was, not primarily why it came about (though, in chapter six, I shall argue that such a 
distinction is not as significant as it may at first appear to be). 
81bid., 162 
9lbid., 24 
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Cobban's theoretical aim, re-iterated at a number of points, is to provide an 
empirically based interpretation which escapes `the rigid patterns of system-makers 
who have deduced their history from their theories' 10. His dislike of Lefebvre's (and 
others') Marxist approach derives from their reliance on a theory which Cobban 
perceives as self-confirming, reductivist, and distorting of the historical facts. The 
charge of self-confirmation is most interesting, and is applicable both to the facts 
themselves, and to the importance given to those facts: 
`The sociological historian uses his theory as the criterion for the selection of the relevant 
historical facts, and then on the basis of those selected facts he illustrates and confirms the 
theory by which they have been selected. Part of the fascination of general sociological 
theories is that success is built-in. '" 
`There is also another way in which sociological laws are self-confirming: by taking one 
factor in history as basic, all the others can be reduced to conditions in which it operates. 
Thus if different responses occur in economically identical circumstances, the primacy of the 
economic factor is maintained by making the factors which produce the aberration into 
conditions, on which the economic factor acts as a prime cause. ''' 
Clearly, in his own explanation Cobban cannot do without relying on the notions of 
cause, significance, and types, which he recognises in his chapter one. However, 
Cobban's ideal theory would involve a reliance on concepts which are multi- 
dimensional. He would seek to deny the existence of wider historical laws; and 
would search for a more pluralistic understanding of the strands making up the origins 
of the French Revolution. 
Cobban's explanation reverses the Marxist, orthodox position: `the revolution was to 
an important extent against and not for the rising forces of capitalism. 
' 13 Likewise, 
`the revolution was a triumph for the conservative, propertied, 
land-owning classes, 
10 Ibid., 168 
" Ibid., 13 
12 Ibid., 13 
13 Ibid., 168 
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large and small. ' 14 The Revolution can only be seen as a bourgeois revolution if the 
bourgeois in question are conservatives: landowners, rentiers (those who made a 
living from investments such as crown bonds), and officials. However, a Marxist idea 
of bourgeoisie implies that they are the capitalists, financiers and entrepreneurs. 
Cobban also introduces a conflict between town (industry) and country (land 
ownership); a conflict which Lefebvre has noticed, but which Cobban thinks `more 
fundamental than he [Lefebvre] allows ... ' 
15 
Although Cobban makes it clear that he does not want to reduce his interpretation of 
the coming of the French Revolution to a single law, it is capable of summary. 
Cobban's fundamental idea is capable of being couched in social-economic Marxist 
terminology, yet reverses Marxist belief. The Revolution was fundamentally the 
work of those interested in attempting to maintain the status quo in a changing 
political and economic world: the work of land owners, conservatives, and those with 
a vested interest in preventing capitalism. 
Jules Michelet 
Michelet and Hegel (the following case study) are rather further from the historical 
mainstream than Lefebvre and Cobban. Michelet writes in an unashamedly personal 
style, and for unashamedly contemporary reasons: primarily, that he wanted to keep 
the glorious memory of the Revolution (that between 1789 and 1792) alive, in order 
to inspire new revolutionaries (such as those of the abortive 1848 revolution). He 
is 
perhaps better regarded as a literary figure than he is as an 
historian, his book being 
seen by the late nineteenth century as the work of 
`the poet historian' 16. Yet Michelet, 
for all his stylistic peculiarities, has had a genuine 
influence on French Revolutionary 
'4Ibid., 170 
15 Ibid., 167 
16 John Hooper, `Changing Perceptions of Jules 
Michelet as Historian: History Between Literature and 
Science, 1831-1874' in Journal of European 
Studies 23(3) (1993), 295 
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historiography since his book's publication in 1853. The origins of the French 
Revolution are considered at the start of a dramatic and emotive narrative of the 
French Revolution, itself a part of a wider history of France. 
Whilst Michelet's narrative is clearly intended to provide an understanding of the 
origins of the Revolution, Michelet's focus at the start of his work is on a question 
which can appear to the modern reader somewhat tangential: 
`Is the Law, such as it appeared in the Revolution, conformable, or contrary to the religious 
law which preceded it? In other words, is the Revolution Christian or Anti-Christian? This 
question, historically, logically, precedes every other. '17 
The dialectic between Christian ideas and Revolutionary ideas is important to 
Michelet not only because he wonders whether they might be (or might have been) 
reconciled. It is also important because it shapes his whole understanding of \vhat the 
Revolution was and why it came about. During the reign of Louis XIV the people of 
France lived under the idea of a paternal monarchy: that the King was also the father 
who would look after his nation. There was no justice, as there was no law: but there 
was love. This reign of love was the Christian era; since the fundamental Christian 
principle is the victory of love, or grace, over the law. 
For two reasons, this `rule of grace' became unstable. Firstly, the government was 
inefficient - due primarily to evil intendants (regional governors); here, as elsewhere, 
Michelet has no qualms about making sweeping moral judgements. This made the 
Revolution inevitable as early as 1709. Secondly, the `rule of grace' was only as 
good as the particular father-king; and, in the case of Louis XV this meant that it was 
not good at all. The reaction to these problems was firstly, and fundamentally, 
intellectual: consisting of the work of Montesquieu, Voltaire and Rousseau. `When 
these two men [Voltaire and Rousseau] have passed, the Revolution is accomplished 
in the intellectual world. "8 
17 Jules Michelet, Historly of the French Revolution, trans. Charles Cocks, ed. Gordon Wright (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1967; originally 1853), 17 
18 Ibid., 63 
46 
Hence Michelet's insistence that the essence of the Revolution is the rise of reason 
and justice, explicitly against the Christian principles of grace and love: `The 
Revolution is nothing but the tardy reaction of justice against the government of 
favour and the religion of grace. ' 19 Given Michelet's narrative, the answer to his 
fundamental question of whether the Revolution is Christian or anti-Christian is not 
surprising: despite their similarity, fundamentally the two are opposed: 
`The Revolution continues Christianity, and it contradicts it. It is, at the same time, its heir 
and its adversary. In sentiment, and in all that is general and human between them, the two 
principles agree, but in all that constitutes very and special life ... they are adverse and thwart 
each other. 920 
With regard to Michelet's explanation, there is one further striking feature - his 
emphasis on unity. As Hayden White explains21, the guiding force of Michelet's 
narrative is the struggle for unity -a typically Romantic desire. In describing the 
elections to the Estates General in early 1789, Michelet says that `when, for the first 
time, in the course of ages, these words were heard: All shall assemble to elect, all 
shall send in their complaints, there was an immense, profound commotion, like an 
earthquake'22. Later, he remarks of the elections that `A movement so vast, so vaned, 
so wholly unprepared, and yet so unanimous, is most wonderful! All took part in it, 
and (except an insignificant number) they all desired the same thing. '23 
Of course, this was not even remotely true in any strict sense - the electors numbered 
five million in a population of around 28 million. But in emphasising unity, in 
believing in it as an ideal, and even in claiming its teleological inevitability, Michelet 
repeated the revolutionary doctrine itself. 
191bid., 27 
20 Ibid., 22 
21 Hayden White, Metahistory: the Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore, 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 150-152 
22 Michelet, 83 
23 Ibid., 87 
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Georg Hegel 
Although it might seem odd to regard Hegel as a `proper' historian, there really is no 
more reason to exclude Hegel than there is, say, Michelet (as Hayden White has 
argued in Metahistory24). In particular, both wrote intellectual history, both used 
abstract terminology, and some degree of teleological support is provided in both 
accounts. One difference, however, is Hegel's formidable theoretical backing for his 
history, of a different magnitude to that of the other historians considered here. I will 
give a brief account of the relevant parts of Hegel's theory, before reconstructing the 
explanation he provides for the French Revolution. It is worth noting that my purpose 
is to use Hegel's philosophy to understand better his history; whereas it is more usual 
in the philosophical literature to use Hegel's history to better understand his 
philosophy. I should also note that I follow here Hegel's treatment in The Philosophy 
of History, rather than the slightly different account presented in the Phenomenology 
of Spirit. 
Hegel's `Philosophical history' is based on the presupposition that `Reason rules the 
world, and that world history has therefore been rational in its course. '25 Yet, Hegel 
does not want to proceed using a priori ideas, but empirically: he states that the idea 
of history's rationality is not only presupposition, but also the outcome of the study of 
history26. Aren't these two positions - the idea that we should adopt the 
presupposition that history is rational and the desire to proceed empirically - 
inconsistent? A possible solution is to be found in Hegel's quite modem recognition 
that no historian can examine the past without some `categories'; that there can be no 
`purely empirical' history. Since categories must be involved, whether consciously 
adopted or not, Hegel self-consciously uses the category of reason through which to 
24 White, Metahistory, 427-428 
25 Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 12 
26lbid., 13 
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examine history: `To him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rational 
in return. '27 
This interpretation is supported by an interesting passage from Hegel's The 
Philosophy of Right: 
`An event, or a situation which has arisen, is a concrete external actuality which accordingly 
has an indeterminable number of attendant circumstances. Every individual moment which is 
shown to have been a condition, ground, or cause of some such circumstance and has thereby 
contributed its share to it may be regarded as being wholly, or at least partly, responsible for 
it. In the case of a complex event (such as the French Revolution), the formal understanding 
can therefore choose which of a countless number of circumstances it wishes to make 
responsible for the event. '28 
The position Hegel describes should be seen as similar to Mill's view of causation: 
that there are limitless conditions for any actual event, between which some selection 
must be made. Hegel in fact goes on to criticise the above conception of selection as 
arbitrary choice; some principle of selection must be adopted, and Hegel believes his 
to be well founded. The first element of Hegelian theory which requires emphasis is, 
therefore, the assertion that a philosophically principled standard is required in order 
to select between conditions. 
Over and above this principle, Hegel emphasises the importance of rationality in 
historical explanation. Roughly, an explanation should consist in demonstrating that 
the event rationally had to happen. More precisely, a historical explanation of a 
particular event x (where x is an individual or social action) properly consists of 
showing that a type of event X (of which x is one example) rationally had to happen. 
This view has two important consequences. First, explanation, or at least the best 
explanations, are for Hegel conceptual, not causal. Causal explanations are too 
contingent: only conceptual explanations provide the degree of `satisfaction' required. 
Second, the target of a Hegelian explanation will be a broad type of event, not, for 
example, the French Revolution in all its particularity. The type of event is, for 
Hegel, almost always a certain sort of change in conceptions of freedom. 
27 Ibid., 14 
28 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. Allen 
Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; originally 1820), Section 115 
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Hegel believes that the true subject of world-history is the development of the spirit of 
the age: the Hegelian `Spirit'. This means the development of freedom; since Hegel 
claims that 
`Just as the essence of matter is gravity, so the essence of Spirit is its freedom. Everyone will 
immediately agree that Spirit is endowed with freedom, among other characteristics. 
Philosophy, however, teaches us that all the characteristics of Spirit subsist only by means of 
freedom ... '29 
Hegel's history therefore essentially consists of the changing ideas of freedom, of 
which the idea of freedom underlying the French Revolution comes near the end of 
the story. History's true movement and progress can be gauged on these 
developments alone. World events are explained as resulting from new ideas of 
freedom, and the contradictions in those ideas explain (dialectically) the practical 
working-out of those events: 
`It has been said, that the French Revolution resulted from Philosophy, and it is not without 
reason that Philosophy has been called "Weltweisheit" [World Wisdom] for it is not only 
Truth in and for itself ... but also Truth in its living form as exhibited in the affairs of the 
world. '30 
Hegel's explanation of the origins of the French Revolution and his explanation of its 
demise thus stem from the same source: the idea of freedom which motivated the 
Revolution. This ability to explain both rise and fall should be contrasted with, for 
example, Michelet's account; which struggles to explain the failure of revolution. 
The idea of freedom which lies behind the French Revolution originates in 
Enlightenment philosophy - in particular, in the work of Kant and of Rousseau. It is 
an idea which is purely universal; meaning a-historical and unrestricted: 
`According to it [Kantian philosophy] the simple unity of Self-consciousness, the ego, 
constitutes the absolutely independent Freedom ... Rationality of Will is none other than the 
29 Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 20 
30 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1956; originally 1840), 446 
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maintaining of one's self in pure Freedom - willing this and this alone - Right purely for the 
sake of Right, Duty purely for the sake of Duty. 01 
Immediately following, Hegel raises a contrastive question: `Among the Germans this 
view assumed no other form than that of tranquil theory; but the French wished to 
give it practical effect. ... why 
did the French alone, and not the Germans, set about 
realizing it? ' (Hegel considers the response that `the French are hot-headed', 
fortunately regarding this solution as `superficial'. ) The answer is that Germany had 
been through the Reformation, whereas France had not: 
`In Germany the entire compass of secular relations had already undergone a change for the 
better; those pernicious ecclesiastical institutes of celibacy, voluntary pauperism, and laziness, 
had already been done away with; there was no dead weight of enormous wealth attached to 
the Church, and no constraint put upon Morality -a constraint which is the source and 
occasion of vices; there was not that unspeakably hurtful form of iniquity which arises from 
the interference of spiritual power with secular law, nor that other of the Divine Right of 
Kings ... The principle of Thought, therefore, 
had been so far conciliated already"' 
Thus, in France, `The new Spirit began to agitate men's minds: oppression drove men 
to investigation. '33 Hegel is also concerned to ask why the Revolution was initiated 
by `the people', why the revolution came `from below'34. The reasons that the 
government did not undertake the change demanded were that (i) the Court, Clergy, 
Nobility and Parliaments (surely Hegel meant, parlements: the French law courts 
staffed primarily by nobility) were unwilling to surrender their privileges; (ii) that the 
government could not reconstruct the State on the basis of individual wills; and (iii) 
that as a Catholic state, adherence to religious ideals in France had to take priority. 
Social revolution was therefore inevitable. 
31 Ibid., 443 
32 Ibid., 444-445 
33 Ibid., 446 
34 Ibid., 446-447 
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Francois Furet 
It would not be too great an exaggeration to claim that Furet is the most influential 
contemporary historian of the French Revolution. His interpretations of the Jacobin 
regime (1793-late 1790s) and the role of the Terror are at the centre of his writing, yet 
he also inquires into the origins of the Revolution. In Interpreting the French 
Revolution Furet uses a reading of Alex de Tocqueville and Augustin Cochin to shape 
his own interpretation. Whilst Tocqueville emphasised the (primarily) economic 
continuity between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary France, Cochin 
emphasised the political and cultural discontinuity. 
Furet's explananda are given according to a series of questions. Like Tocqueville, 
Furet sees a great deal of continuity before and after the Revolution; yet, given this 
fact, he asks why a revolution was `required' at all: 
`... between the origins and the end result ... there is a blank page that Tocqueville never 
filled.... why did the process of continuity between the old regime and the new involve a 
revolution? '35 
Turning the Marxist interpretation upside-down, Furet believes the Revolution to have 
had a negligible socio-economic effect; `neither capitalism nor the bourgeoisie needed 
revolutions to appear in and dominate the history of the major European nations in the 
nineteenth century'. Why was France then `the country that, through the Revolution, 
invented democratic culture, and revealed to the world one of the basic forms of 
historical consciousness of action' 36? 
A few pages later, Furet questions why the Revolution `erupted with such torrential 
violence'37, and why the French adopted cultural assumptions `which precluded for 
example ... the English 
idea of representation'38. Furet understands the Revolution as 
35 Francois Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. Elborg Forster (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981; originally 1978), 23 
36 Both quotes: Ibid., 24 
37 Ibid., 28 
38 Ibid., 36 
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independent of socio-economic forces; it was an abnormal, even unnatural, event. We 
need an explanation as to why only France went through this profound, violent 
change. 
It is clear that Furet's belief in the inadequacy of the Marxist theory (in particular, its 
idea of the French Revolution as a normal, predictable phase in human history) affects 
his theoretical approach in general. His criticism of the notion that the Revolution 
was inevitable leads to a suspicion of causal analysis in general: 
`A phenomenon like the French Revolution cannot be reduced to a simple cause-and-effect 
schema. The mere fact that the Revolution had causes does not mean that they are all there is 
to its history. '39 
This interesting theoretical claim has a direct bearing on my interpretation of the case 
study explanations, and for this reason I shall comment in detail on Furet's theoretical 
convictions in chapter six. An important component of Furet's views on this topic is 
that pre-Revolutionary causes are insufficient to explain the development of the 
Revolution; only the earlier history of the Revolution itself suffices. This is suggested 
by such comments as that 
`One could, for instance, explain the revolt of most of the deputies to the Estates General by 
the political crisis in the Ancien Regime; but the situation created in its wake by the vacancy 
of power and the ensuing insurrection added a totally unprecedented dimension to that crisis, 
with consequences that no one could have foreseen two months earlier. AO 
Furet does, in fact, provide a conventional causal explanation, though it emphasises 
the unpredictability of the event: 
`the `revolution' was born of the convergence of very different series of events, since an 
economic crisis, a complex phenomenon in itself, involving agricultural, `industrial', 
meteorological and social factors) took its place alongside the political crisis that had begun 
in 1787. This convergence of several heterogeneous series, surely a fortuitous situation, was 
39 Ibid., 22 
40 Ibid., 22 
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to be transformed as early as the spring of 1789 by a retrospective illusion in which it was 
seen as the inevitable consequence of bad government. '4' 
Yet these causal claims are only one element of Furet's explanation. Much of Furet's 
thinking on the origins of the French Revolution is shaped by his understanding of the 
Revolution as mediating between the two concepts of `state' and `society'. Thus, `In 
the dialogue between societies and their States that is part of the underlying texture of 
history, the Revolution tipped the scales against the State and in favour of society. '42 
The answer to the question posed above concerning France's inability to adopt the 
English model, or some other peaceful resolution, is in terms of state and society. In 
brief: Louis XIV (King of France from 1643-1715) had closed pre-existing avenues 
which allowed society to be represented to state. Those bodies which did 
subsequently claim powers of representation - particularly the parlements - were too 
conservative to win the support of educated society in general. So the French turned 
to the philosophes and men of letters, with disastrous consequences: 
`The men of letters tended to substitute abstract right for the consideration of facts, principles 
for the weighting of means, values and goals for power and action. Thus the French, deprived 
as they were of true liberties, strove for abstract liberty; incapable of collective experience, 
lacking the means of testing the limits of action, they unwittingly moved toward the illusion 
Of polltics. '43 
Furet sees the Revolution as a political and ideological event, whose socio-economic 
aspects are negligible. It is to be interpreted primarily as the coming to political 
power of society, and the replacement of (what was in theory) the absolutist 
monarchical state. A fortuitous conjunction of economic and political crises brought 
the Revolution into being; but its development could only be explained by the 
peculiarly French role of intellectuals in pre-revolutionary political debate, and by the 
unfolding of the Revolution itself. 
41 Ibid., 24-25 
42 Ibid., 24 
43 Ibid., 37 
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Simon Schama 
Simon Schama is one of the most prominent contemporary historians specialising in 
any period. Citizens, his 900-odd page chronicle of the French Revolution, is 
eminently readable, informal, and packed with idiosyncratic and surprising events and 
anecdotes. 44 Schama deliberately fashions his explanation in the form of a narrative, 
rather than in the more analytical, abstractive style which was more prominent when 
Citizens was published. This is because Schama believes that only the narrative form 
can make sense of the fact that `the Revolution was a much more haphazard and 
chaotic event and much more the product of human agency than structural 
conditioning'45 
The precise target for explanation is not given, but the aim can be understood as the 
traditional narrativist one of bringing meaning to the events of the narrative, without 
compromising the belief in the complexity and haphazardness of the sequence. The 
belief that the Revolution resulted primarily from a succession of accidents is at the 
core of Schama's treatment. Schama disputes the idea that because the event was of 
`epochal significance, then the causes that had generated it had necessarily to be of an 
equivalent magnitude'46. So how is the chaotic made meaningful? There are, to some 
degree, general themes which organise Schama's narrative, as we shall see. In 
addition, Schama builds his compelling narrative around various lively, distinctive 
characters. 
Thematically, Schama takes his approach to the French Revolution to have furthered 
certain ideas which had already been suggested. Three in particular: in a 
Tocquevillean spirit, continuities (between pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
France) should be emphasised as much as discontinuities, particularly in socio- 
economic terms. Secondly, `The Revolution' is better viewed as multiple revolutions, 
as Or, in Murray's words: `Schama's Citizens is as brilliant in presentation as it is suspect in 
scholarship': Bill Murray, `Review Article' in Australian Journal of French Studies 26(1) 
(1989), 100 
45 Simon Schama, Citizens: a Chronicle of the French Revolution (London: Viking, 1989), xv 
46lbid., xiv 
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dictated more by local passions and interests than by the interests of whoever ruled in 
Paris. Finally, individual agency, and in particular revolutionary utterance, was more 
important than social `structure' . 
47 
There are three more positive themes which Schama explicitly states will motivate 
and organise his account. He wishes to emphasise the relationship between the 
concepts of patriotism and liberty; the analogy between citizenship and the family 
(which was also explicitly followed by the revolutionaries); and, most especially, the 
violence of the Revolution. 
In a narrative of this length - it takes over 400 pages to reach the fall of the Bastille - 
it is hard to select particular sections without that selection being, to some degree, 
arbitrary. Yet the following passages demonstrate Schama's privileging of the theme 
of patriotism, which (as promised) re-occurs throughout: 
`The monarchy collapsed when the price of its financial rescue was measured not in profits or 
offices but in political concessions. ... henceforth, an alternative conviction was in the 
ascendant: that patriotic freedom would produce money where reforming absolutism had 
not. ' 
48 
`The bringing together of political patriotism with social unrest - anger with hunger - was (to 
borrow the revolutionaries' favourite electrical metaphor) like the meeting of two live 
wires. ' 
49 
In his theoretical approach, Schama's is quite typical of modern historiography. The 
explanation is broadly causal, yet resists summary into one or two major causes, as 
Lefebvre (for example) was keen to do. In addition, causal explanation does not 
exclude interpretive explanation (the explanation of social action in terms of rules 
which motivate those actions); as can be seen in the exploration of the citizenship/ 
family notion. 
17 Ibid., xiv 
48 Ibid., 288 
49 Ibid., 294 
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Schama downplays any `structural' causes, replacing them with an array of micro- 
causes. He also tends to emphasise more unusual and overlooked causes, such as the 
culture of patriotism in the old regime. Schama's judgements of significance, implicit 
in these decisions, is the element of his work which has attracted most criticism. At 
least two reviewers of Citizens (Murray and Spitzer50) attack Schama's approach as 
'unbalanced': in his excessive emphasis first on the stable and irreproachable aspects 
of the old regime, and then on the blood lust of the lower classes which led to the 
Terror. 
Despite Kellner's claims51 that Schama should be seen as a post-modernist historian 
because he eschews meta-narrative, Schama in fact has certain very clear general 
themes which are implied in his selection and emphasis. The Revolution was a glitch 
en route to a modern democratic French state. The old (pre-revolutionary) regime 
was adequate to the tasks facing it, whilst the Revolution became prone to an evil 
excess. Though there are themes identifiable in Schama's work, the overall effect of 
his narrative is to instil a belief in the multiplicity of the Revolution: that the causes of 
the Revolution were as numerous as they were fortuitous, that there was no one 
Revolution, and that we should be wary of such broad types as the 'bourgeois'. 
Theda Skocpol 
Skocpol is a macro-sociologist, rather than a historian. As such, it is no surprise that 
the explanation she offers is more scientific than the other seven considered here. Her 
overall aim is to explain social revolutions in general; but she is also careful to pay 
detailed attention to the history of each particular revolution she considers (French, 
Russian and Chinese). Her understanding of her task reflects this awareness of 
universal and particular: 
50 Alan B. Spitzer, `Narrative Problems: the Case of Simon Schama' in Journal of Modern History 
65(1) (1993): 176-192 
51 Hans Kellner, `Beautifying the Nightmare: The Aesthetics of Postmodern History' 
in Strategies: A 
Journal of Theory, Culture and Politics 4 
(1991): 289-313 
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`Each such revolution, furthermore, has occurred in a particular way in a unique set of social- 
structural and international circumstances. How, then can a sociologist hope to develop 
historically valid explanations of social revolution as such? '52 
To answer, Skocpol turns to comparative analysis. Her method is to first select cases 
whose histories are as similar as possible: France, Russia and China primarily, with 
Prussia, Japan and England as similar cases but where there was no revolution. These 
cases are then compared according to Mill's Methods of Agreement and Difference, 
in order to discern causal influence. The Method of Agreement states that where two 
cases share the same outcome, the cause is a feature which they share in common. 
The Method of Difference states that where two cases have different outcomes, the 
cause is a feature in which they differ. This `comparative historical analysis' is, says 
Skocpol `the mode of multivariate analysis to which one resorts when there are too 
many variables and not enough cases. '53 
Skocpol recognises some of the problems of this kind of approach, including the 
necessity of a prior understanding of which variables are relevant. The methods are 
only perfectly applicable where the cases stand in a very particular relationship; the 
Method of Agreement only yields a definite answer where the cases share only one 
feature, whilst the Method of Difference only yields a definite answer where the cases 
differ in only one feature. Given that actual comparative cases never reach these 
ideals, we need to screen candidates for causal factors by an initial judgement of 
relevance (the problem of multiple differences facing the Method of Difference will be 
relevant elsewhere in the thesis, notably chapter seven). Skocpol recognises that 
`strategic guesses have to be made about what causes are actually likely to be 
operative - that is, which ones could, or could not actually affect 
the object of 
study. '54 Similarly, Skocpol recognises that historical theory is, to some extent, 
necessary before proceeding with comparative historical analysis; in order to provide 
concepts for use in that analysis. 
52 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, 
Russia and China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 33 
53 Ibid., 36 
54 Ibid., 39 
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Indeed, Skocpol is, if anything, too wary of the comparative method. Two examples: 
firstly, she worries that `comparative historical analysis necessarily assumes (like any 
multivariate logic) that the units being compared are independent of one another'55, 
whereas this is not true of her examples. I do not see the justification for this 
restriction; in particular, so-called `incompatible contrastive explanation' (see chapter 
three) makes perfect sense, yet the two contrasts are dependent upon each other in the 
sense that if one contrast is actualised, the other cannot be. Secondly, she states that 
comparative historical analysis `cannot provide the causal hypotheses to be 
explored'56. Yet, given appropriate terminology and an understanding of what is 
relevant, this is exactly what comparative methodology can do: for it asks us to look 
for differences (or similarities) between the cases, and to treat these as causal 
hypotheses. 
Skocpol's approach to explaining social revolutions is 'statist': 
`We shall analyse the causes and processes of social revolutions from a nonvoluntarist, 
structural perspective, attending to international and world-historical, as well as intranational, 
structures and processes. And an important theoretical concomitant will be to move states - 
understood as potentially autonomous organizations located at the interface of class structures 
and international situations - to the very centre of attention. '57 
Specifically, she wants to establish the statist view as superior to the Marxist `social 
class' understanding of revolutions. This conviction she bases on the claim that the 
statist model picks out the more salient causal factors: 
`Perhaps especially because the factors that they consider are indeed an important part of the 
story, Marxists have failed to notice a crucial point: Causal variables referring to the strength 
and structure of old-regime states and the relations of state organisations to class structures 
may discriminate between cases of successful revolution and cases of failure or non- 
ss Ibid., 39 
56 Ibid., 39 
57 Ibid., 33 
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occurrence far better than do variables referring to class relations and patterns of economic 
development alone. 'S$ 
Turning specifically to the French Revolution, the key fact requiring explanation for 
Skocpol is why France `devolved - despite a half century of vigorous economic 
expansion - from near-dominance in Europe to the humiliations of martial defeats and 
59 royal bankruptcy'. This is a key fact, since it `renders comprehensible the specific 
political crisis that launched the French Revolution' 
The reasons for this military and financial breakdown are three-fold. Firstly, royal 
absolutism was always more an ambition than a realised goal; institutions such as the 
parlements, and the sale of state offices (venality) left the crown with the political 
obstacle of a socially dominant class. This was to prove a major hindrance, in 
particular in attempting to alter tax collection so that the nobility were no longer 
exempt. 
Secondly, French agriculture remained 'backward': both in the sense of consisting of 
highly divided small-holdings, and in maintaining the seigniorial rights of large 
landowners. These problems were masked from 1730-1770 by a combination of good 
weather and internal order, but were liable to lead to food crises in times of bad 
harvest. Furthermore, this agricultural weakness hampered the development of 
French industry, particularly as compared to the British. 
Thirdly, the strategic position of France necessitated wars on land and at sea, wars 
which in the long run simply could not be adequately funded. These three causes 
combined to leave the French monarchy without sufficient funds to avert an 
`administrative and military breakdown'. From Skocpol's comparison with Prussia, 
Japan and England, she aims to show that these three causes are each necessary, and 
jointly sufficient. 
Skocpol's explanation privileges structural causes over voluntary agency; indeed, as 
the explanation is given above, voluntary agency has no causal role whatsoever. 
Political and strategic factors take complete precedence over social and ideological. 
58 Ibid., 34-35 
59 Ibid., 52 
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Roger Chartier 
The title of Chartier's The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution makes it clear 
that any explanation found here will be limited in scope to cultural aspects. The use 
of `cultural' origins is consciously intended to replace the investigation of 
`intellectual' origins found in, for example, the work of Michelet, Hegel, or Chartier's 
professed forerunner, Mornet. In making this change, Chartier wishes to place 
emphasis on the `collective decisions' which comprise culture, rather than the `clear 
thoughts' of individual conceptual innovators6o 
Chartier claims that the emphasis on cultural origins carries three benefits. Firstly, it 
should lead us to abandon the question of whether or not the content of the Revolution 
corresponded to the content of the ideas preceding it (those of the Enlightenment). 
Instead, we should focus on whether and which of the ideas made the Revolution 
conceivable. 61 Secondly, it allows investigation of `not only clear and well elaborated 
thoughts but also unmediated and embodied representations; not only voluntary and 
reasoned engagements but also automatic and obligatory loyalties'62. In other words, 
Chartier wishes to investigate those less conscious aspects of life, which can not 
necessarily be reduced to clear, underlying ideology. Thirdly, it reverses the 
relationship between practice and idea. Chartier wants to deny `that practices can be 
deduced from the discourses that authorize or justify them'63; rather, `even the most 
powerful and most original conceptual innovations are inscribed in the collective 
decisions that regulate and command intellectual constructions before they achieve 
expression in clear thoughts. '64 This understanding of `culture' as practice, rather 
than in terms of clearly articulated ideology, shapes Chartier's explanation. 
60 Roger Chartier, The Cultural Origins of the French Revolution, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane 
(Durham, 
N. C., London: Duke University Press, 1991), 2 
61 Ibid., 2 
62 Ibid., 6 
63 Ibid., 18 
64Ibid., 2 
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To make the novelty of the approach clear, compare it to Mornet's. His task was to 
chart the diffusion of Enlightenment ideas throughout public opinion; one way he 
proposed to do this was by analysing book sales. As Chartier points out, the 
assumptions in such a task are that ideas are fundamental, whilst public opinion and 
practice secondary; and that public opinion is a passive receptacle for those ideas. 
Chartier's work is similar to Furet's, not least in theory and terminology. Like Furet, 
Chartier is suspicious of causal explanation: 
`History has become more circumspect in the designation of causality, and historians have 
learned prudence and scepticism from the difficult task of subjecting the brutal emergence of 
the revolutionary event to rational categories, as well as from their inability to conceive of 
historical development as necessitated and commanded by one discernible thread. '65 
Chartier prefers the idea of `effective history': an approach which `deals with events 
in terms of their most unique characteristics, their most acute manifestations. '66 Most 
theories of explanation would struggle to comprehend such a practice as explaining at 
all: unity, not diversity, is at the heart of most notions of explanation. The one 
exception would be Hayden White, who considers under the title of formist 
explanation the idea that one may explain by revealing an event in all its particularity 
and uniqueness67. This idea will be considered in the context of White's general 
theory of explanation, in the following chapter. 
Chartier's aim, then, is to present and discuss certain `conditions of possibility' for the 
French Revolution. The central cultural change in the old regime is the rise in 
importance of - indeed, practically the creation of - public opinion. Cultural shifts of 
this kind brought about the Revolution by making such an event conceivable, hence 
possible. They did not cause the Revolution, in the sense of being sufficient to 
explain the content of the Revolutionary ideas. 
65 Ibid., 1 
66 Ibid., 5 
67 White, Metahistoty, 13-15 
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As an example of this point (and also of Chartier's privileging of practice over ideas), 
consider Chartier's treatment of the reading habits of eighteenth century France. The 
way that the educated eighteenth century French person read fundamentally changed 
in the latter part of that century, in that it became more critical. The importance of the 
cultural shift in reading habits was not so much in what was read, but the critical way 
in which it was read. For this made conceivable a critical approach to established 
authority more generally. 
In his conclusion, Chartier returns to his worries over the causal approach; since, 
despite his earlier theoretical points, he admits that the idea that `the event and its 
origin belong to distinctly different, clearly separated, sets of facts connected by a 
causal relation' has been for him a `working hypothesis'68. 
The real novelty of Chartier's explanation is not so much to claim that there are 
cultural origins, nor even to ascribe more importance to them than is commonly 
recognised, for he clearly does not attempt this. It is, rather, to challenge definitions - 
culture in particular - and to challenge the relationship between originating factors, 
particularly ideas and practice. 
What can be learnt from the case study? 
The primary aim of this chapter has been to provide the reader with a passing 
acquaintance with the historical works which will be referred to in the remainder of 
the thesis. Yet, it is of interest to note that even a study as rough as that above can 
produce interesting results for a descriptive philosophy. The advantage of considering 
actual historical examples, and in attempting to respect the complexity of those 
examples, is that we can start to appreciate that there are multiple elements of 
historical explanation which require philosophical examination. The explanations 
68 Chartier, 197 
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considered above are (usually) not simple affairs, as might be suggested by the usual 
stock set of hackneyed examples. 
We would be wise to presume that explanatory competition won't be reducible to 
factual disagreement between historians. The explanations considered in this chapter 
suggest that an explanation contains multiple philosophically relevant aspects, any of 
which may have a role to play in accounting for explanatory competition. One way 
that I structure Parts II and III of this thesis is by examining each element in turn, and 
asking of each whether, and how, that aspect affects explanatory exclusion and 
competition. 
Most basically, each explanation makes use of facts; which I take to include facts 
concerning which causes were operative. Clearly factual disagreement will play at 
least some role in explanatory consistency and exclusion (chapter four). 
Historians do not only provide positive claims, but also negative or critical claims. 
Whilst sometimes a criticism of another's explanation may be clearly distinguished 
from one's explanation itself, this is not always the case. Negative or critical claims 
appear to be not just peripheral to the explanation proper, but essential in determining 
what precisely the content of that explanation is (also explored in chapter four). 
Each explanation has a target - that which demands explanation. It is clear that 
explanations using roughly similar wording ('the French Revolution') can still point 
to different targets; we need to account for this. We should also take account of the 
role of presupposition in framing explanatory targets. Finally, we need an account of 
the relation between sameness or difference of explanatory target, and explanatory 
consistency or exclusion (chapter five). 
Each explanation also has a methodological theory, whether or not that theory 
is 
explicit. In particular, each historian has ideas concerning what 
is to be regarded as a 
good explanation. There may also be explicit constraints over the application of such 
explanatory terms as `cause', `law', or `structure'. 
We need to ask what the relation is 
between such theoretical aspects and the more basic elements of the explanation. 
W%Ie 
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also need to know to what extent the adoption of different theories leads to 
explanations which simply cannot be compared (chapter six). 
A key concept is a recurrent feature of explanations. By this I mean the concept or 
concepts which organise understanding of the subject matter. This `organisation' can 
take different forms: in privileging a particular concept, a historian may provide a 
historical law, show there to be a teleological process, or illustrate that disparate 
events should be grouped together (also chapter six). 
Each explanation inevitably deploys the related tools of selection and weighting (the 
claims of one thing being more important than another). The crucial question to ask 
of these concepts is how they are related to explanatory competition: are judgements 
of selection and importance a result of personal preference or interest, or can 
explanations be ranked in a more substantive manner? (chapters seven, eight and 
nine). 
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Chapter Three: Explanation 
In chapters one and two I have investigated the methodological issues relevant to this 
thesis, and have introduced the case studies to be used. The third preparatory task is 
to investigate the concept `explanation'. Whilst it will not be an explicit aim of this 
thesis to provide a thorough analysis of the concept, it is clear that an investigation of 
`competing explanations' dovetails with an understanding of what an explanation is. 
In this chapter, I will summarise some of the more influential approaches to 
explanation, especially those that relate to my specific task of charting competing 
historical explanations. In particular, I will interested in material relevant to the 
analysis of explanation of historical particulars, such as the French Revolution. Most 
philosophical analyses of explanation are conducted, explicitly or otherwise, with 
reference to scientific explanation; much of this work, though by no means all, is 
relevant to historical explanation. 
The categorisation of approaches to explanation adopted below distinguishes four 
fundamental strands: erotetic, cognitive, ontic and linguistic. Most writers fit neatly 
into one of these groups, though some do combine elements from more than one 
strand. I certainly do not wish to imply that this latter position is not possible; for the 
typology is one which is intended to describe typical approaches, rather than to map 
logically exclusive options. Indeed, the position which I shall recommend is 
formulated so that the virtues of each strand (as I see them) can be retained. The 
fifth 
approach, contrastive explanation, is important to later issues, so will also 
be 
introduced in some detail. It is, however, an approach to explanation which can only 
be argued to be supplemental to the more fundamental analyses of explanation 
represented by the first four types. 
The aims of this chapter are two-fold. Firstly, 
I will introduce approaches to 
explanation, knowledge of which will 
be required for the arguments of chapter four 
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onwards. Certain explanatory theories are referred to a number of times in subsequent 
chapters, and hence require introduction: in particular, those of Bas Van Fraassen, 
Carl Hempel, Jaegwon Kim, David Lewis, Hayden White, and Peter Lipton. 
Secondly, I will begin to elucidate my approach to historical explanation through 
comparison and criticism of these positions. I present a preliminary sketch of a theory 
of explanation at the end of this chapter; these ideas will be both applied and 
elaborated in the investigation of explanatory competition from chapter four onwards. 
One of the main desiderata in developing a theory of historical explanation will be to 
remain faithful to the overall vision of philosophical analysis defended in chapter one. 
This implies that the term `explanation' be applied non-reductively, and permissively. 
We should not presume that the concept will be capable of analysis under a single set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions; and we should investigate different types of 
explanation on their own terms, at least initially. To this end, I shall identify 
`explanatory reductivists': those who would attempt to limit the notion of scientific 
and historical explanation to a single type; for example, causal or nomological. Yet a 
pluralistic approach does raise its own concern: namely, if there are different types of 
explanation, what (if anything) is common to them all? This issue will re-occur in 
this chapter. 
Erotetic explanation 
Van Fraassen pioneered the approach of explanations as why-questions in his 1980 
The Scientific Image'. Explanations have traditionally been viewed as products: 
arguments, statements, or similar. Regarding explanations as, fundamentally, 
processes shifts attention to the actual spoken or written acts, performed in particular 
conversational contexts. According to the erotetic theory, the correct way to analyse 
`explanation' is, therefore, in terms of the logic of questions: erotetic logic. 
1 Bas C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980) 
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The content of a why-question, Q, is determined by three features: (a) the topic to be 
explained, (b) a contrast or contrasts which constrain the answer (the nature of which 
will be examined later in this chapter), and (c) a relevance relation which also, in a 
different way, constrains answers. The relevance relation delineates a class of 
answers which are of the right type, according to the particular context of the 
question. Whilst it may appear that the key notion is this relevance relation, Van 
Fraassen attempts to minimise its role by refusing to provide any substantive content 
to the notion: `Is this not where the inextricably modal or counterfactual element 
comes in? But not at all; in my opinion, the word `because' here signifies only that A 
[the answer] is relevant, in this context, to this question'3. 
This emphasis on the pragmatics of explanation is the distinguishing feature of Van 
Fraassen's erotetic theory. The conversational context - the implicit desires and 
motives of the questioner in what precisely they want answered, and in what way - 
determines which precise question is asked. In particular, interpretation of the 
explanatory relevance relation requires knowledge of the particular pragmatic context. 
Knowledge of the explanatory topic and the contrast(s) seems not to be sufficient to 
produce knowledge of what is relevant. This is so because `relevance' also depends 
upon what kind of question the questioner had in mind. Van Fraassen's example is of 
the question `why did you get up at 7 o'clock this morning? '. To this, correct answers 
could be either `no reason, really', or could be `because of the milkman's clatter'; 
dependent upon whether the relevance relation restricted answers solely to motives 
(so no reason can be given), or whether it allowed causal factors in general. 
Van Fraassen's introduction of the pragmatics of explanation has been extremely 
influential; so much so, that even those philosophers who would attempt to provide a 
more substantive analysis to `explanation' than Van Fraassen (Wesley Salmon, for 
example) see pragmatic aspects of explanation at least as one important feature 
amongst others. No one can now ignore pragmatic and contextual features in a theory 
2 The introduction of the notion of contrast remains one of the most influential aspects of 
Van 
Fraassen's theory of explanation (though he cannot lay sole claim to its introduction: see 
later in this 
chapter). However, since I will argue that contrastive explanation 
is formally unrelated to erotetic 
explanation, I do not consider contrast at this point. 
3 Van Fraassen, 143 
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of explanation4. Once a space is opened for contextual factors to influence what is 
explained, and the adequacy of that explanation, then it is conceivable to suppose that 
empirical study might illuminate features of explanation. In this vein, the 
psychologist Denis Hilton has described the typical ways for types of relevance 
relation to vary according to different types of question. s 
Answers to why-questions are to be judged according to four criteria: (i) they should 
be true; (ii) they should fit with the truth of the explanatory topic and the falsity of the 
contrast(s); and (iii) they should satisfy the relevance relation. Further, Van Fraassen 
considers using (iv) probabilistic relevance as a guide to explanatory relevance; such 
that answers which probabilistically favour the topic over the contrast class are to be 
preferred. Criteria (i) and (ii) are insufficient to properly capture the adequacy of 
answers to contrastive why-questions, as I shall argue in the section on contrastive 
explanation. Criterion (iv) will also be examined in relation to contrastive 
explanation later in this chapter; and, for somewhat different purposes, in chapter 
eight. Here, though, I will be less concerned with providing an erotetic theory of 
answers than I will be in the general conception of `explanations as why-questions'. 
Whilst the erotetic theory of explanation has brought certain benefits to the 
philosophy of explanation in general, in introducing the ideas of context and 
' Of course, these comments do rely on a certain notion of `pragmatic': specifically, that pragmatic 
features of explaining are those which derive from implicit, shared and context-dependent 
understanding of the questioner and responder. Achinstein, for one, has argued that this understanding 
of `pragmatic' is insufficient, since non-pragmatic theories of explanation may also incorporate the 
idea that knowledge of context is required to fully specify the explanatory target (Peter Achinstein, 
`The Pragmatic Character of Explanation' (originally 1984) in Explanation, ed. David-Hillel Ruben 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 326-344). My notion of `pragmatic' states only that the 
request for explanation is underdetermined by explicit demands, hence implicit and contextual clues 
must be used. However, once the request for explanation has been made definite and complete in this 
way, the resulting explanation may still be assessed entirely conventionally: i. e. non-pragmatically. 
Achinstein regards the notion that standards of assessment be pragmatically given as the hallmark of a 
truly pragmatic theory of explanation. I am not averse to this idea (see chapter six for a similar claim), 
but would still wish to regard the emphasis on context in the specification of explanatory target as an 
important step in developing a pragmatic theory of explanation. 
5 In his most recent paper, for example, (Denis Hilton and John McClure, Are Goals or Preconditions 
Better Explanations? It depends on the question' in European Journal of Social Psychology 28 (1998): 
897-911) Hilton finds that where questions are framed in terms of wirtiv an action occurs, or which 
request a causal explanation of the action, then goals are rated as 
better explanations than 
preconditions. However, if the question requests a causal explanation of an action which 
has been 
obstructed, then preconditions are seen as 
better explanations than goals. 
69 
pragmatics, contrast, and explanatory process, I would argue that as a complete 
theory it is insufficient. Two questions are particularly fundamental, and seem tricky 
to answer using the resources of an erotetic theory. 
First: are there to be any restrictions on what counts as a proper `relevance relation 16 9 
If not, then any proposition may, in the right context, be treated as a correct answer 
(and hence explanation) of any other. For instance7, relations of astral influence may 
be appropriately selected as an erotetic relevance relation; say, in order to explain 
JFK's death by citing the positions of the planets. Such an answer meets Van 
Fraassen's criteria for answers ((i) to (iv) above): the claims about the planets' 
positions may be true, the claims fulfil the desired relation, and the answer, along with 
astrological background theory, favours the topic over the contrasts in the appropriate 
way. With no restriction on proper `relevance relations', then the erotetic analysis 
finds good explanations where it shouldn't. 
But if `relevance relation' is to be restricted, then it seems clear that this can only be 
done by moving beyond the resources of a purely erotetic theory of explanation. 
Indeed, Kitcher and Salmon claim that if Van Fraassen wishes to avoid an "anything 
goes" account of explanation, this `ought to commit him to solving most (if not all) of 
the traditional problems of the theory of explanation's. I agree with their conclusion 
that whilst Van Fraassen has drawn attention to the pragmatics of explanation, his 
theory can, and must, be enriched by turning to other notions of explanation. 
One answer which may be attractive to the erotetic theorist is that appropriate 
relevance relations should be restricted according to the maxim that scientific 
explanation should rely only upon relations allowed by the accepted science of the 
day: astral relations cannot feature in scientific explanations as they don't feature in 
scientific theorising in genera19. 
6 This criticism is also at the core of Kitcher and Salmon's critique of Van Fraassen's theory 
(Philip 
Kitcher and Wesley Salmon, `Van Fraassen on Explanation' (originally 1987) 
in Wesley Salmon, 
Causality and Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998): 178-189). 
7 The example is from Kitcher and Salmon, 183-185 
8Ibid., 188 
9 This response is suggested by Van Fraassen, 141,126 
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Yet this response is insufficient, and it is instructive to realise why. Whilst astral 
relation may not be a scientifically acceptable category, and hence is never an 
appropriate relevance relation, others may be scientifically respectable, yet still not 
always appropriate. To answer `why did that crystalline structure grow? ' by citing 
biological relations between the elements of the crystal would be incorrect, even 
though biological relations are scientifically acceptable. Biological relation is not an 
appropriate relevance relation in this case, and this cannot be explained using only 
erotetic criteria. 
The second tricky question for the erotetic theorist is whether all answers to why- 
questions are really explanations; and, conversely, whether all explanations are 
answers to why-questions. Seemingly not; `why should one behave non- 
egoistically? ' is a why-question which is not a request for explanation (rather, it is a 
request for justification). And it seems obvious that explanations can be given in 
response to different kinds of questions (particularly, how-questions and what- 
questions), or even without any preceding question at all. 
To the second counter-example, we might say that so long as an explanation-seeking 
why-question can be reconstructed - whether or not it was actually uttered - then the 
erotetic theory can be usefully employed. One reply to the first counter-example 
would be to limit explanations to answers in response to `explanation-seeking vv hy- 
questions' (a phrase which has, in fact, become common in the recent literature on 
explanation). However, this reply is analytically circular: with this move, `why- 
question' has become a term of art, only specifiable relative to a prior understanding 
of `explanation'; for it presumes a prior ability to distinguish `explanation-seeking' 
from `non-explanation-seeking' why questions. As an analysis of explanation (as 
opposed to an illumination of certain features of explanation), the erotetic approach 
0 seems inadequate' 
lo It is disappointing that recent defences of the erotetic theory do not attempt to answer these 
questions. Matti Sintonen, for example, 
in his `Why Questions and Why Just Why-questions? ' in 
Synthese 120 (1999): 125-135 argues that it is the erotetic view which can 
best unify various insights 
into and approaches to explanation, since 
it is descriptively accurate with regard to scientific practice 
(126-128). But without, in particular, an answer to the problem of 
distinguishing explanation-seeking 
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It may be properly claimed that it is unfair to press the erotetic theory in the above 
way. Perhaps it is better to regard the erotetic theory as providing an analysis not of 
the explanatory relation, but of explanatory relata. The erotetic approach treats 
explanatory relata as questions and answers; and as we have seen, this response has 
the interesting consequence of focusing attention on the acts of explanation, and 
hence the context in which those acts are carried out. However, to better understand 
what constitutes a good relation between question and answer, we must rely on other 
resources. 
Cognitive explanation 
A cognitive approach to explanation would analyse explanation as that which brings 
cognitive benefit(s) of a particular kind. Equivalently, explanation is that which leads 
to understanding of a particular kind, or kinds. This approach has the benefit of 
bringing to the fore the fact that explaining is an act carried out for epistemic reasons, 
and that the goodness of the explanatory product is measured (over and above the 
basic truth of the explanans) according to epistemic criteria. It demonstrates why we 
seek explanation over and above simple knowledge of historical fact; for it brings a 
different cognitive reward. The key phrases requiring examination are, of course, 
`cognitive benefit' and `understanding'; the wide variety of potential ways to 
conceive of these terms is reflected in the range of what may be called cognitive 
models of explanation. To the criticism that to analyse `explanation' in terms of 
`understanding' is to replace one awkward term with a worse one, I would say that 
many traditional analyses of `explanation' may fruitfully be seen precisely as attempts 
to analyse (explanatory) `understanding'. 
It should be recognised that turning to cognitively based criteria is an obvious, and 
popular, way to extend the erotetic approach. Sintonen, in asking what kinds of 
questions from other questions, it is unclear how precisely the erotetic view can unify approaches to 
explanation. 
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questions are good requests for explanation, comes close to a cognitive analysis in 
stating that `Scientists value questions which, if answered, would further 
understanding' 11. Van Fraassen concludes his discussion of explanation by saying 
that `scientific explanation ... 
is an application of science. It is a use of science to 
satisfy certain of our desires' 12. 
I shall mention here some of the more influential attempts to analyse `cognitive 
benefit', or 'understanding': in terms of providing expectability or unification, 
removing a particular sort of cognitive predicament, and grasping appropriate internal 
rules. Each associated theory of explanation is familiar in philosophy of explanation 
literature, though the association which I draw between them is perhaps more unusual. 
Hempel's `Deductive-Nomological' (D-N) analysis of (scientific, social scientific and 
historical) explanation13 is surely the best known of all modern approaches to 
explanation; it has certainly received the most comment and criticism. To recount the 
main points briefly: according to Hempel, an explanation should cite one or more 
empirical facts, and one or more laws, which together form non-redundant premises in 
a deductive argument whose conclusion is the fact to be explained. 
Diagrammatically: 
Particular facts: C1, C2 ... 
C, t 
General laws: L1, L2 ... 
LX 
[Linking principles: joining terminology of Cx with that of Lx] 
Conclusion (explanandum): E 
" Ibid., 128 
12 Van Fraassen, 156 
13 See, for example, Carl G. Hempel, `Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation', in Carl G. Hempel, Aspects 
of Scientific Explanation, and Other Essars 
in the Philosophie of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965) 
^3 
The equally well known modification to the above model replaces the requirement of 
deductive implication with a requirement that CX and Lx show E to be highly likely; 
such a model is termed Inductive-Statistical (I-S). 
What cognitive benefit does such an explanatory argument bring? It shows that the 
explanandum was to have been expected (and hence that, given sufficient knowledge 
before the event, it could have been predicted). I believe that the appeal of Hempel's 
theory (aside from its close fit with a positivist philosophy, if that is considered an 
appeal) lies fundamentally in the deep connection felt between an explanation `why', 
and the demonstration that the explanandum event had to happen. 
Yet, as it has been demonstrated time and again in this context, whilst such a 
connection cannot be denied, this does not imply that the D-N model provides a 
satisfactory analysis of scientific explanation. Arguments showing that 
`expectability' is neither sufficient nor necessary for `explanation' form the bulk of 
the many criticisms of the Deductive-Nomological analysis. Expectability alone is 
insufficient, for the laws relied upon need to be `of the right sort'. 
The explanandum may be logically deduced from true premises of the appropriate 
sort, and yet not be explained by those premises. The fact that John is a person, and 
that all (or most) people who take birth control pills are not pregnant, implies the true 
fact that John is not pregnant. Yet, despite correctly conforming to the D-N schema, 
the explanans are irrelevant: John is a man! Bromberger's flagpole example14 
demonstrates a special sort of irrelevance: that due to asymmetry. Whilst the height 
of a flagpole and position of the sun can be used to imply, and explain, the length of 
the shadow of that flagpole, the length of the shadow plus the position of the sun can 
imply, but not explain, the height of the flagpole. 
Salmon has argued forcefully that neither is expectability necessary; he claims that the 
explanans do not have to imply that the explanandum had to happen, nor even 
(as 
with I-S) that it was highly probable15. All that is required of explanans 
is that they 
14 Despite the notoriety of Bromberger's flagpole, apparently 
it was never introduced in any of 
Bromberger's published works. 
15 See, for example, Wesley C. Salmon, `A 
Third Dogma of Empiricism' in Basic Problems in 
Methodology and Linguistics eds. R. Butts and 
J. Hintikka (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1977) 
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show the explanandum to be more likely than it would have been without the presence 
of the explanans; in other words, that the explanans made a difference (with respect to 
the appropriate reference class). 
A related approach is one which locates the cognitive benefit of explanation in 
unification of phenomena. Explanation analysed as unification emphasises the 
explanatory power of being able to reduce the number of independent theories 
required to deduce the phenomena we wish to explain. Such an approach is `global', 
since we need to examine our theoretical framework in general in order to discern 
where unification, and hence explanation, has been achieved. Yet its similarity to 
Hempel's approach can be seen in the central role given to deduction in both analyses. 
The general link between the reduction of independent assumptions and explanatory 
power seems correct, but difficulties remain which mirror those of the D-N analysis. 
Consider, for example, that whilst disparate meteorological phenomena are unified 
through correlation with less disparate barometer positions, they are not thereby 
explained by the barometer positions. Of course, we believe that the explanation runs 
the other way: the meteorological phenomena explain the barometer positions. In 
general, just as with the D-N analysis, the laws which are intended to unify 
phenomena must be `of the correct kind'; statistical correlation is insufficient. To 
specify what `correct kind' means seems impossible without resorting to a more 
fundamental explanatory notion: such as that the correlation instantiate causal 
relations. Such a move introduces an ontic conception, examined in the next section. 
A different kind of cognitive approach was attempted by Bromberger16. Bromberger 
first locates a particular kind of epistemic predicament which, he claims, is uniquely 
present where explanation is requested. An explanation can then be defined as the 
removal of this type of predicament. A P-predicament exists when the recipient 
cannot conceive of a possible correct answer. For example: 
16 Sylvain Bromberger, `An Approach to Explanation' in Analytical Philosophy, 
Second Series, ed. R. 
J. Butler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965): 72-105 
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(1): `How many French revolted in 1789? ' 
(2): `Why did the French revolt in 1789? ' 
Whilst one who asks (1) can conceive of many possible correct answers (various 
numbers of French people), the idea is that one who asks (2) cannot. Often, we will 
find that an explanation involves the removal of a P-predicament, yet Bromberger 
points out that this is not always the case: sometimes we can conceive of a possible 
answer to an explanation seeking why-question, for example. Therefore, there is a 
need for a second type of predicament: a B-predicament. This condition is intended 
to be more objective than the subjective nature of the P-predicament; a B-predicament 
exists when the recipient cannot conceive of the correct answer. Bromberger then 
defines an explanation as that which either removes a P-predicament, or removes a B- 
predicament. 
Bromberger's approach, though I have categorised it as cognitive, proves a 
particularly fruitful extension of the erotetic idea. For, at the least, Bromberger's 
model allows us to be able to distinguish in a non-circular way `explanation seeking 
why-questions' from `non-explanation seeking why-questions', in terms of types of 
cognitive predicaments. 
It is important to note that Bromberger's definition is not equivalent to more usual 
(scientific) definitions of explanation. In particular, the temporal nature of 
explanation usually emphasised is not a feature of Bromberger's model. The answer 
to 
(3) `What sort of life could there be on gas giants? ' 
would not usually be regarded as a request for explanation, since 
it does not require 
features which were previous to, and somehow led to, that which requires 
explanation. However, for Bromberger (3) could conceivably 
be an explanatory 
inquiry deriving from aP or B-predicament, since I cannot conceive of a correct 
answer (no more than I can to (2), at any rate). 
It must be said that Bromberger's ideas have not 
been widely adopted. The reliance 
on the notion of a P-predicament places perhaps 
too much emphasis on the subjective, 
76 
and variable, notion of `what one can conceive of; and leads to apparently odd 
categorisation of explanations, as (3) demonstrates. The introduction of `B- 
predicament' is intended to remedy these deficiencies, at least in part. However, 
Bromberger's insistence that this latter notion make reference to an objective `correct 
answer' leaves the theory in the same place as the erotetic theory; the major task of 
specifying what a truly `correct answer' amounts to is not tackled. In addition, we 
surely require a notion of `proper removal' of an epistemic predicament in order to 
define explanation; since we must be able to rule out being hit over the head, 
brainwashed, or just given counselling to make us stop worrying, as explanatory 
episodes - even though they may indeed remove explanatory predicaments. 
One final type of epistemic or cognitive benefit which I shall mention further 
demonstrates the breadth of cognitive approaches to explanation. Winch's conception 
of a social scientific explanation is that which provides understanding of internal 
ruled 7, also known as `interpretivism'. A good explanation of a social action is one 
which describes social relations in a certain way: a way that makes clear the social 
context within which the action is performed, and which refers to the rules which the 
participants themselves use to orientate their behaviour. To take a popular example, 
an interpretivist answer to `why did that person exchange a piece of paper for some 
money? ' might be to describe what `cheque' means in our society, and in particular, 
what the rules governing how cheques are treated by banks are. ' 8 
These social rules should be clearly distinguished from scientific rules. A social rule 
guides our action `from the inside'. A scientific rule, or law of nature, is a statistical 
correlation. An example of Winch's may illustrate the difference: `The difference 
[between rules and laws] is precisely analogous to that between being able to 
17 Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (London: Routledge, 1958) 
18 This interpretation of Winch's ideas is the most common one, but is not the only one possible. For 
example, in a short article Sharrock and Anderson argue that 
Winch's thesis concerns constraints upon 
description in the social sciences, not explanation (R. J. Anderson and W. W. Sharrock, 
`Understanding Peter Winch' in Inquii v 28 (1985): 119-122). They take Winch to be arguing that to 
successfully describe an action means to make 
it intelligible; and this means showing it to be rule- 
governed. Showing action to be rule-governed, 
in Winch's sense, is therefore a precursor to proper 
explanation, rather than an alternative 
form of explanation. 
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formulate statistical laws about the likely occurrences of words in a language and 
being able to understand what was being said by someone who spoke the language" 9. 
Criticisms of Winch's thesis have focused, firstly, on whether such an approach to 
social science is really necessary. Understanding social action in terms of rules 
formulated from the perspective of the participators themselves, and in their social 
context, is often clearly fruitful and important. However, is this the only way to 
provide social explanation? Interpretivists object to explanations citing structural 
factors which are not part of the conceptual scheme of the society whose actions are 
being explained, but it is unclear how this restriction can be defended. It is claimed 
that only an explanation in terms of social rules treats humans as purposive agents, 
rather than as lumps of matter. But even if this is the case, different perspectives on 
historical individuals and societies are allowable; at any rate, historians certainly do 
take widely different perspectives, as we shall see in particular in chapter six. 
Secondly, a common criticism is that an approach such as Winch's is, despite first 
appearances, capable of subsumption under a scientific approach. In particular, if it 
can be established that interpretative explanations cite reasons, and that `reason' is 
capable of analysis as a sub-species of scientific `cause' in general, then 
interpretivism does not represent the radically different (anti-scientific) methodology 
that it is claimed to be. 
The above summary has provided at least a flavour of the variety of cognitive 
approaches to explanation, though I am certain that the list could be extended. Rather 
than get enmeshed in the details of any one proposal, I wish to consider certain more 
general questions: Is it possible to conceive of multiple cognitive benefits which 
might thereby define what an explanation consists of? And if so, is there a well 
motivated way to delineate these types? In other words, what makes the above 
mentioned types of understanding explanatory modes of understanding? 
Wesley Salmon's recent writing on explanation20 certainly demonstrates a willingness 
to conceive of more than one type of explanation. His primary models are 
19 Ibid., 115 
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explanation through unification, and explanation through citation of causal 
mechanism. The latter type of explanation will be examined in the following section. 
What is important to note here is that Salmon treats both under a cognitive heading, 
such that each produces a complementary type of understanding: understanding of 
`the general scheme of things', and understanding of mechanisms. 
There does seem little a priori reason to reject the notion that there can be more than 
one cognitive `type' of explanation. Focusing on Salmon's two cognitive virtues of 
explanation through unification (the `Unificationist Thesis') and explanation through 
citation of causes (`the Causal Thesis'), Barnes attempts to refute the possibility, yet 
fails21. He claims that `the Unificationist Thesis and the Causal Thesis are ultimately 
at odds with each other, and thus cannot be easily conjoined (despite Salmon's ... 
argument to the contrary)'22. To show this, Barnes imagines three phenomena to be 
explained (e1, e2 and e3); which are explained by three causes (Cl, C2 and C3). 
Each cause is separate, and contributes only to its respective phenomena. In this case, 
the proponent of the Causal Thesis must affirm that there has been a gain in 
explanatory understanding, whilst the Unificationist must deny it. 
Certainly this is true; the question is whether it is a problem. Barnes states that the 
Unificationist and Causal Theses diverge in this case'23; however, nothing in the 
possibility of multiple types of cognitive explanation precludes this. Indeed, it is 
entirely to be expected that the standards of different types of explanation would 
disagree over the explanatory power of particular examples, since they demand 
different properties from explanations. And, once we accept the possibility that there 
may be different types of explanation, we are at liberty to suppose that certain types 
may be more appropriate for certain cases. We need only dispense with the idea that 
there should only be one answer to `how good is that particular explanation? ' 
Salmon's types of `scientific' understanding are set within a wider array of types of 
understanding, yet it is unfortunate that Salmon gives us no reason why certain types 
20 For example, Wesley C. Salmon, `Scientific Explanation: Causation and 
Unification' in Critica 22 
(1990): 3-21 
21 Eric Barnes, `Inference to the Loveliest Explanation' in Synthese 103 (1995): 251-277 
22 Ibid., 264-265 
23 Ibid., 265 
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are to be regarded as explanatory in a scientific sense. He does distinguish 
`psychological' understanding from `scientific' understanding on the basis that only 
the latter guarantees that the understanding is based upon `objective evidence'24, but it 
is doubtful whether this condition can do much work. Just as with Salmon's own 
criticism of Van Fraassen, we can point out that insisting that scientific explanations 
be true with respect to the best science of the day does not properly limit the types of 
relation which can be traced between those truths. 
More charitably, we could interpret Salmon as being unwilling to impose a priori 
constraints upon types of explanation (or explanatory understanding), because he 
wishes to rely on a posteriori evidence concerning how scientists actually operate. I 
believe this is close to what Salmon would say; in any case, it is the answer I shall 
recommend. We should not limit - in a precise way - the sorts of understanding 
which may ground `historical explanation' before examining historical explanation in 
practice. 
To summarise the findings of this section: analysing explanation in terms of the sorts 
of cognitive benefits, or understanding, that it brings is a promising approach. I see 
no reason why we shouldn't expect the specifics of such a programme to be dependent 
upon an empirical study of the explanatory practices of historians, in line with the 
philosophical methodology proposed in chapter one. We will need to look at what 
historians are aiming to do in order to delineate the cognitive virtues of explanation. 
However, we should also be entitled to expect general comments concerning why 
certain types of understanding are explanatory, and others not. I will return to this 
question in chapter six, after having examined the historical accounts 
in the above 
way. 
Yet we have seen that cognitive approaches taken in isolation are susceptible to 
counter-examples. These generally take the form of an 
intuitive demonstration that 
the `explanation', possessing the cognitive virtue demanded by the particular theory 
24 Wesley C. Salmon, `The Importance of Scientific Understanding' 
in Salmon, Causality and 
Explanation, 90 
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of explanation, is nonetheless irrelevant, hence non-explanatory. A possible remedy 
to these counter-examples of this kind is to incorporate ontic notions. 
Ontic explanation 
An ontic approach takes explanation to be that which cites some underlying 
mechanism at work behind the phenomena to be explained. It has been argued that 
causation is paradigmatic of such a mechanism; but there may be other types of 
mechanism, including functions or goals, structural factors ('standing conditions'), 
relations of supervenience, or dispositions. To what extent does such an approach 
require substantive metaphysical commitment? At a minimum, it only requires that 
the appropriate mechanisms can be recognised; no particular metaphysical conception 
of these mechanisms need be elaborated for these purposes. However, it is necessary 
that the ontic mechanisms be regarded as more than purely statistical correlations: to 
an empiricist such as Van Fraassen, this commitment would be unacceptable. 
An advantage of an ontic approach is that a clear line can be drawn between providing 
explanatory information, and providing descriptive information: only the former 
concerns relational mechanisms. A second benefit is that a minimal sense of 
relevance and asymmetry come built in to the analysis, given that relationships such 
as cause-and-effect are asymmetrical. Counter-examples of the sort which plague the 
D-N analysis (like Bromberger's flagpole) are thereby avoided. A final advantage is 
that the model may be commendably a posteriori, since the precise `mechanism' can 
be specified according to the science of the day (this is, for example, Salmon's 
approach). 
We must note that, strictly speaking, `citing some underlying mechanism' should not 
always be necessary, even under an ontic approach. This should be replaced by 
`citing information concerning underlying mechanism', in order to allow for the 
common practice of explaining by citing absences. ('Why did Blair get elected, rather 
than Hague? ' `Because he didn't make so many mistakes! ') This need not be a 
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problem for an ontic approach; in particular, a theory of contrastive explanation (to be 
considered in the final section) can enable a particularly satisfactory understanding of 
explanation by absences. 
One way the ontic position must be supplemented is with an account of the 
pragmatics of explanation. This is for the reason that a vast range of mechanism lies 
behind any given phenomena we wish to explain. For example, the event `Blair 
getting elected' has a causal history stretching back to the formation of the universe; 
yet only a tiny fraction of this causal history will be truly relevant for any given 
demand for explanation of why Blair did get elected. Citing `the Big Bang' does no 
explanatory work, except perhaps in the most peculiar of contexts, even though the 
Big Bang is in the causal history of Blair's being elected. We need to understand 
`relevant' in a pragmatic sense, since the Big Bang is as relevant as any other cause of 
Blair's being elected from a purely ontic perspective. I believe the most satisfactory 
way to make precise this notion of pragmatic constraint as it relates to ontic 
explanation is through the use of contrastive explanation, discussed below. 
One type of ontic model is provided by Aristotle, in his theory of the Four Causes 25 
It is usually argued that Aristotle's `causes' are better interpreted as types of 
explanation, rather than strictly causes in the modem understanding of the term. The 
four types of explanation given by Aristotle derive directly from an Aristotelian 
metaphysics. They are explanation in terms of substance (or 'form': referring to the 
structure of that bringing the effect about); matter (as in `bronze is the cause of the 
statue'); source (or 'motive': the type most similar to the modern conception of 
`cause'); and purpose (or `final goal', to which the item strives towards). It is usually 
appropriate to cite any of these four types in explaining a phenomenon, with certain 
exceptions: such as the inability to produce mathematical explanations on the basis of 
`source'. Hence to cite one type of Cause is not to exclude the citation of the others in 
explanation of the same event. Aristotle claimed that mistakes were made 
by 
previous philosophers precisely because they sought only one type of 
Cause. For 
25 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. John Warrington (London: Dent, 1956), 
Book A 
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example, Thales only sought explanation by `substance', Anaxagoras only according 
to `purpose'. 
Ruben's interpretation of the Four Causes26, which I am inclined to accept, strongly 
emphasises the ontic nature of Aristotle's theory: Aristotle should be understood as 
demanding that an explanation should cite some underlying mechanism. Ruben 
himself provides a list of relations which can properly underpin explanations: causes, 
laws of co-existence, internal causation (inertia), self-explanation (mereological or 
reductive explanation), Cambridge dependency, supervenience and disposition27. A 
similar ontic analysis of explanation is given by Jaegwon Kim28. 
The alternative ontic position would oppose the analysis of `underlying mechanism' 
in terms of an extensive list such as Ruben's. It would argue that we can restrict ontic 
explanation purely to causal explanation: such that an explanation cites some of the 
`causal mechanism' or `causal history' leading to the event to be explained. One of 
29 the clearest defences of such a position comes from David Lewis. 
Any debate concerning the relative merits of the Aristotelian (`florid-metaphysics') 
position and Lewis' ('causal-reductivist') will turn primarily on two, not unrelated, 
issues. Firstly, how broad is to be the definition of `cause'? Is it the case, for 
example, that the term `cause' can encompass standing conditions, inertia, and 
Aristotle's `substance' and `matter'? Secondly, is it metaphysically possible to 
consider disposition, function, supervenience and the like to be reducible to causal 
structure? I am less concerned about these issues than I am about the standing of the 
ontic model with regard to the other approaches mentioned in this chapter, though I 
will return to it in chapter six. Suffice to say that causal explanation will be seen to be 
the paradigmatic sense of ontic explanation in general, though it may not be able to 
encompass the entire meaning of the latter. 
26 David-Hillel Ruben, Explaining Explanation (London: Routledge, 
1990), chapter III 
27 Ibid., 217-230 
28 In particular, Jaegwon Kim, `Noncausal 
Connections' in Nous 8 (1974): 41-52 
29 David Lewis, `Causal Explanation' (originally 
1986) in Explanation, ed. Ruben 
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It seems sensible to combine the cognitive and ontic approaches in some way. 
Explanation is fundamentally a cognitive activity; it is that activity which produces a 
certain understanding. However, as we have seen, even if we can specify what 
`understanding' is to mean in this context, not just any understanding of the correct 
type is truly explanatory. This is where an ontic criterion proves useful: for the 
demand to `cite an appropriate mechanism' provides a way of understanding what 
more is needed for explanation. My conception of historical explanation, developed 
throughout this thesis but particularly in chapter six, will rely on both cognitive and 
ontic notions. 
Can we, however, dispense with the cognitive element to the analysis, and rely solely 
on ontic (plus pragmatic) notions? Salmon thinks not, since `understanding' can be 
deployed in more than one sense, only one of which refers to understanding of causes. 
Yet certain writers claim that an ontic analysis can dispense with the cognitive 
element. Such a conviction has been argued for in two different ways: by rebutting 
alleged examples of non-causal explanations, or, more positively, by demonstrating 
that all cognitive explanatory virtues reduce to ontic notions. 
Lewis attempts to rebut supposed examples of non-causal (scientific) explanation of 
particulars, on a case by case basis, either through re-interpreting them as cases of 
causal explanation, or by arguing that they are not really explanations at all. I will not 
examine Lewis' arguments in detail, but will mention two grounds for concern. 
Firstly, in his third case30, Lewis argues that the supposed `explanation' is, in fact a 
re-description: `Why is Walt immune to smallpox? T 'Because he possesses antibodies 
capable of killing the smallpox virus'. Lewis instead regards the possession of 
antibodies as being the disposition which is Walt's immunity. But even 
if this is so, it 
seems clear that we can sometimes explain a phenomenon 
by re-describing it (a claim 
which will be substantiated in chapter six). If this 
is the case, then Lewis' answer 
may not be sufficient to rebut the counter-example. 
Secondly, Lewis claims that `understanding' can be dispensed with, since 
`understanding why an event took place might, I think, just mean possession of 
explanatory information about it - the more of that you possess, 
the better you 
30 Ibid., 190-192 
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understand'31. This simply doesn't seem true; indeed Lewis' phrase on the following 
page suggests a counter-example: "`Who is Bob Hawke? " No need to write the 
definitive biography ... 
' 
The second argument for a purely ontic notion of `explanation' proceeds by 
attempting to demonstrate that the cognitive virtues underlying cognitive analyses of 
explanation in fact reduce to the purely ontic virtue of `knowing the underlying causal 
mechanism'. If this is the case, then `understanding' plays no substantive role in the 
analysis, and the only explanatory good is more knowledge of the causal history (just 
as Lewis claimed). This is the strategy of Barnes and Rappaport32, in their respective 
criticisms of Lipton's account of Inference to the Best Explanation. Barnes, for 
example, aims to reduce Lipton's explanatory virtues of `precision' and `coherence 
with background beliefs' to knowledge of causal mechanism, so that `Lipton's various 
criteria of explanatory loveliness rest upon antecedently accepted principles of the 
33 world's overall causal structure' 
Linguistic explanation 
Hayden White's ideas are possibly less well known to analytic philosophers of 
explanation than those already introduced. However, the influence of those ideas on 
the philosophy of history of the past thirty years has been immense; and, in any case, 
much of what White has to say on narrative and explanation has a bearing on the 
central questions of this thesis. 
I call White's philosophy of history `linguistic' since it focuses purely on the 
discourse of historians. For White, historical explanation is analysed as 
deriving from 
the linguistic devices a historian uses. An explicit part of this approach 
is that the 
31 Ibid., 195 
32 Steven Rappaport, `Inference to the Best Explanation: is it Really Different 
from Mill's Methods'. '' in 
Philosophy of Science 63 (1996): 65-80 
33 Barnes, 274 
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explanatory concepts of the discourse do not refer to anything in the historical record. 
There are, in the historical past itself, no narrative structures, no historical laws, no 
relations of importance or significance. These items are not discovered by the 
historian in the historical past; rather, they are rhetorical devices created by the 
historian in their writing. White described and compared these rhetorical devices in 
some detail; an outline of his four-fold categorisation of explanatory devices 
34 follows 
First, the historian explains the historical events through emplotting those events in a 
narrative form which takes a familiar shape. These forms include Romance (featuring 
a hero who succeeds by transcending the world of experience); Tragedy (terrible fates 
are suffered, yet lessons can be learnt by the spectators of these events); Comedy 
(temporary triumph is achieved through a reconciliation of sorts); and Satire (the 
opposite of Romance: `man is ultimately a captive of the world rather than its 
master'35). Note that the similarity of fictional-narrative forms and historical- 
narrative forms is, for White, quite intentional. 
Second, the historian explains through formal argument. This mode of explanation is 
more akin to theories of scientific explanation, especially Hempel's D-N theory. 
However, White wishes to take into account the fact that `historians disagree, not only 
over what are the laws of social causation that they might evoke to explain a given 
sequence of events, but also over the question of the form that a "scientific" 
explanation ought to take. '36 For this reason, explanation by `scientific' laws 
represents only one option: the mechanistic. The other three possibilities are formist 
(explanation proceeds by identifying the unique aspects of that explained); organicist 
(explanation proceeds by identifying the common final goal which unifies the events 
explained); and contextualist (explanation proceeds by tracing the threads which 
connect the event to be explained to its wider context). 
34 The major source for these ideas is the Introduction to 
White's Metahistory. In this work, White 
examines eight nineteenth-century 
historians, but it is clear that White believes that a similar notion of 
historical scholarship is applicable more generally. 
35Ibid., 9 
36 Ibid. , 12 
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Third, the historical events are always provided by the historian (often unconsciously) 
with an ideological implication, which serves to explain in a moralistic sense. The 
four options which White conceives of are Anarchism, Conservatism, Radicalism, and 
Liberalism. In addition to these three basic explanatory devices found within the 
historian's discourse, there are differing historiographical styles. These styles, or 
`tropes', are ways of verbally categorising the historical past, prior to deploying the 
three explanatory strategies. These explicitly rhetorical devices are metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony; and each style tends to be associated with 
particular explanatory types from those above. (I will say no more concerning the 
categorisations of ideological implication and historiographical style, since they will 
be of less relevance to the current study. ) 
It is possible to question White's over-formalism (that he is overly restrictive of the 
possible options in each category of explanation), and perhaps his reliance on an out 
of fashion and over-structural literary theory. Debate has also raged over the extent to 
which narratives are created by the linguistic practice of the historian, as White 
claims, or are discovered in the historical past. However, more important in the 
context of this thesis is to ask in what sense White's philosophy is a philosophy of 
explanation. 
The only general answer is that all these types of explanation somehow endow the 
events of the historical account with a sense of meaning, through the use of various 
rhetorical devices. (White's account could, therefore, be seen partly 
in terms of a 
cognitive theory of explanation. ) Explanation by 
ideological implication explains by 
providing a moral meaning to the set of events. Explanation 
by emplotment explains 
by providing a familiar meaning to the events 
(it is claimed that the various types of 
plot are deeply embedded within our shared culture; even 
that they are culture- 
transcendent37). 
37 Hayden White, `The Value of NarratiVity 
in the Representation of Reality' in Hayden White, The 
Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins 
University Press, 1987), 1 
87 
Explanation by formal argument provides meaning by providing "`the point of it all" 
or "what it all adds up to"'38. Little more can be said about explanation by formal 
argument in general, considering the variety in the types of formal argument. In 
particular, a type such as `formist explanation', which explains not according to unity 
but particularity, is particularly hard to explicate in terms common to the other types. 
Even White, at times, struggles to comprehend formist explanations as genuinely 
explanatory. Commenting on the transition from organicist to formist history, 
exemplified in the work of Ranke, White says that 
`The transition [from organicist to formist] can be characterised as a modification in which 
the impulse to explanation is sublimated to a desire simply to describe the process as it 
unfolds before the historian's gaze. '39 
Stating why precisely the various rhetorical devices should be regarded as explanatory 
devices represents something of a gap in White's writing. One of White's few 
statements on this topic is to maintain that narrative (and presumably the other 
rhetorical devices) are the only way to move beyond simple representation. 
Following Barthes, White states that `narrative ceaselessly substitutes meaning for the 
straightforward copy of the events recounted'40. Later in the same essay, he makes it 
clear that `meaning' should be taken, primarily, as `moral meaning': `it seems 
possible to conclude that every historical narrative has as its latent or manifest 
purpose the desire to moralize the events of which it treats. '4' 
The breadth of White's scheme may be admired as a virtue, since quite different 
historical approaches are treated on their own terms, free from the influence of a 
restrictive, a priori, conception of explanation. Yet this very breadth is liable to invite 
criticism. In particular, we are surely entitled to ask what these different types of 
`explanations' have in common; in other words, what makes them (and not other 
rhetorical devices) explanatory. To the extent that White does provide an answer - 
in 
38 White, Metahistory, 11 
39 Ibid., 186 
40 White, `The Value of Narrativity', 2 
41 Ibid., 14 
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terms of providing meaning -- we can ask whether all ways of providing meaning are 
explanatory. 
I hope, primarily in chapter six, to develop an understanding of historical explanation 
which can account, as does White, for the range of explanations produced by 
historians. Yet, this understanding proceeds by identifying at least relevant, and 
substantive, similarities between types of explanation. In addition, in order to 
properly account for explanatory exclusion and competition, I will argue that we need 
to abandon White's overt and extreme anti-realism, and his emphasis on the 
moralising nature of all historical writing. 
Contrastive explanation 
The idea that explanation is contrastive amounts to the thesis that the explanandum is 
not represented by a simple proposition `p', but a complex represented by the phrase 
`p rather than q (or ql, q2, q3 ... 
42. The terminology: p is the fact, whilst q is the foil, 
or contrast. The overall complex I call the explanandum, or equivalently the 
explanatory target. Contrastive explanation has become an influential and well 
developed body of theory since the idea was first introduced by Dretske43, and then 
developed by Van Fraassen44, Garfinke145, and Lipton46 
Van Fraassen introduced the notion of contrast in the context of his erotetic theory of 
explanation, and contrastive explanation and erotetic explanation have been 
42 Contrastive theory might be applied to other concepts as well as `explanation'. `Knowledge' is an 
obvious candidate: one may know `that p (rather than q)' - i. e., 
be able to distinguish p and q- and yet 
not know `that p (rather than r)'. This may be useful in understanding sceptical arguments 
designed to 
demonstrate our inability to distinguish between, say, the real world and a certain sort of 
illusion. 
43 Fred I. Dretske, `Contrastive Statements' in Philosophical Review 81 (1972): 411-437 
44 Van Fraassen, chapter 5 
as Garfinkel, chapter 1 
46 Peter Lipton, `Contrastive Explanation' (originally 1990) 
in Explanation, ed. David-Hillel Ruben 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): 207-227 
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commonly treated as a package. However, I would argue that it is preferable to 
consider contrastive explanation as a thesis concerning what precisely it is that gets 
explained (the explanandum, or target). It is, therefore, a thesis which can be used to 
supplement any of the above four approaches. The erotetic approach would speak of 
contrastive why-questions; the causal (ontic) approach would refer to causal 
information required to explain a contrastive phenomenon. In analysing `contrastive 
explanation', reference to why-questions is redundant, as Markwick points out47. I do 
commonly refer to `contrastive questions' and `contrastive answers' in what follows, 
but this should not be taken to mean that those phrases are analytically basic. A 
contrastive question is one which has as its object a contrastive target; a contrastive 
answer is one which answers a contrastive question. 
In what follows, I will firstly discuss contrastive questions: their form, and constraints 
upon good questions. Next, I will discuss contrastive answers: in particular, criteria 
of adequacy governing replies to contrastive questions. 
A contrastive question is of the form `why p, rather than q (or ql, q2, q3 ... )? '. Such a 
question presupposes (i) that the fact is true, whilst the foils are not, and (ii) that at 
least one of the set had to happen. The earlier view (Garfinkel, Van Fraassen) 
maintained the presupposition that one and only one of the set had to happen; I will 
follow Lipton in dispensing with this exclusivity requirement, for the following 
reason. 
Lipton was the first to point out that there are different types of contrastive question - 
compatible and incompatible48. In the case of compatible contrasts, it is possible that 
both fact and foil could have been realised; though, as it turned out, only the fact was. 
Incompatible contrasts, however, preclude each other: there is no way that both fact 
and foil could have been realised (though it could have been the case that what we call 
the foil was realised whilst what we call the fact was not). This distinction is 
particularly relevant to historical questions, for there are examples of each. `Why was 
47 P. Markwick, `Interrogatives and Contrasts in Explanation Theory' in Philosophical Studies 96 
(1999), 188-9 
48 Peter Lipton, `Contrastive Explanation', 211 
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there a revolution in France in 1789, rather than in England? ' is compatible; `why was 
there a revolution in France in 1789, rather than 1787? ' is incompatible 49 
Contrastive explanation provides a framework for understanding the role of 
implicature and the pragmatics of explanation. The contrast or contrasts are 
frequently not explicitly specified; this is because in most situations, the contrast is 
very obvious. The usual contrast to `why did you hand your essay in a day late? ' is 
unlikely to be `rather than handing in something else', though this may be implied in 
certain contexts. More likely is the contrast `rather than handing in the essay on 
time'. The contrast is implied by the pragmatic context, and is then used to shape the 
relevance of potential answers. In discussion of the ontic conception, I mentioned 
that it is necessary to provide a pragmatic understanding of explanatory relevance; I 
will argue in chapter five that the purpose of contrastive explanation is to focus the 
explanatory information which is relevant in a particular explanatory context. 
Whilst the ultimate guide to what contrast is intended can only be understood relevant 
to the particular explanatory situation, there are certain features which make contrasts 
more or less useful. A good contrastive question is typically one in which the foils are 
relevantly similar to the fact. The fact and foils should share many features, allowing 
attention to be focused upon the fewer differences. For example, whilst Skocpol's 
question `why was there a revolution in France in the late eighteenth century, rather 
than in England? ' is enlightening, the question `why was there a revolution in France 
in the late eighteenth century, rather than in New Zealand? ' is anything but. 
Barnes notes that the criterion of similarity between fact and foil is necessary but not 
sufficient to constrain sensible contrastive questions50. Barnes asks us to imagine that 
if `Bush wins the '88 election' (P) had not obtained, then `Bush was depressed' (Q) 
would have; further, in actual fact P turned out true. P and Q presumably have similar 
causal histories, right up to the point where Bush won the election, where the 
histories 
49 We can add that, though useful, the distinction between compatible and 
incompatible is not as sharp 
as Lipton seems to presume. The fact and 
foil may preclude each other to any given degree; we might 
call these `lifeboat cases'. If Jill and Jane are stranded 
in a lifeboat wherein only a small amount of 
food is available, the question `why did Jill survive, rather than 
Jane? ' still logically be a compatible 
one, yet a compatibility which is, in practice, unlikely since 
the survival of one radically reduces the 
chances of survival of the other. 
50 Barnes, 46-47 
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of P and Q diverge. Therefore, the similarity condition is fulfilled. Yet the 
contrastive question `why did Bush win the '88 election, rather than getting 
depressed? ' is not a sensible one to ask; unlike `why did Bush win the '88 election, 
rather than narrowly losing it? '. Barnes proposes to add a further criterion for good 
contrastive questions: that `P and Q are culminating outcomes of some single type of 
natural causal process'51. Of course, what `same type' means will, in part, depend on 
pragmatics, specifiable according to investigative interest. 
A contrastive question focuses attention on the difference between fact and foil(s). A 
first, approximate, formulation for a condition of adequacy that a contrastive answer 
must meet is that the answer must provide such information, and only that 
information, which distinguishes between the occurrence of the fact and the foil(s). 
But this is very rough; in particular, we need an accurate analysis of `distinguish' in 
the previous sentence. I shall consider three possible explications: Lewis' 
counterfactual analysis, Lipton's Difference Condition (DC), and Van Fraassen's (and 
Hitchcock' probabilistic relevance model. 
Lewis claimed that to explain `why P rather than Q' is to provide a cause of P which 
would not have also led to Q. For example, to explain 
(MO) 'why L. gave a talk at Monash University rather than giving a talk at Oxford 
University' 
we might cite the fact that `the climate is good in Monash at that time of year'53 
Lipton pointed out54, however, that we could imagine a particular cause of 
P (say, 
`being invited to speak at Monash') which would not also have led to Q; yet could 
imagine such a cause to be non-explanatory. In terms of MO, this would 
be the case 
where an invitation also came from Oxford. Lewis' analysis, therefore, 
does not pick 
out a sufficient condition for explanatory adequacy. 
51 Ibid., 50 
52 Christopher Hitchcock, `Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of 
Determinism' in British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 50(4) (1999): 585-612 
53 Lewis, `Causal Explanation', 196 
54 Lipton, `Contrastive Explanation', 215-216 
92 
The natural response to the sort of counter-example offered is that we should modify 
Lewis' formulation so as to demand a cause of P, a type of which would not have also 
led to Q. This would indeed solve the counter-example where both universities 
invited L., but Lipton sees a further problem. He envisages a case where there is a 
cause of Q which is a necessary cause: for example, suppose that an invitation is a 
necessary condition of speaking. In this case, an invitation could still have been the 
explanatory cause of speaking at Monash rather than at Oxford, since maybe only 
Monash issued an invitation. Yet a cause of that type certainly would have led to 
speaking at Oxford. Thus, the modified counterfactual analysis now does not pick out 
a necessary condition for explanatory adequacy. 
The net result of this argument is that a counterfactual model will not do; we need to 
pay attention to the actual history of the foil. Lipton proposes that to explain 'wvhy P 
rather than Q, we select an actual difference between the causal histories of P and 
not-Q : where not-Q is the actual history which represents the failure of the foil to be 
realised. There should be given a 'cause of P and the absence of a corresponding 
event in the case of not-Q'55. This is the Difference Condition (DC) for adequacy of 
answers to explanation-seeking contrastive questions. 
DC provides detail to the rough idea that answers should somehow distinguish 
between fact and foil(s), and as such is a major advance in our theory of contrastive 
explanation. It is, essentially, the analysis I will adopt for the subsequent use of 
contrastive explanation in this thesis. However, I do wish to make three comments 
which should sharpen understanding of DC. 
Firstly, DC clearly applies only to causal explanation, due to the language used; yet I 
believe contrastive explanation to be a type of explanation applicable to any relation 
thought to be potentially explanatory. However, it would seem that only a simple 
modification would be required to extend the applicability of DC 
beyond causal 
explanation. Any ontic explanation will maintain a set of 
facts explanatorily relevant 
to the happening of P, and a further set relevant to the happening of not-Q. Thus, 
55 Ibid., 217 
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generalising DC, an answer to `why P rather than Q' requires an actual difference 
between the explanatorily relevant facts pertaining to P and to not-Q, where this fact 
is explanatorily relevant to P and a corresponding fact is absent in the case of not-Q. 
Secondly, we should recognise that DC does not restrict differences between the fact 
and negated foil to a single one. There may be many relevant actual differences 
between the histories of P and not-Q. Some of these differences may be more salient 
than others - an idea developed in Part III. 
Thirdly, DC handles cases of compatible contrast better than it does those of 
incompatible contrast. In the case of incompatible contrasts, it seems (given just what 
I have stated above) that DC asks us to find a difference between the history of the 
fact, and the history of the negated foil. Yet, where the two options are mutually 
exclusive, the history of the fact refers to much the same information as does the 
history of the failed foil. Consider 
`why did L. go to Monash, rather than not going? ' 
What is in the history of failing to `not go to Monash', if it is not just going to 
Monash?! There is, in this case, no way for a cause to be in one history and not the 
other. 
Lipton recognises this difficulty, and consequently responsibility falls to the notion of 
'corresponding event' S6. In cases of incompatible contrast, DC should not require us 
to simply find a cause of P absent from the history of not-Q. Rather, it requires a 
cause of P which does not have a corresponding event in the history of not-Q. A 
corresponding event in the history of not-Q is 'something that would bear the same 
relation to Q as the cause of P bears to P'57. 
As Hitchcock points out58, the notion of `same relation' is not an exact one. 
Hitchcock's example introduces Adam, who orders a lasagne rather than a salad. It 
would be plausible to explain this choice by stating that Adam was hungry; even 
though the hunger was in the history of both ordering the lasagne and not ordering the 
56Ibid., 217 
57 Ibid., 217 
58 Hitchcock, 596 
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salad, and would have been a cause of eating the salad had Adam ordered this. The 
reason that the hunger is nonetheless a relevant difference is that Adam's hunger bore 
`more of a relation' to ordering the lasagne than it did to ordering the salad. 
Recognising the vagueness of `corresponding event' is not necessarily a fatal 
concession for DC to make. We only need recognise that answers to incompatible 
contrastive questions can be better or worse, due to the cause being more or less 
corresponding. 
Finally, we should consider the `probabilistically relevant' (PR) notion of contrastive 
adequacy as a possible competitor to DC. Hitchcock offers PR in response to the 
above criticism of `corresponding event'; Van Fraassen's account is similar. Van 
Fraassen's contrastive condition of adequacy on an answer A to explain `why B 
(rather than ... )' is `on the basis of how well A redistributes the probabilities on the 
contrast-class so as to favour B against its alternatives. '59 Hitchcock takes an answer 
to a contrastive question to be an attempt to provide a probabilistically relevant factor, 
given the presupposition that either the fact or (to be read inclusively) one of the foils 
must have been the case60. The answer must `redistribute probabilities' in the correct 
way: it must increase the probability of the fact happening over the foil(s). 
One advantage of PR is claimed to be that it is easily able to accommodate the 
changes in degree which we saw were necessary in our discussion of Lipton's notion 
of `corresponding', since an answer may increase the probability of the fact over the 
foil(s) by any degree61. The problematic notion of `correspondence' is to be replaced 
by the tidier (and potentially quantitative) notion of `probabilistically relevant'. It is 
worth examining this claim. At first sight, DC and PR perhaps seem equivalent, so 
long as causal explanation in general is equivalent to the citing of facts which raise 
the probability of the effect62. 
59 Van Fraassen, 147 
60 Hitchcock, sections 7 and 8 
61 Ibid., 602 
62 We might question this assumption in two ways: firstly, by asking whether all causes raise 
probability. Secondly, we might ask whether all raising of probability is achieved causally. Other 
means include as a result of geometrical properties (as in Lipton's example of the orientation of thrown 
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Yet, on closer inspection, the two approaches yield different kinds of answers. In 
discussion of a structurally similar case to MO (Lewis' Monash/ Oxford decision), 
Hitchcock asks `why Jones, rather than Smith, has paresis'63. According to PR, the 
correct reply is `the information that Jones had latent untreated syphilis, but Smith did 
not'. The subtle, yet crucial, difference between this formulation and that of DC is 
that the answer does not cite a relevant cause, but instead provides probabilistically 
relevant information. 
This locution suggests counter-examples to PR. For example (back to L. 's decision), 
suppose that Monash has a good climate at this time of year, whilst Oxford has 
excellent real ale pubs. Suppose further (not implausibly) that these facts were 
equally likely to tempt Lewis to visit the respective universities. Then the information 
given in sentence S: `Monash has a good climate at this time of year and Oxford has 
excellent real ale pubs' is not probabilistically relevant to (4). Therefore, according to 
PR, S is absolutely no good as an explanation. However, it seems that S is more of an 
explanation than the reply T: `both Monash and Oxford invited Lewis'. The latter is 
not only probabilistically irrelevant (as is S), but, unlike S, provides no explanatory 
causes at all. 
The difference between S and T cannot be found in their probabilistic relevance, 
which is equal: both are zero. Rather, the difference is that in the first statement the 
causes stated are of different types; in the second they are not. But to understand this 
feature as explanatorily relevant, we require a notion of `correspondence'; 
probabilistic relevance will not account for the difference. The notion of 
`correspondence', or `same relation' remains necessary; it cannot be replaced by 
`probabilistically relevant'. I suggest instead that probabilistic relevance may do 
some work as a condition of the degree of goodness of contrastive answers, requiring 
DC as a prior condition of adequacy. This suggestion will be examined in chapter 
eight. 
sticks, `Contrastive Explanation', 208; discussed in chapter six); or even as a result of 
logical relation. 
`Abel's death' raises the probability of `Brenda being a widow' (from 0 to 1), but does not thereby 
cause Brenda's widowhood. 
63 Hitchcock, 605 
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The account of historical explanation which I shall recommend draws primarily on the 
ontic and cognitive traditions. I will not attempt a defence of this account at this 
point, since it will be developed in conjunction with an examination of the case study 
explanations. However, the outlines can be sketched: an analysis of historical 
explanation must emphasise (i) the need for relevant causes (understood in a broad 
sense), or other relational ontic feature and (ii) the need for proper conceptualisation 
of those causes. (i) seems vital in marking out what is distinctive about explanatori, 
information, and in dissolving problems of asymmetry which plague solely cognitive 
accounts. `Relevant' in (i) is to be understood with reference to the constraints of 
contrastive explanation, and hence is primarily a pragmatic term. 
Yet those who would place all the weight on ontic notions (even if supplemented by 
pragmatic rules) underestimate the role of re-conceptualisation in explanation. Even 
if historians cite correct and relevant causes, not every way of doing this will be 
explanatory. In addition, `explanation by re-description' is particularly prevalent in 
historical scholarship, and this must be accounted for. 
I will develop this dual understanding of explanation is chapters five and six. Chapter 
five will be concerned with the criterion of causal relevance: I shall rely heavily on 
the theory of contrastive explanation, and aim to demonstrate the applications of this 
notion with regard to explanatory exclusion. Chapter six will be concerned with the 
criterion of proper conceptualisation, and its link with explanatory competition. I 
will, at that point, investigate the cognitive virtues which underpin the historical 
explanations under examination. The overall aim is to adopt an account of historical 
explanation which can do justice to the wide variety of historical explanations found 
in the case study, and in historical scholarship more generally. 
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Part II 
Chapter Four: Principles of Explanatory Exclusion 
Part I was concerned with developing the methodological basis for the present work, 
introducing the historical material to be used as a case study, and providing an overview 
of approaches to analysing `explanation'. The primary focus of Part II will be 
explanatory exclusion. 
It is helpful to begin by considering two previous attempts to analyse the idea of 
explanatory exclusion. Each proceeds from a different understanding of explanation, as 
introduced in chapter three. The first `Principle of Explanatory Exclusion' (PEE 
hereafter) is Jaegwon Kim's. It is based on the idea that explanation picks out relevant 
features of the world - it is therefore an ontic conception. The second PEE is based upon 
Bas Van Fraassen's erotetic theory of explanation. After a brief examination of some 
examples of competition and non-competition in our historical examples, I will then 
develop my own, more general, notion of explanatory exclusion. 
Ontic Principle of Explanatory Exclusion 
A good first step towards comprehending explanatory exclusion is to focus on the targets 
(explananda) of the explanations. Where two explanations have the same target we might 
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think that their relationship is thereby a candidate for exclusion. However, not all 
explanations with the same target thereby exclude one another: a first explanation which 
cites the icy road as a cause of the accident does not exclude a second which cites the 
tiredness of the driver. 
Having the same target seems relevant to explanatory exclusion then, but not sufficient 
(and, I will argue, not strictly necessary either). An attempt to specify what else is 
required for exclusion is given by Kim's Principle of Explanatory Exclusion (which I 
shall subsequently abbreviate KPEE): 
`there can be no more than a single complete and independent explanation of any one event, and 
we may not accept two (or more) explanations of a single event unless we know, or have reason 
to believe, that they are appropriately related - that is, related in such a way that one of the 
explanations is either not complete in itself or dependent on the other. " 
Kim deploys this principle to debate the status of causal mental explanations as compared 
to causal neuro-physiological explanations; yet his PEE is intended to be general towards 
both subject matter and nature of the explanatory relation. In particular, it is not intended 
to be restricted only to causal explanation. Clearly, in order to assess KPEE, we need to 
be able to properly interpret certain key terms: in particular, `complete' and 
`independent'. Kim's substantive attempts to define these terms are based on making 
apparent the link between the KPEE and explanatory realism. 
Kim defines explanatory realism thus: `C is an explanans for E in virtue of the fact that c 
bears to e some determinate objective relation R. Let us call R, whatever it is, an 
"explanatory relation. " 92 We should make clear at this point that, under Kim's version of 
explanatory realism, `e' - what is explained - stands 
for an event. Given a commitment 
to explanatory realism of this kind, it is claimed that KPEE follows naturally. 
This is 
1 Jaegwon Kim, `Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and Explanatory Exclusion' in Midwest 
Studies in 
Philosophy 12 (1988), 233 
2 Ibid., 226 
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shown by attempting an exhaustive consideration of all possible relationships between 
multiple ontological `relations', and hence (given explanatory realism) between multiple 
explanations. The aim is to demonstrate that there are only three possibilities, 
corresponding to those mentioned in the definition of KPEE. Either relations (hence 
explanations) exclude, or they are incomplete, or they are dependent. 
Consider two explanations of the same event e; explanation one refers to fact c's 
appropriate relation to e, whilst explanation two refers to fact c*'s appropriate relation to 
e. There are five possible relations between c and c*, and hence (given explanatory 
realism) five possible relations between explanations one and two: 
1. c= c*. The explanations refer to the same items, even though different terms 
may be used to pick these out. 
2. c is supervenient on c*. 
3. c and c* are not independent; for example, c is an earlier link in a causal chain 
which comes to include c*, hence c* is dependent upon c. 
4. c and c* are each components of a wider explanatorily relevant event; for 
example, c and c* are both necessary but insufficient causes comprising a 
jointly sufficient set. Hence neither c nor c* is complete. 
5. c and c* overdetermine e. In this case also, Kim claims that neither c nor c* is 
complete. 
Cases one and two are those in which we actually have only one explanation, not two. 
Case three describes dependent explanations, which are excluded from KPEE. Cases 
four and five are cases of incomplete explanations, also excluded from KPEE. To derive 
KPEE, therefore, we need to assume two things: firstly the realist principle that 
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explanatory relationships mirror ontological relationships; secondly, that the above five 
possibilities map all possible ontological relationships3. 
Any defence of the latter premise is likely to be inconclusive, since it is only established 
to the extent that we cannot think of any possible relationships other than the five 
mentioned by Kim. I will mention only one potential counter-example here4. Two 
explanations may be linked by the relationship of instantiation. Such examples are each 
(potentially) complete, and are not dependent (in the sense of one being a cause of the 
other), yet do not lead to exclusion. As such, they appear to be a counter-example to 
KPEE. An example: `Why did Able die? ' Explanation (i) states that it was `Because of 
Briar's passionate jealousy'; explanation (ii) that it was `Because of Briar's stabbing of 
Able'. Explanation (ii) is an instantiation of explanation (i), specifying the detailed 
mechanism by which (i) took place. 
Whilst an explanatory relationship of instantiation cannot be straightforwardly 
accommodated by KPEE, I will argue in chapter five that such examples can be shown to 
be comprehensible according to the general intuition behind KPEE. Still, the issue does 
demonstrate that development of Kim's PEE in the way that I shall suggest is not an 
optional extra, but necessary if KPEE is not to be susceptible to counter-example. At this 
point, however, I would now like to question three more general features of the above 
model. These are: first, the treatment of over-determined explanation in KPEE; second, 
the applicability of a defence of KPEE outside the realm of causal explanation; third, and 
most importantly, the notion of a complete explanation. 
3 Thagard's comments on explanatory competition are similar in most respects to Kim's. For example, in 
his most recent paper on the topic (Paul Thagard, `Probabilistic Networks and Explanatory Coherence' in 
Cognitive Science Quarterly 1 (2000): 91-114) Thagard provides two necessary and jointly sufficient 
conditions for explanatory exclusion: that the explanations explain the same explanandum; and that the 
explanations are not `explanatorily connected' (Thagard, 97). This phrase is intended to cover cases where 
one explanation is a part of the other, or both are part of a greater explanatory whole; hence this condition 
corresponds to Kim's demand for 'completeness'. Thagard overlooks the necessity for a requirement of 
independence. 
4 Suggested to me by George Botterill. 
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It is clear that Kim's treatment of over-determining causes is unsatisfactory. Indeed, 
given Kim's strategy of defining explanatory relationships with reference to ontological 
relationships, the claim that two over-determined explanations are individually 
incomplete seems inconsistent and unmotivated. The meaning of `over-determined' is 
that the two causal processes are complete antecedents for the same effect, and are 
independent. If this is so, then over-determining explanations must also be excluded 
from KPEE (though, Kim does indicate at one point that he is prepared to consider this 
possibility5). 
Of course, the relevance of this criticism depends entirely on whether there are many (or 
any) genuine cases of causal overdetermination in the historical subject matter. And this 
issue itself depends largely on whether we take explanatory targets to be broad or narrow: 
if the former, there is more scope for potential cases of overdetermination. The 
examination of the nature of explanatory targets, in the following chapter, will address 
this question. 
Secondly: whilst it is Kim's intention that KPEE be general with respect to explanatory 
relation, it is not clear how this can be supported. As we have seen, substantive support 
for KPEE has only been provided through the investigation of possible causal 
relationships, thereby demonstrating that causal explanations of the same event are either 
exclusive, dependent, or incomplete. The five possibilities envisaged by Kim do perhaps 
seem exhaustive of causal relationships (though, as I have suggested, this can hardly be 
proved conclusively). Yet it is not at all clear that these correspond in any 
straightforward manner with explanations featuring other explanatory relationships - for 
example, teleological, functional, or rational. Still more problematic would be the 
comparison of different explanatory relationships; for example, where there are two 
explanations of the same event, one of which is causal, the second teleological. Are these 
to be excluded? Are they complete or not, independent or not? This is an issue which I 
5 Jaegwon Kim, `Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion' (originally 1989) in Jaegwon Kim, 
Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays, ed. Ernest Sosa (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 253 
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shall explore in chapter six. For now we must admit that, to the extent that it is a good 
theory, KPEE has only been shown to be plausible in accounting for causal explanation. 
`Man's mind cannot grasp the causes of events in their completeness, but the desire to find those 
causes is implanted in man's soul. '6 - Tolstoy 
What are we to make of the notion of a complete explanation? Let us focus on causal 
explanations, in line with my second observation. In this case, two potential meanings of 
`complete' immediately come to mind. First, we could take a complete causal 
explanation to be one which cites all antecedents of the target event. Famously, Mill 
regarded only such a complete set as the `real Cause' of an event7. Yet, considerations 
similar to Mill's suggest the impossibility of ever listing such a set, and therefore the 
impossibility of providing a complete explanation. In imagining a set of conditions 
sufficient to produce a particular death, Mill lists 
`the act of eating the dish, combined with a particular constitution, a particular state of present 
health, and perhaps even a certain state of the atmosphere ... all the conditions were equally 
indispensable to the production of the consequent; and the statement of the cause is incomplete, 
unless in some shape or other we introduce them all'8 
Not only are there many causal antecedents of any given event, it is clear that causal 
explanation must also utilise negative causal information; in other words, causal 
explanations also mention the absence of certain factors. If the unfortunate person in 
Mill's example usually took a particular medicine before eating, but before the fateful 
meal in question did not, then an explanation of the death could not be considered 
complete without including amongst the antecedents the fact that `the person did not, 
before eating the dish in question, take their regular medicine'. Yet if this is to be 
6 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Louise and Aylmer Maude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991; 
originally 1868-9), 1055 
7 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Charlottesville: Lincoln-Rembrandt, 
1996; originally 1843), Book III, Chapter V, Section 3 
8 Ibid. 
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allowed, then the causal information required for a complete explanation of this sort is 
not only lengthy, but unlimited: for there can surely be no exhaustive list of absent 
causes. In that case, it is unclear how completeness can function even as an ideal 
standard for explanations. Finally, the notion of a complete explanation can appear still 
more ridiculous when we consider that causal chains stretch back indefinitely in time: 
should a complete explanation therefore mention all causes of a given event? 
A second, and more promising, interpretation of `complete' is to make use of Deductive- 
Nomological explanation. Consider the explanation 
(1): `JS ate dish x and had condition y; everyone who eats dish x and has condition y 
dies; therefore JS died. ' 
Or (2): `JS ate dish x and had condition z; everyone who eats dish x and has condition z 
dies a painful death'. 
If such explanations are available then they are also, in one sense, complete explanations 
of JS's death. The sense in which these are complete is that the premises are sufficient to 
produce the target. This reading of `complete', as meaning `sufficient', is at least more 
workable than `complete' as meaning `all causal information', since sufficient 
explanations are certainly possible in practice. 
Yet Kim is not keen to interpret `complete' in this way: he is concerned that to do so 
would be in contradiction with the principles of explanatory realism9. Kim's reason for 
believing this appears to be the general one that 
`a preoccupation with the deductive or inferential character of explanation leads to a form of 
explanatory irrealism ... 
[it] point[s] away from explanatory realism with the causal relation 
serving as objective correlate of the explanatory relation"O 
9 Kim `Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion', 240-243 
10 Kim, `Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and Explanatory Exclusion'., 236 
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Why would Kim think this? There are three possibilities which seem reasonable, given 
Kim's other comments on the issue. First, we may be concerned about the status of the 
laws relied upon. Under a realist, ontic model of explanation, do we therefore have to 
defend nomological realism in addition to causal realism? Second, we may be concerned 
about the notion of an explanation as an argument; Salmon and Kim, in particular, have 
often emphasised the irrealist consequences of such a conception. Third, it would no 
longer be correct to think that explanatory targets are events. Hempel makes it clear that, 
according to the D-N analysis, what is explained are not events, but 
`kinds or properties of events. ... 
For the object of description and explanation in every branch of 
empirical science is always the occurrence of an event of a certain kind. ... 
What is sometimes 
called the complete description of an individual event ... would require a statement of all the 
properties exhibited by the spatial region of the individual object involved, for the period of time 
occupied by the event in question. Such a task can never be completely accomplished. '" 
However, I am not inclined to regard these three issues as particularly serious. The 
question of nomological realism is, in the same way as the question of causal realism, 
outside the scope of this thesis. To the extent that we can assume (as I shall) some form 
of the latter doctrine, there is no reason to reject, prima facie, the former. In chapter six, I 
will make it clear that I do not regard the inferential structure of certain explanations to 
be contrary to their causal (ontic) nature. Finally, the argument of chapter five will be 
that explanatory targets are not (despite, perhaps, first appearances) events. 
That does not mean that I regard the analysis of `complete explanation' by means of 
`sufficient explanation' as a fully satisfactory answer. Whilst explanation may be 
regarded both from a causal-realist and an inferential perspective, the inferential does 
have a tendency to introduce causally irrelevant explanans. This was demonstrated 
in 
chapter two, particularly in the example of John and the birth control pills. In that 
example the irrelevance was very easy to spot (that's what made it such a clear counter- 
example to a purely D-N analysis), but this is not always the case. 
To take a well known 
11 Carl G. Hempel, `The Function of General Laws in History', in Journal of Philosophy 
39 (1942), 37 
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example of Hempel's12, the expansion of the copper rod can be deduced (hence, 
according to the D-N model, explained) from both the heating of the rod, and the 
stretching of the rod. Yet, these inferential claims do not imply that the causes were 
equally efficacious. 
More seriously, explanations can be complete and yet not sufficient. If the causal 
mechanism is genuinely stochastic, as it is thought to be in the realm of quantum 
mechanics, then citing all the causes will not be enough to imply that the effect had to 
happen. On the other hand, an explanation may be sufficient, yet not possess the sort of 
features we might intuitively believe to be necessary for complete explanations. For 
example, if the law which guarantees that the explanandum had to happen applies only to 
the case in question (only covers a single case), what does this law really add? Complete 
explanations would then be trivially easy to achieve. 
The notion of a `complete explanation' will turn out to be relevant to much of the 
material of this thesis. I will attempt to develop a more satisfactory understanding of the 
purpose and nature of the concept through further comment at the end of this chapter, in 
chapter five, and in chapter eight. The interim conclusion is that specifying what a 
complete explanation consists of is a non-trivial task, and one which seems to lead to a 
rather different theory of explanation to Kim's ontic approach. However, we cannot 
simply abandon the notion; as I will argue later in this chapter, it does useful work in the 
explication of explanatory exclusion. 
12 Hempel, `Aspects of Scientific Explanation', 418-419 
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Erotetic Principle of Explanatory Exclusion 
Recall that Van Fraassen's erotetic theory analyses explanations as being answers to 
(explanation seeking) why questions. Such questions ask 
`why P rather than Q(or Q1, Q2 ... )?, 
where Q (Q1, Q2 ... 
) are the `contrast class'. The presuppositions of such a why-question 
are that P is true, and that the contrast cases are false. In addition, a range of acceptable 
answers is chosen, or implied, by the question: those which meet the `relevance relation'. 
The answer, A, should meet three criteria. First, A should be true. Second, A should 
discriminate between P and the contrast class (in a sense best given by the Difference 
Condition, introduced in chapter three). Third, A should be a relevant reason for P; for 
Van Fraassen, this means simply that A is one of a class of propositions fulfilling the 
relevance relation in the correct way with respect to the particular question in hand. 
Under the erotetic conception, the provision of an answer which meets the truth 
requirement, the Difference Condition, and the relevance requirement is sufficient for a 
perfectly good explanation. Note that there is no role for 'completeness'. 
Mark Risjord uses this analysis in order to develop an erotetic principle of explanatory 
exclusion. He states that two explanations conflict when either 
'I. the presuppositions of one (kind of) why-question are inconsistent or not compossible with the 
presuppositions of another (kind of) why-question, or 
2. the relevance relation for the two (kinds of) why-questions isolate classes of answers that are 
always or typically inconsistent or not compossible' 
13 
13 Mark Risjord, `No Strings Attached: Functional and Intentional Action Explanations' in Philosophy. of 
Science 66(3 Supplement) (1999), S302 
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It is important to note that Risjord's principles are dependent upon features of the 
question (explanandum), rather than the answer (explanans). This is to be contrasted 
with KPEE, which focused on features of the respective explanans. As we have seen, 
Van Fraassen's theory holds that a why-question has two presuppositions - concerning 
the truth of the topic of explanation, and the falsity of the contrasts relied upon by the 
explanation - and in addition specifies a relevance relation. These features are the basis 
for Risjord's two principles. 
It does no harm to reformulate Risjord's two criteria to make their purpose easier to 
grasp. The first criterion states that, given that topic and contrast jointly constitute the 
target of the explanation, where explanatory targets contradict, the explanations are not 
compatible. (The meaning of `compossible' in this context is not entirely clear, but most 
likely refers to natural compatibility of targets, over and above logical compatibility. ) 
This situation was not envisaged at all by KPEE, but does seem reasonable. Where there 
are contradictory targets (whether or not we believe that those targets are to be 
understood contrastively), it is not possible for both targets to be true; in that case the 
respective explanations are also contradictory, therefore exclusive. I take it that the spirit 
of Risjord's first criterion is undeniable, even if we are not to analyse `target' in terms of 
`why-questions', as Risjord does. 
Risjord's second criterion states that where two explanations conflict over the proper 
relevance relations (i. e. which facts are to be treated as genuinely explanatory), then the 
explanations are exclusive. The fact that explanations disagree over relevance relations 
is not sufficient for exclusion, since it is a feature of the erotetic theory that 
different 
explanations of the same target can quite legitimately have different sorts of relevance 
relations. To use one of Van Fraassen's own examples14, question 
Q may ask 
Q: `why is this conductor warped? ' 
14 Van Fraassen, 142 
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Yet in different pragmatic circumstances (dependent upon what the questioner is 
particularly interested in, what they already know, and so forth) the relevance relations 
may differ. For example, Q asked by a supervisor wanting to know which worker to 
blame may limit relevance to only those answers referring to human error: call this Q1. 
However, where one worker asks another, Q may limit answers to those referring to the 
micro-physical properties of the conductor itself: call this Q2. But in this case it is not 
true that questions Ql and Q2 are exclusive; indeed, this seems a paradigmatic case of 
explanations legitimately focusing on different aspects of the relevant history of the 
conductor's warping. 
Of course, Risjord states that for explanatory exclusion the relevance relations have to be 
not just different, but incompatible (or non-compossible). But note that Van Fraassen's 
example does, in one sense, demonstrate incompatibility of relevance relation: for the 
relevance set of Q1 includes answer A (human error) and not B (micro-physical 
properties), whilst the relevance set of Q2 includes B and not A. What more is required 
for exclusion? It seems that a question has to not only imply a different relevance 
relation than does its competitor, but must also actively disallow the particular answer 
given by the other. In our example, Ql must include A (human error) and also maintain 
that B (micro-physical properties) cannot possibly be a good answer to a question 
concerning the same target. 
This interpretation of the second criterion appears to be that intended by Risjord in his 
analysis of Macdonald and Pettit's rejection of functional explanations of social 
phenomena: `They think that the explanans of social explanations, when taken as 
explanatory, conflict with our conception of ourselves as agents' 
15. In other words, all 
answers to questions involving social action which are in functional terms - those which 
conflict with our conception of ourselves as agents - are excluded. 
However, such an interpretation requires that content be given to `relevance relations' 
which goes well beyond that envisaged by Van Fraassen's in his use of the term. For 
Van Fraassen, the relevance relation represents a pragmatic limitation on what could 
is Risjord, S301 
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possibly be an answer to that particular question, in that particular context. Why- 
questions themselves lay no restrictions on what counts as a good answer in general16: the 
analysis of the latter requires a separate body of theory (as I noted in chapter three). 
Risjord's use of `relevance relation' requires that the specification of such relations go 
beyond pragmatic considerations; for Risjord, to specify a relevance relation is to make 
commitments which transcend particular question and answer situations. Yet the very 
essence of a pragmatic commitment is that it does not extend beyond the particular 
situation in which it is uttered, and that it does not lead to formal relations of 
inconsistency with other pragmatic commitments. 
Risjord's criteria are therefore ill fitted to the explanatory theory which they were 
intended to serve. On the contrary, Risjord's second criterion, as I have interpreted it by 
using non-contextual criteria, bears much similarity to the ontically motivated KPEE. In 
what follows, I intend to build on such similarities to develop a revised set of principles. 
First, however, I want to put into practice the methodology outlined in chapter one by 
considering the case study explanations. 
Historical exclusion and competition 
Intuitively, when are historical explanations regarded as exclusive, and when are they 
regarded as competing? I will consider four fairly clear cut cases drawn from the pool of 
eight explanations introduced in chapter two. Two of these are relationships are naturally 
regarded as competing, and exclusive; two as compatible and non-exclusive. 
16 In particular, see Van Fraassen, 142 
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There is nothing like a historical orthodoxy to inspire criticism. Lefebvre, as one of the 
prime representatives of the Marxist approach to the French Revolution, attracted much 
criticism and his explanation was, more or less explicitly, the foil for many rivals. In 
particular, Cobban intended his alternative social explanation to be a direct competitor to 
Lefebvre's. This challenge was developed in three clear ways. Firstly, Cobban criticised 
Lefebvre's reliance on an overly a priori theory: the Marxist theory of the priority of 
social class hierarchy as based on control of the means of production, which provides 
support for Lefebvre's central nomological claim'7. Secondly, he challenged Lefebvre's 
interpretation of the historical records, with respect to certain key topics such as the 
composition and behaviour of Lefebvre's bourgeoisie18. Thirdly, and very much related 
to the second point, he questioned Lefebvre's understanding of certain core concepts, in 
particular `bourgeoisie'. 
From a philosophical point of view, we need to ask what general principles guarantee that 
Cobban's and Lefebvre's explanations are indeed exclusive. First, though, we should 
allay a potential source of confusion. We must distinguish between (i) direct criticism of 
an explanation, and (ii) the relation of exclusion or competition between two 
explanations. The criticisms cited above are an example of (i); strictly speaking, they 
should not be taken as a case of one explanation excluding another. However, neither 
should we imagine that (i) and (ii) are unrelated. They are related in the sense that 
elements of direct criticism in a historians' work help us to interpret the implicit claims of 
their actual (positive) explanation. In chapter two, I argued that recognising the negative 
and critical features of explanations is vital in interpreting the intended scope and purpose 
of the positive features of those explanations. 
This is clearly the case for an understanding of Cobban's explanation. His negative 
criticism of Lefebvre's social explanation makes it clear that his own positive social 
explanation is intended to be in competition with Lefebvre. The direct criticism primarily 
takes the form of criticism ofLefebvre's explanans: the notion of `bourgeois', and the 
17 Cobban, Chapters I and II 
18 For example, Ibid., 163-167 
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Marxist law. (I will postpone consideration of the criticism of Lefebvre's theoretical 
stance itself until chapter six. ) 
The relationship between Cobban's and Lefebvre's positive explanations is more subtle, 
but the key point is that it must be interpreted in the light of Cobban's direct criticism. 
Whilst neither historian would claim that their explanation was `the whole story' of the 
origins of the revolution (and therefore, each leaves room for other explanatory 
accounts), the fact that Cobban prepares the ground for his explanation by criticising 
Lefebvre's tells us that Cobban does intend to cover the same elements of that story as 
Lefebvre. In other words, the historians focus on similar parts of the revolution's history, 
and arrive at different conclusions: that is why they are in competition, and are exclusive. 
Schama's explanation is less clearly a direct alternative to Lefebvre's, though I would 
argue that it is a partial competitor. One of Schama's aims is to provide an alternative 
explanation to the Marxist account19, though he doesn't mention Lefebvre by name. The 
way that Schama's explanation excludes Lefebvre's is similar to Cobban's: core elements 
of Lefebvre's explanans are challenged, particularly those related to the composition, 
motivation and role of the bourgeoisie. Because Schama's account is, in some ways, of a 
different sort to Lefebvre's, the exclusivity is not so clear cut as that existing between 
Cobban and Lefebvre. In particular, Schama's explanation is more detailed, covers a 
somewhat different chronological period, and has a different target (partly as a result of 
the differing chronological focus). We might think that the relationship between Schama 
and Lefebvre is one of partial exclusion. 
The most clear cases of compatible explanation are of two sorts. Firstly, there are 
explanations which agree over methodological and theoretical background, and which 
simply investigate different aspects of the origins of the French Revolution. Furet's and 
Chartier's explanations seem to be of this sort. Furet assesses the political nature of the 
revolution, whilst Chartier emphasises the cultural. Crucially, we do not find in Chartier 
19 For example, Schama, xiv, 290 
113 
a denial of the importance of other factors. Both writers adopt a broadly `interpretative' 
approach, and are influenced by similar social theorists (Habermas, for example) and 
philosophers (such as Foucault; the influence of whom will be investigated in chapter 
six). 
Secondly, there are explanations which do not seem to agree on much at all, but which 
adopt such different approaches that they may plausibly be seen as complementary rather 
than exclusive. Three examples stand out in this regard: the explanations of Michelet, 
Furet, and Skocpol. Whilst Michelet constructs a narrative leading to the French 
Revolution of the traditional, moralistic, type, Furet adopts a more historiographically 
aware and critical approach to the revolution's origins. Skocpol adopts an equally 
different approach: her explanation is part of an explicitly scientific attempt to understand 
the origins of social revolutions in general. 
What can we learn from this brief examination? One important point is the need to use 
the historians' wider (negative and critical) comments to interpret the intended extent of 
their actual explanation. In particular, this helps the reader to gauge the extent to which 
their explanation is intended to eclipse other particular explanations of the same event. In 
addition, we can discern certain features which are relevant, positively or negatively, to 
historical explanatory exclusion: (i) straightforward conflict between explanans; (ii) the 
role of differing explanatory types in leading to complementarity between those 
explanations; and (iii) the role of differing targets. 
The fundamental principles 
My strategy in the remainder of this chapter will be to provide three principles of 
exclusion. These are derived from different types of logical inconsistency; I take 
it that 
this fact alone is sufficient to support the principles. A consequence 
is therefore that 
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explanatory exclusion can be reduced to logical inconsistency. However, I will argue 
that even principles developed from such a minimal basis can account for the principles 
expressed by Kim and Risjord. 
The following Principles of Explanatory Exclusion are to be regarded as individually 
sufficient for explanatory exclusion. They are not individually necessary for explanatory 
exclusion, though they are intended to be jointly exhaustive. The claim that one of the 
three principles is necessary for any case of explanatory exclusion is supported by the 
thought that an explanation is constituted (only) by a target, explanans, and a claim of 
relevance of some kind between the two. Each principle focuses on one of these features. 
PEE1: The targets of the explanations are inconsistent. If we accept that targets are 
constituted by a combination of topic and contrast(s), as in chapter five I argue that we 
should, then inconsistency can derive from either feature. Should the explanations either 
disagree over the truth of the topic, or over the falsity of the contrasts, then they are 
inconsistent, hence exclusive. (Note that PEE1 has similar import to Risjord's first 
criterion. ) 
PEE2: The truths of the explanans are inconsistent. The most basic source of such 
inconsistency (exclusivity) is due to straightforward factual disagreement. But given that 
a set of explanans always implies further presuppositions - in particular, that the concepts 
used in the explanans are comprehensible and appropriate - disagreement over these 
presuppositions is sufficient to produce exclusive explanations. 
PEE3: The explanatory relevance of the explanans are inconsistent. Under a causal 
theory of explanation, this should be taken to mean that the explanations disagree over 
whether the events or facts cited stand in an appropriate causal relationship to the target20 
20 It may be argued that PEE3 is a special case of the more general PEE2, since the explanans of an 
explanation contains both factual and causal claims. PEE3 should therefore not 
be listed as a `fundamental 
principle'. Even if this is so, PEE3 has an importance sufficient to warrant emphasising this particular type 
of exclusion, as we shall see. And in any case, the case 
is not clear cut: it would not be implausible to 
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To demonstrate these principles, consider a simplified version of Lefebvre's explanation 
for the coming of the French Revolution. Suppose that this explanation states that the 
revolution of 1789 took place in France (rather than in some other country) because, 
previously to that date, the bourgeoisie held economic power but not yet legal/ political 
power'. 
PEE1 would be met by an explanation which either disputed the truth of the topic - that 
there was a revolution in France in 1789 - or the falsity of the contrast(s) - that there 
were no revolutions in other countries in 1789. It is worth repeating that PEE, demands 
incompatibility of explanatory target, not simply difference in target. 
PEE2 would be met by an explanation which disputed the truth of the explanans - that the 
bourgeoisie held economic power but not legal/ political power before 1789. As 
suggested above, this could take the form of a direct factual disagreement, or 
disagreement with presuppositions, such as that there was a `bourgeoisie' in the sense 
required by Lefebvre. Note that the explanans must be strictly relevant for PEE-, to be 
applicable; not just any factual contradiction in a historical account would suffice. If two 
accounts differed, for example, in ascribing Louis XVI as `exceptionally good looking' or 
`pig ugly', this would probably not be sufficient to lead to exclusion. 
Finally, PEE3 would be met by an explanation which disputed the relevance of the 
explanans. In such a case the fact of the bourgeoisie's position would be accepted, but 
not that this fact was explanatorily relevant. Most straightforwardly, if we assume causal 
explanation, this would amount to denying that the bourgeoisie's position was a relevant 
cause of the French Revolution in 1789 (`relevant' in a sense most fully given by the 
Difference Condition, considered in chapter three). 
Note that we don't need to actually investigate the truth of the explanations (i. e., the 
historical record itself) to be able to understand relations of exclusion. It is sufficient to 
restrict the explanans proper to factual claims, which are then, by implication, claimed to be linked in the 
relevant way (usually causally) to the explanandum. I shall remain agnostic over this issue in this thesis. 
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discover that the explanations disagree in the relevant ways. Of course, to actually know 
which of two competing explanations is better we do need to know something about the 
truth of the explanation (i. e., something about the historical record); but this latter task is 
clearly not a job for the philosophy of history. 
Application and extension of the principles 
Two questions allow us to connect PEE1_3 to the previous considerations of this chapter. 
First: given that there is no explicit mention of sameness of target in PEE I. 3, what should 
we make of the apparent importance of this restriction seen in regard to both KPEE and 
the survey of the case study explanations? Second: where do considerations of 
`completeness' of explanation, introduced in the discussion of KPEE, fit in? 
PEE2 and PEES do not require that the exclusive explanations have the same target. 
Should they? Kim's PEE required that exclusive explanations be directed at the same 
event. In addition, in the previous section we saw that it was natural to take into account 
the relationship between explanatory targets when considering exclusion (over and above 
the role of incompatibility of target suggested by PEE1). On the other hand, Risjord's 
principles do not require this; not explicitly, at any rate. 
I want to stick with PEE2_3 as they stand: explanatory exclusion does not require those 
explanations to have the same target, or even a similar target. This is the case so long as 
explanatory exclusion in general is understood as the incompatibility of different 
explanations. If an explanation of the British victory at Trafalgar contained the statement 
`the French navy decreased during the 1780s', and an explanation of the French 
Revolution contained the statement `the French navy increased during the 1780s' then the 
two explanations are incompatible - hence exclusive - no matter that they have different 
targets. 
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Yet explanatory exclusion in a narrower sense -a sense which is likely to be more 
relevant to actual historiographical consideration - does require sameness (or at least 
similarity) of targets. To see why, I want to focus attention on PEE3, and to ask: under 
what conditions are we to judge that there is a dispute between explanations over the 
relevance of explanans? 
This is a potentially tricky problem because explanations themselves (as opposed to 
direct critiques of those explanations) do not appear to contain (negative) propositions of 
the form `c was not relevant'. Yet, PEE3 requires incompatibility of relevance claims, an 
incompatibility which is not satisfied just by replacing `c was relevant' with the 
alternative claim `d was relevant'. This is, in fact, the same problem addressed in relation 
to assessment of Risjord's second criterion. I argued that the mere fact that the relevance 
claims of two explanations differed is insufficient to produce explanatory exclusion. 
Rather, what is required for exclusion is that the acceptance of one relevance claim rules 
out another. But how are we to know when this is the case? 
I think an answer can be formulated using two ideas. The first was introduced in the 
explication of the exclusive relationship between Cobban and Lefebvre's explanations. 
The key to this was the need to rely on the more general critical framework of the 
histories in question. In the case of Cobban's explanation, the critique of Lefebvre which 
preceded it made it clear that the explanation was intended to cover the same ground as 
Lefebvre's, and therefore should be exclusive of it. Similarly, Risjord's example of 
explanations which exclude due to inconsistent claims of relevance relied on a 
comprehension of the wider theoretical framework within which the explanations 
`proper' are situated. 
The second idea required for a proper philosophical understanding of PEE3 is a 
rehabilitation of the notion of `completeness' (which, as I have suggested, can only be 
fully achieved with reference to material in chapters five and eight). The purpose of the 
notion of a `complete explanation' is made clear by PEE3 . PEE3 requires that the 
relevance of a competitor's explanans is challenged; often, this 
is achieved through 
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implicit denial. And `completeness' gives us the resources to understand how this is 
done. The key point is that where one explanation is complete, then there is simply no 
room for another explanation. By providing a complete explanation, the existence of a 
rival explanation is precluded: both cannot be true, hence they are incompatible. This is 
subject to the two provisos noted by Kim: that the explanations are not in a relationship 
of dependence, and that the explanations are directed towards the same target. 
In the more general model represented by PEE1_3, KPEE is therefore a special case. It is 
a way to understand the implicit denial of a competitor's claims to explanatory relevance. 
And in this special case, there is a need for sameness of explanatory target (or at least 
similarity, as I will shortly argue). A remaining concern is why, given that KPEE is only 
a special case of explanatory exclusion in general, it appears to occupy such a 
paradigmatic role. I would conjecture that the reason is that the other principles (PEE, -2) 
are essentially straightforward criteria of propositional incompatibility. Only PEE3 (with 
Kim's principle as the most useful means to give substance to this) is uniquely directed at 
explanatory exclusion. In addition, I would suggest that, although explanations with 
quite different targets may be regarded as exclusive, only those explanations with similar 
targets are generally regarded as truly in competition. (Of course, this claim has only an 
intuitive basis; however, if the reader disagrees, they will be relieved to know that little of 
the subsequent material depends upon it. ) 
Whilst I am convinced that PEE1_3 collectively exhaust the criteria for strict exclusion, I 
am not convinced that they are sufficient to do justice to our everyday, fuzzy, judgements 
of exclusion. For this reason, we need to find room for a notion of `partial exclusion'. I 
aim to demonstrate, however, that cases of partial exclusion can be accounted for on the 
basis of modified understandings of PEE1_3. 
PEE, 
-3 can mislead 
in two, opposite, ways. Firstly, the principles can suggest that 
explanations are exclusive where we would naturally regard those explanations as being, 
for the most part, compatible. Secondly, the principles can suggest that explanations are 
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not exclusive where we would naturally regard those explanations as being so, again for 
the most part. 
It is easy to see how PEE1_3 could be satisfied, and yet explanations remain fundamentally 
consistent. Firstly (PEE1), the explanatory targets may be inconsistent to only a minor 
degree. In particular, there may be two contrastive explanations which share the same 
target ('why did the French Revolution come about? ') and have only minimally differing 
contrast classes ('rather than the British/ German/ Russian'/ `rather than the British/ 
German/ Austrian'). Secondly (PEE2), the explanans may be inconsistent to only a minor 
degree. Thirdly (PEES), the relevance of the explanans may likewise be inconsistent to 
only a minor degree. The meaning of `minor degree' in this context is best explicated not 
by simply counting causes which differ, but by attending to the relative importance of 
these causes. The task of explicating `explanatory importance' is undertaken in Part III. 
On the other hand, there are cases where PEE1_3 are not satisfied, yet where we would 
wish to regard explanations as partially exclusive. One way for this to come about is 
where it is likely, though not certain, that the truths of explanans are inconsistent. For 
example, it may be that it is likely that the explanans of one explanation would have 
causes or effects which were in contradiction with the explanans of a second. `The fact 
that the aristocracy owned the majority of the factories in pre-Revolutionary France' most 
likely contradicts with `the bourgeoisie had the economic power in pre-Revolutionary 
France', though the two do not logically contradict (here, perhaps, is room for Risjord's 
notion of `compossibility'). It should be noted that this condition of `partial exclusion' is 
based on epistemological features, rather than on logical features which are the core 
concern of PEE1_3. We may judge explanations to be `partially exclusive' because we 
think it likely, but not certain, that explanations are incompatible. 
Focusing on KPEE (which we saw was a special case of PEES), there are two interesting 
ways for this to be partially, though not strictly, satisfied. The key requirements were 
for 
complete explanations, leading to the same target. I suggest that partial exclusion may 
be 
achieved either where there are two explanations which are largely complete; or where 
complete explanations lead to a similar target (as well as, conceivably, some combination 
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of these two elements). The meaning of `degrees of explanatory completeness' will be 
investigated parallel to the explication of completeness itself, particularly in chapters five 
and eight. `Similarity of target' can be examined using the resources of a contrastive 
theory of explanation, as is done in chapter five. 
The possibility of nearly complete explanations perhaps helps to make sense of Thagard's 
claim that `we should assume that hypotheses that explain the same evidence compete 
with each other unless there is reason to believe otherwise'21. Whilst most explanations 
are not entirely complete, it is perhaps plausible to suppose that the majority of decent 
explanations at least approach completeness, to the extent that another `nearly complete' 
explanation is at least unlikely to be consistent. In addition, the necessity of adopting a 
more vague understanding of KPEE was demonstrated with regard to potential counter- 
examples to KPEE, particularly cases of `instantiation', in the first section of this chapter. 
To summarise the claims made thus far: explanatory exclusion is always, and only, a 
result of explanatory incompatibility. Explanations are exclusive either where the topics 
of those explanations contradict, or where the truth of the explanans contradict, or where 
the explanatory relevance of the explanans contradict. It is perhaps the latter possibility 
which is of most interest in practice. Conflicting relevance claims may be more or less 
implicit. One important way to understand implicit conflict over explanatory relevance is 
to make use of the notion that complete explanations exclude other (independent, not 
over-determined) explanations of the same target. 
Where one of these conditions is met, it is reasonable to suppose that such exclusivity can 
be of more or less consequence - from a fundamental conflict to one of little significance. 
Conversely, it may the case that none of these conditions is met with certainty, yet that 
the content of the explanations lead one to think that compatibility is unlikely. Two 
possible instances of the latter phenomenon are the competing claims of two near- 
21 Thagard: not included in the published version, but 
in an earlier version of the paper on his web-site: 
http: //cogscl. uwaterloo. ca/Articles/Pages/%7FTraditions. 
html 
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complete explanations; and the competing claims of independent, complete explanations 
with only slightly differing targets. 
What theory of explanation do the principles presuppose? 
What model of explanation, or elements thereof, are presupposed by my three principles 
of explanatory exclusion? Risjord states that `clearly no advance [in understanding 
explanatory exclusion] could be made without adopting some model of explanation' 22. 
To some extent, of course, this is true; though I have endeavoured to construct (and 
phrase) the principles in such a way as to leave them with as wide an appeal as possible. 
For the principles to be applicable, all that is required is that explanations may be 
incompatible. If one agrees that explanations consist of a target, explanans, and claims of 
explanatory relevance, then PEE1_3 follow naturally. 
Even such weak requirements provide PEE1_3 with appropriate bite. Compare Raymond 
Martin's purely epistemological criterion of `competing explanation' (Martin's term 
`competing' should be read as `exclusive', in the sense of this thesis): 
`two explanations of an event are competing explanations of that event if it is more likely, on the 
available evidence, that one or the other explains that event than that both explain it'23 
This doesn't appear to get to the root of the matter: how do we judge whether it is more 
likely that one or both explanations explain it, and how is it possible to be correct or 
incorrect about this? To the extent that there aren't definitively correct answers, Martin's 
criterion may be regarded as an attempted explication of an Irrealist principle of 
22 Risjord, S300 
23 Martin, The Past Within Us, 51-52 
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explanatory exclusion. To what extent, though, is it possible to provide substantive 
principles of explanatory exclusion from the basis of an irrealist theory of explanation? 
The explanatory irrealist, broadly speaking, is one whose criteria for a `good explanation' 
refers solely to provision of epistemological links, not ontological truth. Kim, in 
discussion of this issue, cites the causal irrealists. For Hume, Russell and Wittgenstein, 
amongst others, the causal relation is derived from the explanatory relation. The 
direction of this derivation leads to a rejection of explanatory realism, since the required 
notion of a metaphysical relation which the explanatory relation should mirror is 
conspicuously absent. We might add to these the position of Hayden White. As we saw 
in chapter three, White regards historical explanation as consisting of the arranging and 
privileging of elements of the historical record in a manner which cannot be constrained 
by the historical past (explanations are `invented, not found'). Finally, Van Fraassen's 
erotetic theory of explanation is irrealist, since the `relevance relation' is defined purely 
pragmatically. 
It is natural to suppose that the explanatory irrealist should not feel constricted by 
explanatory exclusion. Indeed, it is interesting that this is indeed the effect of White's 
treatment of different historical explanations. White regards the differing narrative 
structures imposed by historians in order to explain their targets indicative only of the 
fact that they have approached the historical record in different ways. For White, there is 
no question that one narrative excludes any other. 
However, Kim does consider it possible that a plausible account of explanatory exclusion 
could be based on a position of explanatory irrealism, even if it is more natural to ally his 
principle with explanatory realism. He argues on epistemological grounds for what 
might be described as a cognitive or epistemological principle of explanatory exclusion: 
`There is a corresponding epistemological exclusion principle: No one may accept both 
explanations unless one has an appropriate account of how they are related to each other.... 
Even if we abandon the idea that there are objectively explanatory relations 
in the world, we may 
still find something cognitively unsettling and dissonant about having to face, or accept, two or 
more independent explanations of the same phenomenon. The explanatory premises of one 
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explanation need not logically contradict those of another, and there may be sufficient evidential 
warrant for thinking each set to be true. However, accepting the two sets of premises as 
constituting explanations of the same event (or any one thing), each complete in itself and 
independent of the other, may induce a sort of incoherence into our belief system. '24 
As Kim makes clear in the passage which precedes this quote25, such an idea depends to a 
great extent on the plausibility of `the maxim of explanatory simplification': that our 
explanatory scheme is preferable to the extent that it relies on fewer explanatory 
premises. This clearly relates to the idea of explanation by unification, introduced in 
chapter three, as one type of cognitive model of explanation. Without going into the 
detail of such an account, and without accepting that reduction in the number of 
independent explanatory premises always leads to better explanations, we can, I think, 
accept that to unify is generally an explanatory virtue. 
However, whilst Kim's general motivation is clear, the crucial demand is that we have an 
appropriate account of how the explanations are related. Kim attempts to substantiate 
this demand by reference to the terms `complete' and `independent'. Yet, as we have 
seen, these terms have only been explicated with reference to the ontological structure 
underlying explanations. These terms, and the resulting principle, therefore place the 
explanatory irrealist under no compulsion to identify cases of explanatory exclusion. 
One advantage of explicating explanatory exclusion in the very general terms of PPE1_3 is 
that those principles point to constraints which even the explanatory irrealist should 
recognise. What is `irreal' about these theories are the claims of relevance which 
explanations purport to make. Whilst the realist regards relevance claims to be properly 
based on ontic (primarily, causal) structure, the irrealist makes no such demand. PPE3 
will, therefore, have no meaning for the explanatory irrealist, simply because there is no 
way for relevance claims to stand in logical contradiction. Since KPEE is a special case 
of PPE3, it is no surprise that this principle requires a thesis of explanatory realism. 
However, PPE1_2 should present the explanatory irrealist with no metaphysical qualms. 
24 Kim, `Mechanism, Purpose and Explanatory Exclusion', 257-258 
25 Ibid., 254-257 
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At the end of chapter two I summarised the findings of the case studies by drawing 
attention to the different aspects of a historical explanation. In particular, these included 
the explanatory explanans, target, negative or critical claims, theory, concepts used, and 
judgements of importance. I have already outlined how the explanans, target, and 
negative/ critical claims are relevant. But the fundamental principles need to be extended 
in order to properly take account of each of the explanatory elements. 
The explanatory target is important for three reasons. Firstly, PEE, referred directly to 
incompatibility of targets as a criterion of explanatory exclusion. Secondly, I have 
suggested that we are usually most interested in explanatory exclusion where the 
explanations are directed at the same (or similar) target: only in such cases do we regard 
the explanations as genuinely competing. Thirdly, to apply and extend PEE3 in the 
direction indicated by KPEE, we require explanations to have the same (or similar) 
target. In chapter five I will focus on a contrastive notion of explanatory target in order 
to challenge Kim's version of explanatory realism, and then to show how this analysis 
can aid comprehension of explanatory exclusion. 
Consideration of explanatory theories, and of concepts used in explanations, raise the 
issue of incommensurability. A concern is that PEE1_3 appear not to cover the possibility 
that certain explanations are incommensurable. However, for example, the consideration 
of Michelet's, Furet's and Skocpol's explanations above may lead us to regard these as 
incommensurable (incomparable). In chapter six I will examine the possibility of 
conceptual and methodological incommensurability, and, in general, the effect that the 
adoption of different types of explanation has on explanatory competition. 
Finally, `explanatory competition' seems to be, in some sense, a broader notion than 
`explanatory exclusion': there can be competing explanations which do not exclude. 
Such explanations can be better or worse, in the relative fulfilment of explanatory virtues, 
without thereby excluding one another. This possibility will be the topic of chapter 
seven. 
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Chapter Five: Target and Contrast 
In chapter four, I derived three fundamental Principles of Explanatory Exclusion from 
the presupposition that explanatory exclusion is derived from explanatory 
incompatibility. Given that the most basic form of an explanation is of a target, one 
or more explanans, and claims of relevance connecting explanans and target, it is 
natural to formulate three exclusion principles. Conflict over relevance claims is 
perhaps of most interest, and Kim's ontic PEE (KPEE) illuminates an important way 
for this to occur. There can be no more than one complete and independent 
explanation of the same target, since there can be no more than one complete and 
independent set of explanatorily relevant facts pertaining to the same target. 
Justifying KPEE in this way relies on an assumption of explanatory realism. 
In this chapter, I will argue that contrastive explanation should be adopted as the 
means to analyse the nature of explanatory targets. A contrastive understanding 
provides certain unique advantages for the comprehension of explanatory practice in 
general. In particular, I will demonstrate how contrastive explanation can aid 
understanding of both explanatory exclusion, and the notion of a `complete' 
explanation, introduced in chapter four. 
KPEE and explanatory target 
KPEE, and the more general PEE3 (though not PEE, -2) relies on 
the prior acceptance 
of explanatory realism. Kim describes the thesis of explanatory realism thus: C is an 
explanans for E in virtue of the fact that c bears to e some determinate objective 
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relation R. Let us call R, whatever it is, an "explanatory relation. "" Crucially, Kim 
makes it clear that `c' and `e' stand for events. Kim therefore claims that 
if and only if -C names event c, and 
-E names event e, and 
-c stands in an appropriate relation (e. g. causal) with e 
Then C explains E. 
The problem is that these conditions do seem necessary for explanation, but not 
sufficient. Not any way of naming appropriately related events leads to explanation. 
Using the conceptualisations introduced in chapter three, the problem is that Kim has 
identified the ontic requirements for explanation, but has disregarded the necessary 
cognitive requirements. The following, well known, example illustrates this point: 
(1) To cite the hurricane as an explanation of the catastrophe is appropriate. Yet to 
claim that the event reported on page 5 of Tuesday's Times explains the event 
reported on page 13 of Wednesday's Tribune would be incorrect. This even though 
the hurricane is the event reported on page 5 of Tuesday's Times, and the catastrophe 
is the event reported on page 13 of Wednesday's Tribune2. 
The problem stems from the fact that explanation depends on how the relata are 
described. In other words, the explanatory relation is intensional; unlike, most would 
claim, the causal relation. This fact leads to a difficulty not only with Kim's 
definition of explanatory realism, but his principle of explanatory exclusion. 3 
(2) Suppose I am at a football game and feel hungry; I eat a prawn sandwich. Then 
the event `my hunger being satisfied' and the event `my eating a prawn sandwich' are 
one and the same. `I ate a prawn sandwich because I was in the mood for seafood' is 
one explanation; `my hunger was satisfied because I consumed some food' quite 
1 Kim, `Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and Explanatory Exclusion', 226 
2 The example originates from Davidson: Donald Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes' (originally 
1963) in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 17 
3 Marras also criticises KPEE on the basis of its dependence on an unsatisfactory statement of 
explanatory realism: Ausonio Marras, `Kim's Principle of Explanatory Exclusion' in Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 76(3) (1998): 439-451 
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another. Note that `my hunger was satisfied because I was in the mood for seafood' is 
not a good explanation'. 
Example (2) shows that two explanations of the same event may properly focus on 
different aspects of that event. As it stands, this provides a counter-example to KPEE. 
For, as (2) demonstrates, we may have two explanations which are complete, 
independent, focused on the same event, and yet not exclusive. A similar counter- 
example was suggested in the previous chapter, resulting from explanations bearing a 
relation of `instantiation'. In such cases also, two explanations can be complete, 
independent, directed at the same event, and yet not be exclusive. 
There are two ways to respond to these sorts of criticism. We might, firstly, object to 
the tacit notion of either `explanation' or `event' at work in the problematic examples. 
It could be suggested that the `bad' explanations, such as `the event reported on page 
5 of Tuesday's Times explains the event reported on page 13 of Wednesday's 
Tribune' are not strictly incorrect, just odd. In particular, Davidson makes it clear 
with reference to this example that his supposition is that explanations presuppose 
laws. There must be some kind of plausible regularity from the type of event 
mentioned in the explanans to the type of event mentioned in the explanandum. 
There might be some sort of regularity linking hurricanes and catastrophes, but not 
events on page 5 with those on page 13. Why can't this presumption simply be 
denied? 
Perhaps the supposition that all explanations imply a nomological relation can be 
denied (a question I consider in chapter six). However, the more general requirement 
that explanans and target always be cited in appropriate ways can not. The necessity 
of regarding explanation as a partially epistemic notion will be the subject of chapter 
six. For now, let us simply note that Kim himself does not agree with the denial: 
`Just as knowledge requires more than truth, explanations presumably must meet further 
requirements (`internal' conditions - perhaps logical and epistemic ones), although exactly 
what these are does not concern us here. '4 
4 Kim, `Explanatory Realism, Causal Realism and Explanatory Exclusion', 
226 
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Kim's preferred response would be to challenge the notion of `event' in the 
problematic examples. To the extent that the criterion of event identity is `narrow', 
the events mentioned (my hunger being satisfied and my eating of a prawn sandwich, 
for instance) may not, after all, be identical. Kim's theory of events leads to 
particularly fine grained identity conditions, such that events which are intuitively 
identical turn out not to be according to Kim. 
The essence of Kim's analysis is that an event consists of `a concrete object 
exemplifying a property at a time's. Adopting such a view would lead to a rejection 
of the event identity claims made in examples (1) and (2), since different properties 
are picked out in the different cases. But if the events aren't the same, then the 
explanatory target differs, meaning that KPEE is not intended to apply. Whilst Kim's 
`property exemplification' analysis of events therefore allows KPEE to avoid the 
putative counter-examples, the analysis has been criticised on independent grounds. 
Most obviously, it leads to judgements of event identity rather drastically at odds with 
common intuition: Brutus' killing of Caesar turns out to be a different event to 
Brutus' stabbing of Caesar, for example6. 
Whether or not Kim's analysis of events is tenable, we can surmise that KPEE does 
not function if we are to regard explanatory targets as events in the more intuitive 
sense of the term (if, for example, Brutus' killing of Caesar is intuitively thought to be 
the same event as Brutus' stabbing of Caesar). Indeed, Kim's analysis seems closer to 
another, more popular, analysis of explanatory target: in terms of properties of events. 
(One difference is that, for Kim, though an event is constituted by a single property, it 
may exemplify other properties: `Brutus' stabbing of Caesar' may have the property 
of being `performed outside'. However, Katz suggests that Kim's account suffers 
difficulties with such `adverbial modification' of events. ) 
5 Jaegwon Kim, `Causation, Nomic Subsumption and the Concept of an Event' 
(originally 1973) in 
Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essars, ed. Ernest 
Sosa (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 8 
6 See Richard Swinburne, Are Mental Events Identical With Brain 
Events' in . American 
Philosophical 
Quarterly 19 (1982), 176. See also Bernard Katz, `Kim on Events' 
in Philosophical Review 87 (1978): 
427-441 
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Regarding explanations as directed at properties of events, rather than events as such, 
is Marras' preferred approach7. As examples (1) and (2) suggest, it often seems more 
accurate to qualify the analysis of explanatory targets in this way. There are, of 
course, questions which can be raised concerning an analysis of explanatory targets in 
terms of properties. How should properties be individuated? How are we to 
accommodate the fact that the property `deep red' is a part of `red'? And how are wti e 
to understand the intuition that `ambling' overlaps with `strolling'? These are serious 
issues: a conception of what explanatory targets are should be able to make sense of 
the identity of those targets. However, I will not consider these issues in relation to 
properties, for the reason that the property analysis of explanatory target still does not 
get things quite right, whether or not the questions concerning individuation and the 
like can be resolved. 
The spirit of KPEE is not endangered by the above criticisms. For, given a 
presupposition of explanatory realism, some form of KPEE is justified. A modified 
version alters the categorisation of explanatory target from event, which affects the 
scope of KPEE to the extent that the preferred relata differ from events. 
Why contrasts? 
I suggest that we analyse explanatory targets in contrastive terms. I introduced a brief 
history of the theory behind contrastive explanation in chapter three. There I made it 
clear that I regard the fundamental claim of that theory to be one regarding the nature 
of explanatory targets: contrastive explanation regards the target as being of the form 
`p rather than q'. I shall add detail to this analysis of contrastive targets in this 
chapter. 
7 Marras, 448-450 
8 Kim recognises this: `if it is aspects of events, rather than events simpliciter, 
that are explained, then 
explanatory exclusion would apply to these event aspects' 
(Kim, `Mechanism, Purpose and 
Explanatory Exclusion', 257) 
130 
There are four main reasons why contrastive explanation is ideally suited for analysis 
of the targets of historical explanation. Firstly, it enables a satisfactory understanding 
of explanatory exclusion, particularly KPEE, including the notion of partial exclusion. 
Secondly, it enables us to make sense of `complete explanation' as it appears in Kim's 
principle. These two advantages will be explored in the penultimate section of this 
chapter. In addition, contrastive explanation has the flexibility to apply to a variety of 
explanatory targets. Finally, it can be seen to fit well with the historical case studies, 
through its ability to illuminate salient aspects of explanatory practice (over and above 
the main focus of this chapter, explanatory exclusion). 
Contrastive explanation provides a necessary flexibility in categorising explanatory 
targets. Whilst explanatory targets are often more accurately categorised as 
properties, or aspects, of events rather than events per se, this does not always seem to 
be the case. Explanations are sometimes directed at properties of events; but 
sometimes simply at events, and sometimes at absences. 
As Woodward has argued, sometimes we do want to explain just the occurrence of an 
event, and not one of its properties9. Using Woodward's example, we can explain not 
just `that the short-circuit caused the fire to be purple' but `that the short-circuit 
caused the purple fire'. A defender of a thorough going property analysis might reply 
that we should regard `existence' as a property; one which is necessary for the 
presence of other properties of that event. But this view is beset by notorious 
problems, raised by, for example, Kant, Frege and Russell. We can also explain 
absences: `why was there no fire? T 'Because the circuitry did, after all, remain intact'. 
What could be the property referred to in such explanations? 
A further set of examples provides difficulties for an analysis of explanatory target 
based purely on event properties. In conjunction with an examination of the case 
study explanations, I will argue that mention of event properties 
does not always 
provide the necessary detail in characterisation of explanatory targets. 
Whilst 
properties of events generally lead to more 
fine-grained explanatory targets than 
9 James Woodward, `A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation' 
(originally 1984) in Explanation, ed. 
Ruben 262-265 
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events (which is why the examples (1) and (2) in the previous section are problematic 
for an analysis based on the latter but not the former concept), there are occasions 
where even the relevant properties are insufficiently fine-grained to fit the intuitively 
applicable target. 
The following brief study assesses the suitability of contrastive explanation as an 
analysis of the explanatory targets of the case study explanations, prior to a more 
theoretical investigation of the above claims made in support of contrastive 
explanation. I will focus on three ways that historians' contrasts shape and affect 
their explanation. As elsewhere in this thesis, I attempt to use this descriptive study 
not only to exemplify aspects of my chosen theory of explanation (in this case 
contrastive explanation), but also to shape understanding of that theory itself. 
The most obvious dimension of explanatory target which depends upon the historian's 
choice of contrast is which aspects of an event's history are relevant. Recall that the 
Difference Condition for answers to contrastive questions, introduced in chapter three, 
states that the only relevant causal history is that which has no analogue in the history 
of the contrasts. The choice of contrasts therefore `screens off as irrelevant elements 
of the causal history. If the choice of contrast or contrasts is a good one, the 
remaining elements are manageably few. The examples of Lefebvre, Hegel and 
Skocpol demonstrate the difference in foci which derive from differences of contrast. 
Lefebvre uses different kinds of revolution as contrasts: the English revolution (of 
1688), and the nineteenth century continental revolutions10. In this way, two aspects 
of the French Revolution are picked out for explanation by Lefebvre. 
By comparison 
with England, the salient difference is the violence of the revolution; 
by comparison 
with the continental revolutions the salient difference 
is that the French Revolution 
was a revolution `from below'. Corresponding to these salient 
differences, the 
contrasts select certain parts of the (causal) history of the 
French Revolution as 
relevant; those parts which do not correspond to anything 
in the histories of the 
English or other continental revolutions. 
10 Lefebvre, 2 
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At one point, Hegel uses as a contrast a revolution which never happened: an 
imagined German revolution at a similar time to the Frenchl1. The salient difference 
picked out by Hegel's contrast is, of course, that of nationality. Hegel therefore must 
locate a cause of the French Revolution which has no corresponding factor in German 
history; quite plausibly, he focuses on the differing Ecclesiastical relationships in each 
country. 
Skocpol uses contrastive cases to shape her explanatory target more explicitly. The 
features of the French Revolution to be explained are those which differ from the 
contrastive cases of the `failed revolutions' of Prussia, Japan and England12. In 
accordance with this choice, the relevant aspects of the French Revolution and its 
history are, for Skocpol, primarily concerned with attempted reformations carried out 
by the French state. (Notice that to the extent that Skocpol's overall explanatory 
target is a general fact, rather than a particular, contrastive explanation is not 
restricted to explanation of particulars. ) 
However, we should note that Skocpol's explanandum is also shaped by comparison 
with other cases, in accordance with Mill's Method of Agreement. The Method of 
Agreement states that where two circumstances produce the same outcome, the cause 
is a common factor. Skocpol therefore compares the French Revolution to other 
revolutions which are of the same type as the French: those of China and Russia. This 
strategy - which we might call convergent explanation - is easier to take account of 
than is the use of contrastive explanation. We should say that to explain P compared 
to Q is to provide a cause of P which is also a cause of Q. Convergent explanation 
mirrors contrastive explanation in many ways. For example, just as a rule of thumb 
guide to selection of contrast is that the contrast be as similar as possible to the fact to 
be explained, so the facts compared should be as different as possible (whilst 
exhibiting the same outcome), so as to minimise similarities and hence `relevant' 
causes. We might wonder whether such use of convergent explanation counts against 
my overall recommendation of contrastive explanation: I will return to this 
in the final 
section of this chapter. 
" Hegel, The Philosophy of History, 443 
12 Skocpol, 37 
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A second use of contrast in relation to targets of explanation is in accounting for the 
detail of explanatory targets. (This aspect of contrastive explanation was first pointed 
out by Garfinkel13, but so far as I am aware, has received no attention since. ) 
Garfinkel introduced the example: `why did the car skid? '. What is the implicit 
contrast to this question? To explicitly complete the question by adding `rather than 
5cm further on' would usually be inappropriate, since it would require an answer too 
detailed for most purposes. The answer to `why did the car skid (there), rather than 
5cm further on? ' would need to refer to aspects of the history of the skid which 
related only to its occurrence in that precise place. These are not aspects which would 
normally be cited in answer to `why did the car skid? '. This is because we have an 
alternative, if approximate, idea of what the contrast should be: perhaps `rather than 
not at all in that journey', or `rather than around the next bend'. 
Lefebvre's account provides an example of this phenomenon. Lefebvre states his 
intention to explain the `distinctive features' of the French Revolution'`. Yet he 
clearly does not intend to explain why the Estates General first met on the 5 May 
rather than the 4 May; nor why the violence of the revolution resulted in precisely the 
number of executions that it in fact did. Each of these explanatory targets rely on 
contrasts which are (pragmatically) too close to the fact to be explained, and which 
therefore call for causal history which is inappropriately detailed. The permissible 
contrasts are kept at a pragmatically appropriate `distance' from the event to 
be 
explained. Explanations do of course vary in the detail which they require. 
The 
varying degree of detail required can be regarded as resulting 
from the (usually 
implicit) selection of contrasts which are closer to or further 
from the target fact. 
Sometimes, a detailed explanation - one with a more specific target - 
is better. But 
not always: for an explanation with an overly specific 
target may miss broader 
patterns. An explanation such as Lefebvre's, or 
Hegel's, aims to explain why an 
event of a certain broad type came about: a social change, or 
a change in conception 
13 Garfinkel, 30 
14 Lefebvre, 2 
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of freedom. If we agree that the explanation of more general targets may be fruitful in 
this case, then that choice of level of generality may be preferable. 
Thirdly, our understanding of contrastive explanation can make sense of explanatory, 
refusal (suggested again by Garfinkel15, also by Van Fraassen16). Where there is no 
substantive (non-trivial) difference between the fact and the contrasts of question Q, 
then there is no good answer to Q. In this case, rather than attempting to answer Q, 
the question should be dismissed. How, for example, would we answer the question 
`why are there nine planets (rather than some other number)? 07 We should dismiss it: 
there is no non-trivial difference between the history of there being the number of 
planets which there actually are, and the possible situations in which there were 
different numbers. We might call this sort of explanatory refusal `refusal due to 
applicability of target'. 
Pertinent applications of the idea of explanatory refusal can be found in the historical 
works. Factual explanatory refusal can be seen where the truth of the explanandum is 
challenged. For example, Schama's reply to Cobban's question `How was the 
bourgeois revolution related to the role of the peasantry? ' 18 would be to challenge the 
presupposition that there was a `bourgeois revolution'. Such cases point to exclusion 
of the type PEE1, as outlined in chapter four. 
Refusal due to applicability presents a further class of explanatory refusals. Skocpol, 
in viewing the revolution as essentially political, finds the key question to 
understanding the origins of the French Revolution to be `why did France devolve 
from European dominance to bankruptcy? ' 19 In contrast, Lefebvre, in accordance 
with his emphasis on the social aspect of revolutionary origins, would regard the 
above question as, if not irrelevant, at least peripheral. The disagreement 
depends on 
background theory, just as did the disagreement over the relevance of asking `why are 
15 Garfinkel, 4-10 
16 Van Fraassen, 111-112 
17 Adapted from Garfinkel, 6 
18 Cobban, 24 
19 Skocpol, 52 
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there nine planets? ' According to Lefebvre's understanding of the origins of the 
French Revolution, there is less of a coherent story to be told regarding the difference 
between the French state being bankrupt and being solvent than there is between the 
bourgeoisie being in a politically dominant or a politically subservient position. 
Schama's question `why was the revolution violent? ' provides a second example; the 
question is of prime importance to Schama, but less important to most others. Again, 
the opinions differ on the basis of background theories, implying that a given 
contrastive difference is trivial or fundamental, accidental or inevitable. Explanatory 
refusal due to applicability of target is an extreme case on the scale from explanatory 
relevance to irrelevance, and is well accommodated once the intended contrasts and 
concomitant differences are recognised. 
Contrastive focusing 
We are now in a position to develop a fuller understanding of contrastive explanation, 
initially by investigating how contrastive explanation relates to non-contrastive 
formulations. My central idea will be that contrast is an extremely useful tool in 
understanding any explanatory practice, particularly in relation to the specification of 
explananda. By `tool' I mean to exclude the idea that `contrast' is 
in any sense an 
irreducible, ontological feature of the world; as compared to, for example, events or 
properties. 
In order to clarify this idea, I will first compare contrast to explanatory 
presupposition: are they equivalent notions? 
20. There is, after all, a clear relation 
between that which is presupposed by contrastive answers, and explicit 
presupposition. To explain: in chapter three 
it was recognised that contrastive 
20 Hitchcock, for one, believes that they are 
(Hitchcock, 608) 
136 
questions presuppose that the fact to be explained is true, whilst the contrasts are 
false. In addition, we have seen that according to DC, the similarities between fact 
and contrast(s) are not relevant to a good answer. Therefore, these similarities are 
presumed by the explanation. Only differences are relevant. It is as a result of the 
latter presupposition that contrastive explanation achieves its primary function of 
focusing explanatory attention on a small amount of the enormous source of 
explanatorily relevant material. The first set of examples drawn from the case study 
in the previous section demonstrated this in practice. So long as the contrasts are 
reasonably similar to the fact, the vast majority of explanatory features are thereby 
excluded. 
A contrastive target therefore presupposes that only certain facts are relevant. This 
suggests the possibility of being able to restrict relevance non-contrastively: 
`directly'. The request `why P rather than Q? ' is equivalent to `why P, with respect to 
facts {x}? '; so long as facts {x} are those which are in fact differences between P and 
Q. The same question can, therefore, be asked in different ways, contrastively and 
non-contrastively. Why, then, should we bother with the contrastive formulation? 
It is important to recognise that though the contrastive and non-contrastive 
formulation may be empirically equivalent, they are not formally equivalent: for their 
equivalence is dependent on the empirical proposition `facts {x } are those which are 
differences between P and Q'. In a similar way, `the sky is blue' is equivalent to `the 
grass is green'. They have the same truth value, but this equivalence is dependent on 
contingent (non-logical) factors. 
The most important reason why we might prefer the contrastive formulation is 
precisely because it allows ignorance of such contingent or empirical facts. Asking 
the contrastive question `why was there a revolution in France, rather than Germany? ' 
may be to ask the same question as the non-contrastive `focusing on church-state 
relations, why was there a revolution in France? '. But the latter presumes more 
knowledge than the former. The contrastive formulation only requires the knowledge 
that the two cases are reasonably similar21. 
21 Lipton recognises this as an advantage of contrastive explanation: 
Peter Lipton, 'Making a 
Difference' in Philosophica 51(1) (1993), 50 
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Next, compare contrastive explanation to the analysis of explanatory targets in terms 
of properties. I suggested that not only are some explanations seemingly not directed 
towards properties of events, but in some cases the analysis of targets in terms of 
properties is insufficiently detailed. 
Marras suggested that explanatory relata are properties; I have suggested that they are 
contrastive facts. Aren't these ideas equivalent? In particular, in framing contrasts 
between events, do we thereby pick out properties, such that the difference between 
two cases results in the properties in question? Not quite. The question `why did the 
French Revolution come about? ' implies, from its surface form alone, that the 
explanandum is an event. In asking `why was there a revolution in France? ', a 
property of the event the French Revolution is picked out for explanation: that it is 
French. The contrastive question `why was there a revolution in France rather than 
Germany? ' further restricts the answer. It does this according to the presupposition of 
difference, in that the question admits only of answers which focus on differences 
between the French and German case. 
In this way the relevant history of an event may be focused, in addition to the relevant 
properties of that event. The difference between the non-contrastive and contrastive 
formulations can be seen in the fact that more history is relevant to the former 
question than the latter. For example, the fact that France is a continental country, 
surrounded by geo-political rivals, may be relevant to the question `why was there a 
revolution in France? ' But this information is not relevant to `why was there a 
revolution in France, rather than Germany? ', because the geographical factor is also in 
the history of the contrast. 
The upshot is that contrastive explanation is a device for focusing explanatory 
information, over and above the focus on aspects of events. This focusing can be 
done using straightforward command or exclusion; however, the use of contrast 
carries the unique advantage of being tolerant of ignorance, fitting well with common 
usage, and being flexible enough to encompass a range of types of explanatory target. 
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Contrastive explanation suggests that explananda are constituted according to 
contrastive focusing of events and their histories. In short, explananda are 
individuated according to what a good explanation of those explananda should 
exclude. Any given historical question is shaped by a (more or less implicit) range of 
contrast cases; `shaped' according to the requirement that a certain answer compare 
the fact and foil(s) in a manner given by DC. 
I believe that to understand properly the way that explanatory targets are constituted 
by what they exclude, we need to make use of Garfinkel's term contrast space. 
Whilst the standard examples used to introduce contrastive explanation in chapter 
three - Jones/ Smith, and Monash/ Oxford - made use of determinate, and indeed a 
solitary, contrast, that is not usually the case. Where we apply the notion of 
contrastive explanation beyond such clear cut cases as these, we find that contrasts 
must be seen as at least partially indeterminate for the idea of contrastive explanation 
to make any sense. It is for this reason that I find `contrast space' appropriate, as the 
term implies that contrast cases need not be precisely specified. Instead, contrasts are 
better represented by regions of possibility than by discrete cases. 
To be more precise: contrast spaces are collections of possibilities - those possibilities 
which an adequate answer to the contrastive question must exclude, by pointing to a 
relevant difference between the histories of the fact and the possibilities constituting 
the contrast space. 
We could use the now familiar modal notion of `possible worlds' to make `contrast 
space' more precise, but it is important to note that contrast spaces are not simply 
collections of possible worlds. Firstly, contrast spaces may vary by including 
differing numbers of possibilities from the same possible world. For example, 
contrast space A may include a possible eighteenth century English Revolution, whilst 
contrast space B may include both this and a Russian Revolution of the same time; 
both Revolutions belonging to the same possible world. Secondly, the possibilities 
included in contrast spaces are usually too broad to belong to a single possible world: 
the possibility indicated by `English Revolution' will not 
be a sharply delineated 
logically unique possibility. Garfinkel suggests that contrast space 
be regarded not in 
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terms of `possible worlds', but in terms of Wittgenstein's `logical space' (developed 
in the Tractatus)22. 
Two historical examples previously introduced demonstrate the need for an idea of 
`contrast space'. Hegel asked `why was there a revolution in France rather than in 
Germany? '. This question is an intelligible contrastive demand, yet its intelligibility 
does not rely on there being one definite possibility corresponding to `the German 
Revolution'. Rather, a spread of possibilities best grounds the intended contrast. We 
do intuitively have an approximate idea of the kind of event Hegel had in mind - that 
it is roughly similar to the French Revolution, but taking place in Germany. Yet it 
would be difficult and, for most purposes, quite pointless to delineate these 
possibilities precisely. 
A still clearer demonstration of the need for `contrast space' can be seen in the second 
use of contrastive explanation, in constructing a target of the appropriate level of 
detail. This aspect of contrastive focusing was demonstrated with reference to 
Lefebvre's desire to explain `the distinctive features' of the French Revolution. Any 
given event contains as much detail as the investigator is willing, or able, to keep 
discovering. Yet the explanations we demand only require a certain degree of detail; 
a degree which varies according to pragmatic considerations. As the contrast space is 
`moved' closer to the fact to be explained (in other words, as contrasts are chosen 
which are more similar to the fact), appropriate answers must refer to finer details of 
the causal history. Yet, the distance between fact and contrast space can hardly be 
defined precisely; we have an intuitive, approximate idea of what level of detail is 
appropriate for the particular explanation. 
The idea of a contrast space allows us to specify the identity conditions for 
explanatory targets precisely. An explanatory target is defined according to what 
it is 
intended to exclude. The resulting explanation ignores the similarities between the 
explanatory fact and the contrasts, and focuses only on differences. 
Two key ways for 
contrast space to vary are according to the inclusion of more, 
less, or just different 
regions of contrast space ('outward' variation); and according to a greater or 
lesser 
encroachment into the possibility space of the 
fact itself ('inner' variation). These 
22 Garfinkel, 39 
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two types of variation are demonstrated, respectively, in the examples of Hegel and 
Lefebvre, above. As an aid to understanding, the following diagram represents these 
ideas, in terms of regions of possibility: 
`Fact' to be explained 
Contrastive possibilities which 
shape explanation 
Possibility space in general 
The understanding of the relation of contrastive explanation to non-contrastive, and of 
the role of `contrast space', can now be put to work in three ways. Firstly, in relating 
contrastive explanation to explanatory exclusion. Secondly, in relating contrastive 
explanation to the concept of `complete' explanations. Thirdly, in answering the 
arguments of those who would reduce contrastive explanation to non-contrastive. 
Exclusion and completeness 
We have seen that KPEE does not fare well when targets of explanation are taken to 
be events. For it seems that there can be two complete, independent explanations of 
the same event, as they may legitimately focus on different aspects of that event. 
However, analysis of targets of explanation in terms of properties introduces a 
different sort of concern for KPEE. In this case, the degree of exclusion 
recommended by KPEE can appear much too weak: for only those explanations 
which focus on exactly the same properties are thereby candidates 
for exclusion under 
KPEE. Our intuitive judgements of explanatory exclusion are, it would seem, 
stronger than this: KPEE, conjoined with a 
`property' analysis of explananda, does 
not seem to yield as many examples of explanatory exclusion as wt e would 
like. 
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How does a contrastive analysis affect KPEE? Using the notion of contrastive space, 
we should say that the contrastive spaces should be equivalent in order for the 
explanatory targets to be equivalent. Where the contrast spaces differ, so do the 
explananda; in this case (as far as KPEE goes), there is no explanatory exclusion. 
With regard to the difficulty facing a property analysis that explanatory exclusion is 
too hard to come by, a contrastive analysis appears to suffer still more. After all, I 
have previously argued that contrastive targets are often more specific than targets 
constituted purely according to properties of events. 
Where contrastive explanation may offer an advantage in explicating KPEE is in 
offering an analysis of partial explanatory exclusion. The suggestion made in chapter 
four was that where Kim's criteria - completeness, independence and identity of 
target - are only partially realised, then the result is partial explanatory exclusion. In 
particular, we saw that it was unrealistic to suppose that (complete, independent) 
explanations which were directed at only slightly different targets thereby could not 
be exclusive. Whilst this is a general consideration concerning KPEE, the contrastive 
analysis of explanatory target is an ideal model by which to more accurately interpret 
the suggestion. 
Given that an explanatory target is identified according to the contrast space which it 
excludes, similarity of target can be explicated geometrically. Partial exclusion may 
be the result either of the overlap of contrastive spaces, or as the subsumption of one 
contrastive space within another. The relation between Lefebvre and Skocpol's 
explanatory targets is an example of the former: the explanatory space of each 
includes the example of the English `revolution', yet in other ways they diverge. 
Subsumption of contrast space enables us to understand more specific explanations 
such as Chartier's, which focuses purely on cultural origins, as compared to a wider 
focus of explanation such as Schama's, which focuses on cultural origins and more. 
Other types of origin in Chartier's explanation are `screened off, or presupposed. 
Thus Chartier's contrast space is smaller than Schama's, and hence the resulting 
explanation has a smaller pool of relevant differences to 
include. 
Recognising partial exclusion is an important advance, since 
it provides KPEE with 
some much needed `bite'. KPEE may thereby 
fulfil a substantive role in 
considerations of explanatory exclusion; 
in addition, our intuitions that explanatory 
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exclusion is not such a rare occurrence are respected. Ultimately, the justification of 
partial exclusion due to KPEE must rest on similar considerations to the justification 
of KPEE itself. I argued that the role of KPEE was to be found in its ability to 
provide substantive conditions for when PEE3 was satisfied; in other words, where 
explanations contain incompatible relevance claims. From this perspective, it is clear 
that explanations may focus on somewhat different targets, and yet contain implicitly 
contradictory relevance claims. 
Contrastive explanation also helps to make sense of the problematic notion of 
complete explanation. Whilst the concept is not strictly necessary for an analysis of 
explanatory exclusion, it does feature in an important type of exclusion: KPEE. The 
benefit to be derived from a contrastive analysis is clear once we recall that a good 
contrastive question drastically restricts the range of causal history which is relevant. 
The question `why did the French Revolution come about? ' allows an indefinite 
degree of information to be relevant: any of the causes of the French Revolution. The 
contrastive question `why did the French Revolution, rather than a German 
Revolution, come about? ' excludes as irrelevant all similarities between the French 
and German cases. And it is to be expected that such similarities actually comprise 
the vast majority of the causal history of the French Revolution. In any case, even if 
the range of relevant causes remains too wide, the contrast space may be reformulated 
so as to further restrict this. 
Whilst DC does not necessarily restrict relevant differences between fact and foils to a 
single one, a good choice of contrasts leads to at least a small number of differences. 
Given that a contrastive question only demands information which satisfies DC, 
complete contrastive explanations are, therefore, practically possible. `Complete' is 
therefore made a practically tractable notion, which is clearly required for 
considerations of explanatory exclusion due to KPEE. It should 
be noted that, even 
utilising a contrastive analysis, a complete explanation cannot 
be one which mentions 
all causes of the explanatory target. This 
is so because it is highly likely that a causal 
difference implies the existence of earlier differences in addition (for all but some 
genuinely stochastic cases of causal mechanism). 
However, wt e can at least make 
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sense of a complete explanation at a given time slice of the history of the explanatory 
target. 
It is of interest to compare this contrastive understanding of completeness to another 
potential formulation. In chapter four I pointed out that interpreting `complete 
explanation' as meaning `sufficient explanation', in the sense of providing a 
Deductive-Nomological explanation, raises certain difficulties. However, in the sense 
that they are sufficient, D-N explanations are complete. This `completeness' is 
achieved through the inclusion of a relevant law, stating that the explanandum had to 
come about, given the existence of the particular fact (the cause). 
Yet no law is universally true: in other words, no law actually guarantees, in all 
situations, that the presence of the cause is sufficient for the explanandum. All laws 
are ceteris paribus; they are of the form `all x's are Y, all else being equal'. For 
example, `all masses attract' (the law of gravity), would not be true in a situation 
where some other type of force restrained those masses. Less universal laws than the 
law of gravity have further degrees of presupposition. `Any social class with 
economic power but not legal/ political power will soon gain the latter' clearly holds 
in a fairly limited range of situations (there must be no undue extra-national influence, 
the leadership of the bourgeoisie must be sufficiently dynamic, and so forth). 
What is interesting about the ceteris paribus nature of laws is that this feature has the 
effect of presupposing much of the causal history of the explanandum. It is only 
through these presuppositions that sufficiency - hence, in a sense, completeness - is 
possible. And we have seen that it is through presupposing those aspects of the fact's 
history which are similar to those of the foils that contrastive explanations may be 
complete. In each case, much of the causal history is presupposed, or `held fixed', 
allowing a complete explanation of the remainder. Whilst the production of an 
explanation of D-N form is one way to provide complete explanations, given a well 
formulated contrastive scenario, it is not the only way. 
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Is contrastive explanation always applicable? 
In the final section I want to deploy the understanding of contrastive explanation 
developed in this chapter to two related questions. First, is contrastive explanation 
eliminable? Second, to the extent that it is not eliminable, is contrastive explanation 
applicable to all explanatory episodes? Much of the substance of an answer to these 
questions has already been provided. I need only add here one further idea. 
Contrastive explanation can be both a method and a means of analysis. Very often, 
contrast is the most suitable means to restrict relevant explanatory information. The 
use of contrast enables a historian to focus on which aspects of a target event need 
explaining, and which elements of the history need citing. As such, contrastive 
explanation is a method of requesting explanations. 
However, I have noted that the same - empirically equivalent - question can be asked 
in a number of different ways. It may be asked contrastively. It may be asked by 
explicitly directing attention towards certain aspects of the event and its history ('why 
did the French Revolution come about? I only want to know about... '). It may be 
asked by presupposing aspects of the causal history, which are therefore to be 
excluded from the information (if you knew that your audience did not want to hear 
about economic aspects of the history of the French Revolution, you would exclude 
these from an explanation). It may be asked in still other ways: Skocpol, for example, 
restricted relevance according to the requirement that only those facts which found an 
analogue in the comparison cases were relevant. As I have suggested, contrast is a 
device which is tolerant of ignorance (useful where we simply don't have the 
knowledge to be explicit about what is to be excluded or included), which is flexible 
and which corresponds well to actual practice. Yet we cannot pretend that all 
explanations are asked for contrastively and answered with reference to explicit 
contrasts. 
Even where contrast is not, and perhaps should not be, used 
in practice, contrastive 
explanation remains appropriate as a means of analysis of explanatory targets. 
In this 
sense, contrastive explanation is a `meta-theory' of explanation. 
The explanation may 
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not actually have been asked for and provided contrastively, but analysing the 
explanation contrastively can still carry the benefits previously listed: of making sense 
of explanatory relevance, appropriateness and refusal, the detail of explanatory 
targets, explanatory exclusion (particularly with reference to KPEE) and 
completeness. 
This dual notion of contrastive explanation enables us to claim that the analytical 
benefits of contrastive theory can be applicable even where the explanatory form is 
not explicitly contrastive. Contrastive explanation seems particularly inappropriate in 
two types of explanation found in the case studies, which I shall call (somewhat 
roughly) `what' and `how' explanations. `What' explanations are those which, like 
Cobban's, approach their target through means of factual (rather than 'why') 
questions: such as `who were the bourgeois? What was the feudalism which they are 
supposed to have overthrown? '23. `How' explanations are narrative explanations, 
exemplified here by Michelet and Schama. These explanations are those which aim 
to provide the detailed mechanisms by which an event came about. 
In fact, `what' explanations are equivalent to those questions which explicitly limit 
relevance, considered previously: those of the form `why P, with respect to facts 
{x}? ' The elements of the event in question which are not queried are those which 
are presupposed by a `what' question. Given what I have said about such explicit 
restrictions, this is analytically equivalent to a contrastive formulation; where the 
contrast space shares with the target fact those features which are presupposed. (I 
shall say more about `what' explanations in the next chapter. ) 
`How' explanations - narratives - fit awkwardly with an 
idea of contrastive 
explanation due to the detail provided, and due to multiple foci. A narrative, at its 
most basic, explains the set of temporally ordered facts {c, d, e, f} such that c explains 
d, d explains e, and e explains f. No summary reason or set of reasons 
is usually 
provided for the final state (certainly this is the case with Schama's narrative, 
for 
example). For this reason, it may not be possible to provide one particular contrast 
23 Cobban, 24 
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space which is appropriate for the narrative explanation as a whole, simply because 
there is no one target for the explanation. However, it is still true that contrast is 
applicable at different points in the narrative. 
I wish to consider two arguments whose conclusion is that contrastive explanation is 
either not applicable, or less applicable than I have suggested. The former, `strong', 
claim is that there are really no contrastive explanations. This argument is based on 
the idea that the contrastive question `why P rather than Q? ' can be reduced to non- 
contrastive notation; such that `why P rather than Q? ' is equivalent to `why P? ' and 
`why not Q? '. Further, it is pointed out that in many cases, there is no contrast 
intended; the questioner may simply want an explanation for `why P? '. Temple raises 
this problem for the contrastive theorist: 
`Thus, `Why P& -'Q' seems to be a fully adequate reading for questions of the form `Why P 
rather than Q? '. ... if the contrast theorist wants to avoid this result 
by insisting that there is, 
after all, more to `Why P rather than Q? ' than is captured by `Why P& -Q', then it is 
incumbent on him to provide an account of this excess meaning. '24 
I believe resources exist in the above account of contrastive explanation which enable 
an account of this excess meaning to be provided. The contrast space shapes those 
aspects of P which require explanation, and which elements of the history of P are 
relevant in this explanation. To translate the contrastive question as a conjunctive 
question is to miss this point entirely, for the connective `rather than' is not truth 
functional (as `&' is). `Rather than' depends on the empirical content of the 
connected terms, as can be seen in the demand that the answer to a contrastive 
question provide only differences between fact and contrast space. 
Ruben's objection is similar to Temple's: he states that `explaining the conjunction of 
facts is to explain the contrastive'. Yet the crucial problem with this formulation is 
25 
that we must be careful about the idea of explaining a fact alone; 
does it mean to 
provide all information relevant to that fact? We have seen that this 
is impossible. Or 
24 Dennis Temple, `The Contrast Theory of Why-Questions' in Philosophy of Science 55 (1988), 150- 
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25 David-Hillel Ruben, `Explaining Contrastive Facts' in Analysis 47 (1987), 36 
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does it mean to provide any information relevant to that fact? But this will lead to 
pragmatically irrelevant explanations; exactly the unfortunate result which contrastive 
explanation is introduced in order to avoid. True, target facts could be properly 
limited non-contrastively; I have provided some examples above. Yet we have seen 
that contrastive explanation is still not analytically redundant, as Ruben implies, not 
least due to the unique advantages of a contrastive analysis previously mentioned. 
It must be said that Ruben is sympathetic to uses of contrast which `only' serve to 
define precisely what is to be explained; he cites Lewis' paper, `Causal Explanation', 
as a defence of this type of contrastive theory. To this extent, Ruben's position is 
similar to that defended in this chapter: contrast is to be viewed as a tool. However, 
no writer to my knowledge has defended the idea that contrastive explanations can 't 
be translated into non-contrastive terms. Even such a paradigmatically `contrastive' 
theorist as Garfinkel, for example, strongly emphasises the equivalence between 
contrast space and the presuppositions of explanation. Does Ruben's conception of 
contrastive explanation, therefore, differ to mine? Perhaps in two ways: I locate 
unique advantages which are to found in analysing explanation contrastively; and I 
would claim that a contrastive approach is always a potential analysis of explanatory 
target. 
The second, `weak', argument against contrastive explanation denies this latter claim. 
Whilst some explanations may be seen as irreducibly contrastive, not all can be; in 
particular, where no obvious contrast suggests itself, and so where the default contrast 
`rather than not' is added. And the problem with this is simply that `why P rather than 
not-P? ' is equivalent to `why P? '; thus the contrast is dispensable. As Ruben claims: 
"Explaining why e occurred rather than not' is just a tedious pleonasm for `explaining why e 
occurred', which is to explain a non-conjunctive (and non-contrastive) fact. Indeed, if `e's 
obtaining rather than not' did name a contrastive fact, the very distinction between contrastive 
and non-contrastive facts would be at risk. )26 
26 Ruben, `Explaining Contrastive Facts', 37 
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A less expected source of concerns regarding contrastive explanation can be found in 
Lipton's `Contrastive Explanation'. Lipton's argument for contrastive explanation is 
based on the fact that it is sometimes harder to answer a contrastive question than a 
non-contrastive question; whilst it is, in other cases, sometimes harder to answer a 
non-contrastive question than a contrastive one. The two formulations cannot, 
therefore, be equivalent. Non-contrastive questions are pre-supposed by Lipton; yet 
we are not told what it is to explain a non-contrastive fact. Further, Lipton's 
examples of explanation of non-contrastive facts can be interpreted rather as 
explanations of different, yet still contrastive, facts. 
Lipton's first example of a contrastive explanation is `Why did Jones, rather than 
Smith, get paresis? ' 27. The reply is that `Jones had syphilis'. (The relevant 
background knowledge is that syphilis is necessary, but not sufficient for paresis; and 
that Jones, but not Smith, had syphilis. ) The example of a similar, but non- 
contrastive, explanation is 'Why did Jones get paresis? '. However, this question 
suggests two potential (implicit) contrasts. We could have in mind the contrast `Jones 
without syphilis'; the question would therefore suggest the answer 'because he got 
syphilis'. Or, we could have in mind `Jones with syphilis'; the question would 
therefore suggest the response that 'we don't have the medical information to know! '. 
Lipton assumes the latter contrast, which is why he says that explaining the 
contrastive fact (I would say, the explicitly contrastive fact) is easier. The important 
point is that, even in discussion of a seemingly `non-contrastive' explanatory target, 
an implicit assumption of relevant contrasts is still required. I take the moral to be 
that contrast is often implicit; many more questions are contrastive than appear to be 
so by their surface form. 
What of seemingly more clear-cut examples of non-contrastive explanatory targets? 
In particular, what of the cases located by Temple and Ruben where, if asked for an 
appropriate contrast we could think of nothing better to add than `rather than not'? I 
agree that taken at face value such a contrast adds nothing to simply asking why the 
fact obtained. The contrast `rather than not' does not restrict relevant explanatory 
information, since in this case contrast space is equivalent to possibility space in 
general. To answer such a question, we would need to differentiate the history of the 
27 Lipton, `Contrastive Explanation', 211 
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fact from the histories of all other possibilities; a task which amounts to the provision 
of (at least! ) a full set of conditions of the type envisaged by Mill. 
What I suggest is that we don't take the contrast `why P rather than not-PT at face 
value. Although we are sometimes inclined to suggest that the contrast space is 
simply the negation of the fact to be explained, it is clear that implicitly the contrast 
space is more determinate. Garfinkel made the same point: we need to make room for 
`limited negation, a determinate sense of what will count as the consequent's "not" 
happening'28. 
We have already found examples of what `limited negation' means in practice: 
particularly in Lefebvre's explanation of the French Revolution's `distinctive 
features'. The French Revolution's not happening - the `not-P' of the contrast - 
excluded from the contrast space such possibilities as the revolution starting a day 
later, the violence resulting in a single difference in numbers of executions, and so 
forth. Whilst these exclusions are rarely stated explicitly, we know that they are 
implicitly present simply by considering that a response which did not pay heed to 
them would be pragmatically incorrect. Although the contrastive formulation will 
frequently be abbreviated as `why P rather than not-P? ', in practice no demand for 
explanation is expressed with the expectation that the answer will provide information 
sufficient to differentiate all other possibilities. All historical explanation, in practice, 
may be beneficially analysed as contrastive explanation. 
Summary 
Our starting point was Kim's PEE, which is one salient way to guarantee explanatory 
exclusion. Explanations exclude each other where they are explanations of the same 
event, and they are not related as dependent, or are two incomplete parts of a wider, 
28 Garfinkel, 30 
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complete explanation. Assuming explanatory realism, this idea must be along the 
right lines. But it goes wrong in specifying explananda as events. 
I have argued that explananda are best seen as contrastive facts. The target, or 
explanandum, of an explanation is a combination of the fact to be explained and a 
contrast space which shapes the appropriate range of explanatory information. 
Contrastive explanation states that explananda are individuated according to the entity 
(event or property) which is the target fact, and those possibilities which a good 
answer should exclude. 
Using this notion, we can gain insight into some of the ways that explanations can be 
consistent, exclusive or overlapping. Where explanations share both fact and contrast 
space (and Kim's two other criteria hold), they exclude each other; both cannot be 
correct. Where explanations differ in fact or contrast space, they can be (according to 
KPEE, at least) consistently held. Where the fact is the same and contrast spaces 
overlap, the explanations are partially excluded. Yet, the necessarily indeterminate 
nature of contrast space precludes entirely definite answers to the question of 
explanatory exclusion. 
I have also developed an account of contrastive theory, such that contrast plays a dual 
role: methodological and analytical. Many explanations are framed in contrastive 
terms, explicitly or implicitly, and it makes sense to understand the structure of these. 
Broadly speaking, I accept that Lipton's Difference Condition, when combined with 
an understanding of contrast space more similar to Garfinkel's, is the best way to 
understand contrastive explanation. 
But, in addition, contrast can be a useful tool by which to analyse all explanations. Its 
uses include, but are not restricted to, comprehending the nature of explanatory focus, 
explanatory detail, explanatory refusal, and explanatory exclusion. Such 
demonstrations of the utility of contrastive theory, supplemented with a developed 
understanding of the determinate nature of contrast space, refute the eliminativist 
arguments purporting to show that contrastive explanation 
is dispensable. 
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Chapter Six: Theory and Concept 
To what extent is there a concept of historical explanation? 
The principles of chapter four are clear cut: explanations are exclusive whenever the 
targets, explanans, or, in particular, the relevance claims of explanans contradict. 
However, there remains a concern that these fairly clear cut principles may not be 
appropriate where historical accounts seem to operate according to quite different 
notions of what `explanatory relevance' amounts to. 
Where the competing explanations are both causal, we have made some headway in 
providing criteria according to which the claims of relevance are contradictory. In 
particular, we have seen that one important way to specify when causal explanations 
disagree over claims of causal relevance is to make use of the notion of a `complete 
explanation'. KPEE made use of the presupposition, feasible when conjoined with a 
viable statement of explanatory realism, that there cannot be more than one complete 
and independent explanation of any given target. KPEE can be defended with regard 
to causal contrastive explanations, with the possible exception of cases of over- 
determination. But is KPEE true of explanatory competition in general? In other 
words, is it true that there can be no more than one complete and independent 
explanation of any kind for any given target? 
No argument for this conclusion has been provided by Kim. Recall that his argument 
for the ontic PEE proceeded by considering all possible relationships between 
explanations, based on the assumption that explanatory relationships mirror 
appropriate ontic relationships. Yet the five possibilities are implicitly causal, as 
Kim 
recognises. Indeed, not only has an argument for a more generalised principle of the 
form of Kim's not been given, but there are additional reasons for being sceptical of 
the possibility of such a task. It seems quite possible that there could 
be, for example, 
a teleological explanation for E, and a causal explanation 
for E, each being complete 
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and independent, yet not mutually exclusive. It could even be maintained that a one- 
sided version of events results unless different kinds of explanation (like causal and 
teleological) are both given. It is clear that more detailed consideration needs to be 
given to the extent to which there are different types of explanation, and how the 
adoption of different types affects explanatory exclusion. 
In general, it seems that explanations which hold radically different conceptions of 
`explanatory relevance' are not potential candidates for exclusion. We might think 
that nomological (scientific) and rational explanation, for example, do not come into 
competition with one another because they are incommensurable. The concept was 
introduced (independently) by Kuhn' and Feyerabend2, who both argued that (at least 
some) scientific theories were incommensurable. The meaning of the term differs 
somewhat between Kuhn and Feyerabend, but the core is that incommensurable 
theories are not comparable in a deductive or axiomatic manner3. It is important to 
see that incommensurability is different to incompatibility; incommensurable theories 
are those which cannot be said to be compatible or incompatible. Similarly, 
incommensurable theories cannot be compared as better or worse in a neutral or 
rational manner. 
Incommensurability is a concept that may have applicability outside the realm of 
scientific theories, for which it was first introduced. In particular, it seems reasonable 
to regard certain explanations as incommensurable. We would not seek to compare 
(in a deductive fashion, at any rate) a poetic and a biological explanation for the 
occurrence of love, nor would we wish one explanation to exclude the other. 
Likewise, it is plausible that religious and scientific explanations of the formation of 
the universe may be complementary, rather than exclusive, in virtue of having very 
1 Kuhn, 111-135,198-204 
z For example, Paul Feyerabend, `On the `meaning' of scientific terms' in Journal of Philosophy 61 
(1964): 266-273, and `Consolations for the Specialist' in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. 
Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970): 197-200 
3 In more detail: a Kuhnian definition would be in terms of the Kuhnian notion of a paradigm, such that 
incommensurable theories are those which can only be judged within the terms and standards of their 
governing paradigm. Therefore, since for Kuhn all mature science is governed by paradigms, 
incommensurability is the norm. Between paradigms, there can be little, if any, communication. 
Feyerabend, however, sees it important to find a way to compare incommensurable theories. He 
regards it possible for incommensurable theories to be compared, just not in a deductive manner. 
Feyerabend regards incommensurability as being less common than Kuhn. 
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different purposes and standards of explanatory relevance; at least under non-literalist 
interpretations of creation stories. Both of these examples illustrate a wider notion of 
incommensurability. Do any of our historical examples share similar characteristics? 
The fundamental task for this chapter is, therefore, to ask whether there are `different 
types' of explanatory relevance relations at work in historical explanations. In 
answering this question, I shall outline a general conception of what historical 
explanation consists of. The investigation will initially be conducted in the 
descriptive mode, by examining the theory at work in the case study explanations. 
The philosophical issue of `types of explanation' was first raised in chapter three, but 
at this point the issues can be specified more precisely. The issue raises two related 
questions: those of reduction and pluralism. 
Firstly reduction: are the different modes of explanation (in particular, those identified 
in the descriptive study to follow) representative of totally different types? Or, 
perhaps despite appearances to the contrary, should we regard the differences as more 
superficial? The latter judgement could be supported either through a demonstration 
that certain `types' of explanation are actually reducible to another, more fundamental 
type; or through a demonstration that the different `types' are capable of subsumption 
under a single, more general notion. 
Secondly pluralism: to the extent that this reduction (or unification) is not possible, 
we are faced with a choice. Either we take the non-pluralist view that a certain type, 
or certain types, of explanation are appropriate, whilst others are not. Or we adopt the 
more pluralistic standpoint that each type is different, yet each performs a respectable 
explanatory task. The import of the second question depends on the first; it is only 
relevant if the first question is answered in a non-reductivist way. In all cases, 
`different type' should be primarily understood with regard to differing conceptions of 
explanatory relevance, as they relate to the potential for explanatory exclusion. 
In this section I will outline possible responses to these questions which have actually 
been adopted in the philosophical literature: reductivist and non-reductivist, pluralist 
and non-pluralist, as well as more intermediary positions. 
This survey will lay the 
foundations for my own understanding of historical explanation, which will 
be stated 
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and defended subsequent to the descriptive study. I will use this model to suggest that 
whilst incommensurability of explanatory theory may reasonably be thought to be 
relevant to explanatory competition in general, historical explanations may be 
regarded as commensurable when considering explanatory exclusion. 
In chapter three I outlined the explanatory reductivist position, particularly with 
regard to the causal reductivist arguments of David Lewis and Eric Barnes. In this 
context, causal reductivism is the thesis that all good scientific explanation is causal 
explanation. If this is the case, then there is only one `type of explanation', and so the 
principles of explanatory exclusion can be applied in a straightforward manner. A 
corollary of the causal-reductivist analysis is to yield an answer to the question of 
pluralism: for where scientific explanations cannot be reduced to causal explanations, 
they are therefore inadmissible. 
The causal reductivist must confront the fact that many good explanations certainly do 
not seem to be causal. The most relevant examples of this phenomenon for the 
present study will be found in the case-study historical explanations, considered in the 
next section. But the following are examples of the sort which pose particularly stark 
problems for a causal reductivist view: 
(i) (from Lipton4): `Why, when sticks are thrown into the air and their instantaneous 
positions recorded at some point in their descent, are appreciably more near the 
horizontal axis than the vertical? Because there are two horizontal dimensions and 
only one vertical (hence there are more ways for a stick to be near the horizontal than 
the vertical). ' The explanation cites a geometrical fact, not a cause. 
(ii) (from Ruben5): `Why is element A of a high pH? Because item A has a high 
concentration of H ions. ' In this case, the explanans and explanandum refer to the 
same item. However, whilst self-explanation may be appropriate, self-causation is - 
presumably - ridiculous. 
4 Lipton, `Contrastive Explanation', 208 
5 Ruben, Explaining Explanation, 218-219 
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(iii) (from Ruben'): `Why did this salt dissolve? Because it was placed in holy water. ' 
The explanation cites a true fact, which was indeed causally relevant. However, the 
explanation appears odd - if not downright false - due to the description of the water 
in question. Whilst it may be true that placing the salt in water caused it to dissolve, 
describing that water as holy water weakens the causal explanation, perhaps to the 
extent that it is no explanation at all. 
My final model will take a line similar to the causal reductivist, so I will have to say 
something about such supposed counter-examples. Where my conclusions depart 
most clearly from those of the causal reductivist is in asserting that citing a cause is 
insufficient to provide a good explanation. Recognising that causes can be described 
in different ways, ways which are more or less explanatory, will be crucial in taking 
account of the explanations that historians actually give. A `bare' theory of causal 
explanation, without the necessary focus on differing ways of describing causes, 
simply fails to make sense of the range of types of historical explanation that there is. 
Even if a universal reduction of explanation to causal explanation is not thought 
possible, particular reductions may be advocated. One example is the reduction of 
intentional explanation to causal explanation. Roughly speaking, the intentional 
explanation E;: `A x'd in order to y' can be taken to mean `A intended y, and this 
intention caused them to x'. The intentional explanation is re-interpreted so that it no 
longer points towards the future, but towards the past, as good causal explanations 
should. 
There are notorious problems with such attempted analyses, the most fundamental of 
which is demonstrated by Davidson's rock climber7. A climber in a precarious 
position intends to let go of the rope holding his colleague in order to stop himself 
falling too. Yet the very thought of letting go of the rope makes the climber's hands 
perspire to the extent that he slips accidentally. In this case the climber intended to 
stop himself falling by letting go of the rope, and the intention caused the 
letting go. 
Thus the example is one of intentional action, according to the proposed causal 
6Ibid., 193 
Donald Davidson, 'Freedom to Act' (originally 1973) in Davidson, Essays on Actions and 
Events, 79 
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analysis. But the intention to stop himself falling caused the climber to let go of the 
rope accidentally; so the climber cannot truly be said to have let the rope go in order 
to stop himself falling. The twists and turns resulting from such counter-examples are 
too numerous to detail here, though most do assume that a causal analysis of 
teleological (intentional) explanation must, in principle, be possible8. I shall return to 
this issue towards the end of this chapter. 
The diametrically opposite position is that of the non-reductivist. Different types of 
explanation found in different historical accounts really are as methodologically 
separate as they appear, and for that reason they are incommensurable. Hayden 
White's typology of differing modes of `formal argument', introduced in chapter 
three, exemplifies a non-reductivist philosophy of explanation. Recall that we 
struggled to say what these `types' had in common: the weak answer could only be 
that they somehow made the historical record `meaningful'. Another, more limited 
but clearer, example is provided by Dray's understanding of descriptive explanation, 
Dray believes that `explaining what' (descriptive explanation) and `explaining why' 
are radically different types of explanation. It would be pointless to attempt to make 
one do the job of the other, since the two activities have complementary and 
irreducible roles. Descriptive explanation and `why' explanation cannot, therefore, 
exclude one another. Again, I shall return to Dray's idea, and descriptive explanation 
in general, later in this chapter. 
A rather different sort of non-reductivism provides a further possible position in 
relation to the questions of reduction and pluralism. A strong tradition in certain 
fields of historical scholarship is to disparage the role of causal explanation in history. 
Traditionally, such a position has been motivated by the arguments of the nineteenth- 
century hermeneutic theorists (for example, Winch's theory, introduced in chapter 
three), but is today more commonly reliant on post-structuralist theory. Different 
types of explanation - in this case, the causal and the interpretative - are therefore 
asserted to be separate, not reducible to one another. Yet, only one of those types - 
8 See, however, Scott Sehon, `Deviant Causal Chains and the Irreducibility of Teleological 
Explanation' in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78(2) 1997: 195-213 as an example of one who 
affirms the non-reducibility of teleological explanation 
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the interpretative - is regarded as a proper basis for explanations in history and the 
social sciences. With regard to historical and social scientific explanation, this 
position is therefore non-pluralist. There can be no question of explanatory exclusion 
between explanations of two different types if this view is correct, simply because 
causal explanations are not really respectable historical explanations at all. 
Explanatory Theory 
In the following descriptive survey, I use various conceptions of explanation to 
categorise the historical works: Deductive-Nomological, Nomological-Comparatil'e, 
narrative, teleological and descriptive explanation. These (embryonic) analyses will 
not necessarily be a part of the more considered, general theory of historical 
explanation which I shall subsequently propose. I hope that by relying on such a wide 
range of theories of explanation for my initial typology, I can escape the charge that I 
am simply presuming that the different explanations are all of the same type. To 
some degree, the categorisation is artificial; both in the sense that all the historical 
works display a mixture of the different types, and in that the different types are, in 
any case, not always distinct. The concepts provide, however, a descriptive starting 
point; and it will be a virtue of my approach to historical explanation that it can make 
sense of such overlapping theoretical methodologies. 
There are, in addition, other types of explanation which are not represented in what 
follows, for the reason that I have selected only that which appears to be the most 
distinctive or pervasive mode of explanation in each account. All the accounts 
contain causal claims (despite the reluctance of some of the historians to recognise 
this; an attitude which will be examined in the following section). All, with the 
exception of Skocpol, contain `rational explanations': explanation of action by 
reference to reasons which a particular historical individual, or social groups, had for 
performing the actions they did. 
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Deductive-n omological 
The core of Lefebvre 's explanation of the French Revolution is the application of a 
Marxist law of history: 
`These groups [the nobility and clergy] preserved the highest rank in the legal structure of the 
country, but in reality economic power, personal abilities and confidence in the future had 
passed largely to the bourgeoisie. Such a discrepancy never lasts forever. The Revolution of 
1789 restored the harmony between fact and law. '9 
The explanation reconstructed in deductive-nomological form is as follows: 
(P 1) The nobility and clergy had the highest legal rank; the bourgeoisie had 
the economic power 
(P2) Whenever one class has economic power but not the highest legal rank, 
its legal rank will change (for the better) 
(C) The bourgeoisie's legal rank changed (for the better) 
Such an explanation is explanatory due to its demonstration of expectability. Given a 
deep (long lasting, robust) fact about French society, something like the French 
Revolution as it actually was had to happen. It is undeniable that, if such an 
explanation is available, it is satisfying - we see why the French Revolution had to 
happen. 
However, we should closely examine the target of Lefebvre's explanation. The above 
explanation does not explain the actual event which was the French Revolution, only 
that there was a change of legal rank in the bourgeoisie, at some time. There was, 
however, a change in legal rank of the bourgeoisie in Britain before the French 
Revolution, but no revolution there remotely akin to the French. I mention this not as 
a criticism of Lefebvre, for he clearly recognises the need in his wider account for 
further detail. Rather, the important point to note is that one significant way that 
`types of explanation' can differ is in the precision or generality of their targets. This 
9 Lefebvre, 2 
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aspect of explanatory targets has been explicated, in chapter five, using a contrastive 
theory of explanation. 
Nomological-comparative 
Skocpol 's theoretical basis is consciously scientific. Her method, as we have seen, is 
to select both positive and negative comparison cases. These cases are then compared 
according to Mill's methods of Agreement and Difference, in order to discern causes. 
We must remember that Skocpol's overall aim is to develop a general theory of social 
revolutions. She does wish to explain why the French Revolution took place, as do 
the other historians considered here, but only in the context of an account of why, in 
general, social revolutions take place. I take it then that Skocpol's explanation of the 
French Revolution will, if correct, be satisfying in part because of its ability to be 
applied to further cases. 
Skocpol's account relies on the citing of laws just as Lefebvre's, hence it is also 
nomological. However, Skocpol cites three nomological factors, not one: state 
organisation (greater susceptibility to administrative and military collapse leads to a 
greater chance of revolution), pressure from more developed countries abroad (more 
pressure leads to a greater chance of revolution), and agrarian socio-political 
structures (those which facilitate peasant revolt against landlords lead to a greater 
chance of revolution). 
With regard to the relationship between the generality of laws cited in an explanation 
and generality of explananda, Skocpol's target is correspondingly more precise than 
Lefebvre's. It is worth noting that whilst this may quite justifiably be regarded as an 
advantage for Skocpol's nomological explanation, we saw in chapter five that it is not 
correct to think that the more detailed the explanation, the better. Consider again 
Garfinkel's example: `why did the car skid there (rather than 5cm further on)'. In the 
context of contrastive explanation, there will always be some level of detail which is 
quite properly made irrelevant according to the selection of contrast space. 
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One commentary on Skocpol's work which is of particular relevance to the concerns 
of this chapter is Manicas'10. Manicas claims that though Skocpol's explanation is 
sound by its own standards, it is not really a historical explanation at all. Historical 
explanations, for Manicas, must be `processive'; in other words, they must trace a 
chain of particular events in a narrative fashion. In the context of the eight historians 
considered in this work, I am not sure that Skocpol is so different in this respect. In 
any case, we are owed an argument as to why only `processive' explanations should 
be considered historical explanations. Manicas' notion of `historical explanation' is a 
good example of the sort of restrictive conception against which I contrast my own 
conception, to be developed in this chapter. 
Teleological 
The core idea of Hegel's theory of historical explanation is that causal explanation 
alone is insufficient to provide a proper understanding of historical phenomena. 
Whilst the true Philosophical Historian should not depart from empirically determined 
facts, the sequence of facts must be configured in such a way as to make clear the 
internal essence of that sequence. 
I believe that this demand is best understood with reference to Lakatos' theory of 
Rational Reconstructions, considered in chapter one. One demand of Lakatos' theory 
- the need for normative or rational explication - is that a philosophical 
history of 
science which does not make apparent the essential rationality of that history is, on 
that basis, deficient. Hegel simply widens this notion: the requirement to make clear 
the rationality of a sequence is justified not only for histories of science (or, perhaps, 
other intellectual developments), but for history in general" 
1 
The internal essence of human history is, for Hegel, the development of the spirit of 
the age, or `Spirit'. This means the development of freedom; since Hegel claims that 
10 Peter Manicas, 'Review Article: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions' in Histon- and 
Theory 20(2) (1981): 204-218 
11 This interpretation gains some support from the fact that the type of history immediately preceding 
(and therefore conceptually the closest to) Hegel's preferred methodology of 
`Philosophical History' is 
`Specialised Reflective History'. This type of history is `for example, the history of art, of law, or of 
religion'; Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Histony, 9 
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`the essence of Spirit is its freedom' 12. Hegel's history therefore consists primarily of 
the tracing of the changing idea of freedom, that idea which motivates the French 
Revolution being near the end of the story. In tracing the notion of freedom, Hegel 
claims to make apparent the internal and rational thread of history, understanding of 
which can alone lead to a proper understanding. 
Hegel's theory of explanation is teleological in the sense that the explanation refers to 
the end-state of Spirit. Hegel's account of the French Revolution only makes sense in 
the light of both where Spirit has been, and where it is going: towards perfect 
freedom. Hegel's understanding of teleology clearly owes much to an Aristotelian 
metaphysics, wherein each thing has a potential which it struggles to achieve. To cite 
this potential is to cite the Aristotelian `final cause', which is thereby one way of 
explaining the activities of that item. 
However, Hegel also regards `usual' (efficient) causation not just as complementary 
to `final' causation (as a more orthodox Aristotelianism such as that suggested in 
chapter three would assert), but as the `servant' of the latter13 .I take this to mean that 
a teleological understanding operates by marshalling physical causation in such a way 
that causes are arranged so as to exhibit teleology (an idea which will be developed 
later in this chapter). 
Hegel's teleological explanation gains its support from the belief, acquired 
philosophically and non-empirically, that since there is only one true and right way of 
thinking and acting (with respect to `freedom'), history will eventually reach that 
point. It is for this reason that Hegel's theory has been seen as paradigmatic of 
`speculative' history. If this justification for Hegelian teleology is along the right 
lines, it shows the explanation to be external rational. 
To explain: in chapter one, I argued that the most fundamental question in 
categorising theories of rationality is to what extent the participant's own aims and 
beliefs are considered sufficient to demarcate rationality of action. An explanation 
based on a theory of rationality which aims to make sense of actions only within their 
12 Ibid., 20 
13 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans. 
W. allace 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; originally 1817) Book I: Logic, Section 204 
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own context of beliefs and aims can be called an instrumental or internal rational 
explanation. Hegel, however, clearly conceives of `rationality' as being a more 
demanding notion: the end state of Spirit is the most completely rational state, no 
matter what any participant of history believes or wants. Hegelian rationality is 
therefore external to the circumstances of those participants. 
Narrative 
Michelet is a `classic' narrativist historian, writing at a time when to present a 
moralistic narrative was the standard means of presenting a historical account. 
Schama is a representative of the modem return to narrative, fashionable since the 
1970s. Narrative explanations are, due to their very form, harder to summarise than 
nomological explanations; the latter can be summarised with reference to the key laws 
and initial conditions, as both Lefebvre and Skocpol actually do. Whilst D-N 
explanations are paradigmatic of abstractive explanation, narrative explanations are 
deliberately complex and detailed in an attempt to remain true to the perceived 
complexity of the historical record. 
A few pertinent features of the respective narratives can, however, be noted. Michelet 
narrates the coming of the French Revolution `from the inside'; as (he thinks) the 
participants actually conceived of the event. The narrative is governed according to 
the belief that the revolution was a unitary phenomenon, an extraordinary event which 
embraced and brought together the entire French nation. And the revolution was 
fundamentally a change of basic ideals: the replacement of the Christian principle of 
grace with the Enlightenment principles of justice and reason. 
These fundamental features demonstrate that elements of what we might regard as 
other types of explanation are also present in Michelet's narrative explanation. Part of 
the explanatory worth of the narrative is to be found in its ability to make sense of the 
participant's own actions (`from the inside'). In other words, the worth of Michelet's 
narrative should be judged, in part, according to its demonstration that the events have 
an `internal rationality' to them. In addition, the unity of the French nation exerts a 
teleological pull on events in Michelet's narrative. Finally, Michelet's categorisation 
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of the Revolution in terms of Enlightenment and Christian ideas suggests similarities 
to `descriptive explanations', to be considered next. 
Schama adopts a very different understanding of the revolution. He regards the 
French Revolution as an illiberal `blip' en route to a modern, liberal French nation. 
The causes of the revolution were accidents; the origins haphazard and chaotic. 
Whilst the revolution appears (to the participants and initially to us) to be of `epochal 
significance', what in fact brought it about was a mixture of individual ambition, 
rivalry, and unfortunate short-sightedness. Further, and in direct contrast to Michelet, 
Schama insists that in a very real sense there was no one revolution, but a multiplicity. 
How, in general, do narratives explain? In the basic sense, a narrative could be said to 
be a succession of causal explanations, each of which provides the basis for a single 
narrative step. (This idea was suggested with regard to `how' explanations, in chapter 
five. ) But the central question is how far, and in what way, a narrative's explanatory 
power goes beyond a summation of the causal claims which constitute the narrative. 
One way to claim that the explanatory power of a narrative does exceed that of the 
causal statements would be to make the case for the dependency of explanatory power 
upon the overall configuration of the set of events, such that those events are thereby 
given a comprehensible meaning (Hayden White's theory represents one way of 
developing an intuition of this kind). Whilst a narrative cannot abstract in the way 
that a D-N explanation can, the narrative does in some sense unify the events in the 
account - whether this unification leads to the understanding that the revolution was a 
fundamental and inevitable change of ideas, or that it was essentially a mistake. 
Descriptive explanation 
Chartier, Furet and Cobban all, in somewhat different ways, structure their 
explanations through a mixture of descriptive and causal focus. All three make 
numerous causal claims, despite Chartier and Furet's professed dislike of this mode of 
explanation (a theoretical attitude which will receive attention in the following 
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section). The more interesting feature of these accounts is, however, the use of 
description in an explanatory context. Whilst description is sometimes conceived as 
an activity distinct from explanation, we do need to account for the idea of 
explanation as re-description, or alternatively, conceptual explanation. 
Descriptive explanation proceeds by describing the material under examination in a 
certain way, according to certain concepts. The common factor is that those concepts 
bring explanatory understanding of some sort: at a minimum, they should bring order 
to, or unify, the phenomena under examination. This is the role of the `key concepts', 
identified in chapter two. In each historian's work, there is room for one or two 
concepts which serve a particularly conspicuous explanatory role. A more detailed 
account of the explanatory work done by key concepts follows. One interesting 
question which I shall not raise in what follows is the extent to which the key 
concepts are justified by the historical material: I shall restrict attention to the 
explanatory import of the concepts (no matter to what extent they be empirically 
justified). 
I would be tempted to identify `descriptive explanation' with `interpretative 
explanation' were it not for the fact that the latter phrase is usually understood with 
reference to a philosophy of social science inspired by the later writing of 
Wittgenstein. This `interpretivism' maintains that explanation of social action must 
make reference to the social rules which the participants themselves use to orientate 
their behaviour. Further, this sort of explanation is explicitly regarded as being non- 
scientific and non-causal. Interpretivism is the guiding principle of Winch's theory of 
social explanation, mentioned in chapter three. I would understand `interpretivism', 
in this sense, as one type of descriptive explanation. 
Much of Furet's thinking on the origins of the French Revolution is shaped 
by his 
understanding of the revolution in terms of the two concepts of `state' and 
`society'. 
Thus, `In the dialogue between societies and their States that is part of the underlying 
texture of history, the Revolution tipped the scales against the 
State and in favour of 
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society. ' 14 Furet's fundamental characterisation, based around his key concepts, 
allows him to understand and interpret certain important features of the revolution, of 
which I shall mention three 
Firstly, the characterisation explains such fundamental facts as that French ideology 
and politics altered enormously during the revolution, despite (in Furet's view) the 
fact that little changed economically or administratively. This is because where the 
balance of power swings in such a fundamental way from state to society, everything 
is up for grabs. Ideology could, and did, penetrate any aspect of life, and no 
ideological axiom remained any longer sacred. 
Secondly, the concepts serve to frame Furet's more detailed investigations. For 
example, he uses the concepts to emphasise the fact that the role of representatives of 
society in late eighteenth century France passed from the parlements to the 
philosophes. This is then of interest in explaining the abstract nature of subsequent 
political debate15. Finally, Furet's interpretation of state and society allows a 
fundamental characterisation of the French Revolution to be provided: the revolution 
was the event which swung political power from the state to society. Thus the 
interpretation `has the ... advantage of restoring to the French Revolution 
its most 
obvious dimension, the political one' 16 
Cobban's key concepts are rather more numerous than Furet's, though they do share a 
similarity in all being primarily social: `town'/ `country', `poor'/ `rich', in particular 17 
The resulting interpretation is, for this reason, less tightly unified. Cobban conceives 
of his task primarily as one of critical description. In particular, he wishes to describe 
the nature of social divisions (particularly, through an examination of `bourgeoisie'), 
the rural economic system (whether or not it was `feudal'), the motivations to incite 
revolution, and the economic effects of the revolution. Through this description, the 
various antagonisms which constituted the revolution can be stated. The revolution 
14 Furet, 24 
's Ibid., 37: `Thus the French, deprived as they were of true liberties, strove for abstract liberty; 
incapable of collective experience, lacking the means of testing the limits of action, they unwittingly 
moved toward the illusion of politics. ' 
16 Ibid., 27 
17 Interestingly, like Furet's `State/ Society', Michelet's 'Christianity/ Revolution', and others, 
Cobban's concepts come in opposed pairs. Perhaps this is because the explanandum 
is a revolution? 
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consists fundamentally of the grievance of the poor against capitalism, and the 
grievances of the poor against the rich in general. 
Apart from stressing the necessity (but not the sufficiency) of cultural origins of the 
French Revolution, the most significant aspect of Chartier's work is to challenge 
prevailing definitions of culture. In reversing the assumed relation between practice 
and ideas, Chartier presents an alternative interpretation of the cultural origins of the 
revolution. This interpretation privileges practice and the less conscious aspects of 
social life, over the clearly articulated ideas of the intellectual elite. Chartier's 
approach to cultural origins shapes his understanding of which features of eighteenth 
century French life should be emphasised as leading to the Revolution: cultural 
practice, not explicit ideology. 
In addition to the interpretation of the cultural aspects of eighteenth century France 
(the `origins' of the Revolution), Chartier's work allows a conceptual understanding 
of the course of the Revolution itself. Chartier is concerned with the question of 
continuity or discontinuity: whether the excessive violence of the Revolution ran 
counter to the `process of civilization' of the eighteenth century; and whether the 
dominance of the public sphere seen as the Revolution progressed is paradoxical 
when compared to the invention of the private sphere prior to the Revolution. 
Chartier concludes: `the French Revolution had roots in the century that it brought to 
an end, even where it spectacularly seemed to run counter to the old evolution. ' 18 
Causal historical explanation 
The remainder of this chapter defends a general understanding of historical 
explanation. This understanding is formulated with the twin aims of being permissive 
enough to do justice to the preceding descriptive account; yet being unif}'ing enough 
to be able to demonstrate that explanatory exclusion can be relevant across seemingly 
18 Chartier, 197 
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different explanatory types. I claim that historical explanation paradigmatically 
consists of two elements: (i) claims of causal relevance; (ii) specification of those 
claims in such a way as to exhibit a certain explanatory virtue or virtues. The 
explanation must, therefore, meet two jointly sufficient criteria: the `cause' must be 
actually occurrent and causally efficacious, and it must be cited in an appropriate way. 
This section will examine the causal element of this analysis, the following section the 
descriptive element. 
Crucial to a defence of causal historical explanation is attributing the correct meaning 
to `cause'. I will develop this conception of causation by considering what appears to 
be an obvious problem for a general theory of historical explanation as causal: that 
certain historians explicitly repudiate the notion of causation. 
In contradiction to my condition (i), Furet and Chartier wish to explicitly disavow any 
idea that causal explanation is possible, or useful, in history. Chartier states that 
`History has become more circumspect in the designation of causality' 19, Furet that `a 
phenomenon like the French Revolution cannot be reduced to a simple cause-and- 
effect schema'20. At the very least, such statements imply that not all good historical 
explanation is causal; further comments suggest that Furet and Chartier perceive the 
role of causality in historical explanation to be minimal. I shall select five central 
elements to their critique, the first three of which, drawn from Chartier, are explicitly 
based upon Foucault's comments on historical explanation21. 
The search for `causes' is equated with the search for `origins', but this latter notion 
makes certain undesirable assumptions. `Origins' are brought together and unified, 
but this process `demands a retrospective reconstruction that gives unity to thoughts 
and actions supposed to be "origins" but foreign to one another, heterogeneous 
by 
19 Ibid., 1 
20 Furet, 22 
21 Michel Foucault, `Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' in Michel Foucault, 
Language, Counter-, tfemory, 
Practice, ed. Donald Bouchard (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1977): 139-164 
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their nature'22. The unification of `causes' is given by hindsight, whereas the events 
in fact had no real unity. 
The "chimera of origins" also presupposes that 
`historical becoming is organized as an ineluctable continuity; that events are linked together, 
one engendering another in an uninterrupted flow of change that enables us to decide that one 
is the "cause", another the "effect "'z3 
The distrust of assumptions of continuity derives directly from Foucault (and, 
indirectly, from Nietzsche). Foucault would prefer history to abandon the attempt to 
trace a continuous sequence of cause and effect, and instead to embrace the idea of 
history as a sequence of accidents, deviations, reversals, errors, faults and fissures24. 
Connected to these critiques is a distrust of teleological assumption, which is, it is 
claimed, presupposed by the term 'origins'. Teleology is suspect because it assumes 
`an ideal continuity' : `the notion of origin entails the further risk of proposing a 
teleological reading of the eighteenth century that seeks to understand it only in 
relation to the phenomenon deemed to be its necessary outcome: the French 
Revolution'25. Revealingly, Chartier later accepts that, despite his criticism, a 
teleological treatment is to some degree necessary, since this is the only way to bring 
order to the historical material: `History stripped of all temptation to teleology would 
risk becoming an endless inventory of disconnected facts abandoned to their teeming 
incoherence for want of a hypothesis to propose a possible order among them. '26. The 
assumed equation of teleology and causality at this point is stark. 
Furet and Chartier both regard `cause' as insufficient, and perhaps unnecessary, in 
explanation of the French Revolution because `cause' is limited to concrete, physical 
items. Discussing revolutionary action and ideology, Furet states that `These `events', 
being political and even ideological in nature, invalidate by definition a causal 
22 Chartier, 4 
23 Ibid., 4-5 
24 Foucault, 146 
25 Chartier, 5 
26 Ibid., 7 
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analysis based on economic and social 4 contradictions"27. It is clear that Furet has in 
mind a Marxist analysis as his paradigm of a causal explanation. Likewise, Chartier 
warns us that `... attributing "cultural origins" to the French Revolution does not by 
any means establish the Revolution's causes; rather, it pinpoints certain of the 
conditions that made it possible because it was conceivable. '28 `Cause', for Chartier, 
cannot be applicable to cases where the historian simply `makes an event 
conceivable'. 
Finally, Furet and Chartier believe causal explanation to be insufficient, since in many 
ways the revolution was an entirely new event. Furet maintains that `The mere fact 
that the Revolution had causes does not mean that they are all there is to its history.... 
the revolutionary event, from the very outset, totally transformed the existing situation 
and created a new mode of historical action that was not intrinsically a part of that 
situation. '29 Chartier agrees: `Even assuming that the Revolution had many origins 
(intellectual, cultural, or other), its own history still cannot be limited to them. '30 
I cannot enter into detailed criticism of Chartier's and Furet's philosophical position, 
which draws on elements from Foucault, Nietzsche, and even from a classic Humean 
critique of causality. Fortunately, I don't think this is necessary. All I intend to point 
out is that Chartier and Furet do in fact provide causal explanations in the sense in 
which I understand them; and that their theoretical worries are aimed, by and large, at 
a rather different target. 
The minimal sense by which I understand `cause' is simply that of an antecedent 
which was empirically necessary in the circumstances for the phenomenon to be 
explained. That antecedent may be intellectual, economic, social, or of any other 
type. Causes need not be rationally or teleologically linked to effects. There is a 
`continuity' of some sort existing between cause and effect, but this continuity need 
not be `ideal', fundamental or even particularly interesting. It is a `continuity' which 
27 Furet, 23 
28 Chartier, 2 
29 Furet, 22 
30 Chartier, 8 
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does not preclude understanding the causal sequence as accidental or productive of 
the radically new. By contrast, in general, Furet's and Chartier's theoretical 
comments either presuppose that the `cause' makes the effect rationally and 
teleologically comprehensible; or that `causes' should be limited to socio-economic 
factors. There is no reason to accept either of these restrictions. 
Furet's and Chartier's final criticism is somewhat different: that the revolutionary 
development cannot be accounted for simply by what preceded it. But once we 
recognise the revolution as a complex particular (extended over time), we can agree 
with the statement without thereby abandoning the demand for causes. For it is quite 
possible that earlier parts of the revolution causally explain later elements, in a way 
that could not have been foreseen by limiting attention to causes operative before the 
revolution. In this way we can make sense of the claim that the Revolution's history 
need not be limited to its (pre-Revolutionary) causes. 
In general, my intention is to critique Furet's and Chartier's theoretical comments 
through an application of Reflective Equilibrium. Furet and Chartier do, despite 
claims to the contrary, provide causal explanations (seen both in the preceding 
descriptive survey, and in the following section). There is, therefore, logical tension 
between elements of the same historical account: in the juxtaposition of the practice 
of citing causes and the theoretical aversion to causal explanation. This tension can 
be resolved by specifying a viable meaning of `cause' which can make sense of what 
Furet and Chartier do in their explanations. 
The theoretical comments can then be read as a warning that causes of a certain type 
may not be assumed in explanation of the Revolution. As I have suggested, a causal 
explanation is not just a list of causes: those causes must be specified in a particular 
way. The target of Furet and Chartier's criticism are particular ways of specifying 
causes. Their arguments should be interpreted as an attempt to show that causal 
explanations phrased in rational or teleological terms will not be possible 
in historical 
explanation in general, and for the French Revolution in particular. 
Clearly, my proposed proto-analysis of `cause' raises many 
issues. Firstly, I use the 
term `empirically necessary' to exclude logical antecedents as causes. 
However, a 
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long philosophical tradition questions whether we can make sense of empirical 
necessity, over and above logical necessity. Secondly, I say that a cause must be 
`necessary in the circumstances' in order to make sense of the idea that, whilst two 
causes may lead to (roughly? ) the same effect, in the specific circumstances which 
obtained, only one cause could have led to that effect. However, genuine cases of 
over-determination will pose a problem for an analysis of this sort. 
I don't intend to explore these issues in any detail, since it is to be hoped that if a 
better (though similarly permissive) analysis of `cause' can be provided, then that 
analysis could replace my own without affecting what I say about causal explanation. 
With regard to my development of the latter idea, it is of more use to return to the 
three examples, introduced in the first section, which seem to suggest difficulties with 
a causal approach to explanation. 
Example (i), `Lipton's sticks', seems not to be a causal explanation, since the 
explanation is in terms of a global feature of our space-time structure. It is commonly 
thought that `causes' should be restricted to events, or changes of state; a type of 
entity which `a global feature of our space-time structure' manifestly is not. 
However, according to my definition of `cause', example (i) does turn out to be 
causal, since it refers to `an antecedent empirically necessary in the circumstances' 
(so long as the meaning of `antecedent' does not restrict the types of entities which 
may be `causes'). The structural properties are indeed necessary, in the 
circumstances, for the position of the sticks to be as they are. Does this point to a 
weakness in my conception? 
I would argue that it does not, considering that my conception of `cause' is something 
of a term of art. As I have freely admitted, it is no thorough-going analysis of the 
term. Rather, the purpose of arguing that all historical explanations are (partially) 
causal is to allow us to conceive of the possibility that seemingly 
different types of 
historical explanation may yet be exclusive. For this task, the prime requirements 
for 
a definition of `cause' are that it allows historians to substantively - empirically - 
disagree over the truth and relevance of causes; and that it can be used 
in an 
understanding of contrastive completeness of explanation. 
I am therefore inclined to 
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insist that we stick with my conception of `cause', even where that conception is 
applicable to items which would not normally be regarded as causes. However, if this 
recommendation is too unpalatable, the core argument of this section may be 
rephrased accordingly, with no dire consequences. 
Rather than claiming that all historical explanations feature a cause or causes, 
described in certain appropriate ways, the causal case may be regarded as a 
paradigmatic example situated within a more general schema. The more general 
schema would be that all historical explanations cite an ontic relationship. This ontic 
relationship may be causal, structural, dispositional ...: 
indeed, the sorts of ontic 
relationships mentioned in chapter three. These relationships may all produce 
`antecedents empirically necessary in the circumstances'; hence they are on a par with 
regard to explanatory exclusion. It is neater to regard all historical explanations as 
having a causal element; but if causal relationships are regarded as only one possible 
type of ontic relationship, and `ontic relationship' is analysed broadly as I have 
analysed `cause', then it makes no difference. 
Example (ii), Ruben's `self-explanation', is intended to be incompatible with causal 
explanation, no matter what conception of causation is utilised. The example is 
compelling to the extent that we agree that no analysis of causation should permit the 
same item to be both cause and effect. I think that examples such as these present one 
sympathetic to causal explanation with a choice; my preference being for the second 
option. We might refuse to accept the example as a genuine case of explanation: this 
is Lewis' strategy, is reply to an analogous case31. Lewis' response makes it clear 
that, despite perhaps appearances to the contrary, the example is one of description, 
not explanation. 
Alternatively, we might point to the fact that no sensible theory of explanation would 
hold that all explanations - including mathematical, philosophical, and religious - 
must contain a causal element. Indeed, some explanations surely have no ontic basis 
at all, having standards of adequacy which are purely cognitive. A clear case is 
explaining `why x is an A' (using another example of Ruben's, `why is a cow a 
3! Lewis, `Causal Explanation', 190-192 
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ruminant'32): relevant facts about x must be given, but these can hardly be causal 
facts. Whilst scientific and historical explanations are not typically of the same sort 
as mathematical or philosophical explanations, there seems no reason to suppose that 
an explanation more of the form of the latter might not appear in a scientific or 
historical account. This seems to be a good case for recognising the `family 
resemblance' nature of explanation. 
Example (iii) can be dealt with more quickly. I accept that this demonstrates that 
citing causes of E is not sufficient to explain E. The causes must be described in the 
correct manner: a requirement which is the subject of the following section. 
Explanatory concepts 
In addition to more or less explicitly citing causes, historical explanations must 
conceive of these causes in the correct way. This is clearly demonstrated by Ruben's 
example, (iii), and demonstrated less clearly but in more detail by the case study 
historical explanations. Causal explanation, and using description, concepts or 
interpretation to explain, are not contradictory activities, as is sometimes claimed. (I 
understand `descriptive explanation', `conceptual explanation' and `explanation 
through interpretation' - in a sense not restricted to Winch's use of the term - to be 
roughly equivalent notions). Indeed, not only does causal explanation always require 
the proper use of concepts in explanation, but the use of critical description in 
bringing understanding to the historical material frequently involves or implies causal 
claims. 
My second claim to be substantiated in this section is that there is no one correct way 
to conceive of, or describe, causes in a historical explanation. Indeed, it is because 
there are multiple ways to provide the necessary conceptual backing in a historical 
explanation that we are faced with what seem to be different `types' of historical 
32 Ruben, Explaining Explanation, 220 
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explanation. In particular, I want to reject the commonly held view that causes must 
be cited so as to exhibit a nomological relation between cause and effect. Maybe this 
is a requirement of scientific explanations, which usually provide the reference class 
in philosophical discussions of explanation; but it is not a universal requirement for 
historical explanation. Whilst there are multiple means to properly conceptualise 
causal claims in history, I will make some general comment as to the nature of these 
historical concepts. I take this task to be that which is necessary to tackle the 
question, raised in chapter three, concerning how we are to demarcate explanatory 
modes of understanding. 
My third task, in the final section, will be to comment on the implications for 
explanatory exclusion of the dual understanding of historical explanation 
recommended here. Whilst exclusion resulting from claims of explanatory relevance 
relies on the causal element of an explanation, it would be wrong to think that the 
conceptual type of explanation has no effect on judgements of exclusion. 
In order to substantiate my claim that causal and conceptual explanation are 
complementary, rather than necessarily alternative, activities, we need to examine 
descriptive or conceptual explanation in more detail. Explanation may sometimes be 
achieved simply by re-describing the item in question. Under what conditions is re- 
description successfully explanatory? Davidson33, Hempel34, Ruben35 and others 
have pointed to the importance of laws in explanation. A re-description is 
explanatory where that re-description demonstrates a nomological connection 
between explanans and explananda. Explanation through re-description may be 
considered an elliptical version of D-N explanation, where the law is suggested rather 
than explicitly formulated. For example: 
`Why did that saucepan break? Because it was made of glass' 
33 Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes' 
34 Hempel, `The Function of General Laws in History'; in particular 40-41 
35 See, for example, David-Hillel Ruben, `Singular Explanation and the Social Sciences' in Philosophy 
65 (1990): 95-117 
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Whilst no law is mentioned explicitly, the re-description implies a plausible, if 
approximate law: that most objects made of glass break upon contact with a hard 
surface. What appears to be a conceptual or descriptive explanation is really nothing 
distinctively of the sort. If this theory of descriptive explanation is maintained 
universally, then any alleged descriptive explanation which did not imply a 
nomological connection would be on that basis not really an explanation at all. Such 
candidates ('the peoples of Europe rapidly migrated as stars in an exploding 
supernova') might be considered rather as metaphors; perhaps useful for 
understanding, but not truly explanatory. 
But there are counter-examples to the nomological model. Useful examples can be 
derived from Walsh's work on colligation: such as that Hitler's reoccupation of the 
Rhineland in 1936 might be explained by locating it within a more general policy of 
German expansion pursued from 1933 onwards36. The salient feature of this example 
is that the German expansion is a singular, though complex and extended, event. The 
explanation does not, therefore, seem to be even tacitly nomological. Rather, the 
example appears to be explanatory in the sense that it unifies the explanandum within 
a wider particular. 
Dray37 provides a similar argument against a nomological analysis of descriptive 
explanation. Dray's analysis of the explanatory value of `explaining what' is that it is 
summative: `it allows us to refer to x, y and z collectively as "a so-and-so" '38. In 
defending descriptive explanation as being distinct from D-N explanation, Dray 
emphasises the fact that the former had an entirely different purpose to the latter. 
Descriptive explanations are answers to "what" questions; Deductive-Nomological 
explanations are answers to "why" questions. 
Walsh's notion of colligation leads to a similar analysis. Walsh developed the idea of 
colligation through such examples as the aforementioned `Hitler's occupation of the 
Rhineland'. He emphasises the way that historians frequently explain by ordering 
individual events into wider processes. Colligatory wholes are complex particulars: 
36 W H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy, of History (London: Hutchinson, 1951), 59 
37 W. H. Dray, "`Explaining What" in History' in Theories of History, ed. Patrick Gardiner 
(New York: 
Free Press, 1959): 403-408 
38 Ibid., 406 
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like `the policy of German expansion', `the Dark Ages', or `the French Revolution', 
they are intelligible wholes whose comprehensibility does not require multiple 
instantiation. In his later work on the subject, Walsh made it clear that explanation 
through colligation has a similar function to Dray's notion of `explaining what' : `Dray 
and I are concerned ... more with interpretation than with explanation'39. The two 
activities should be seen as separate, and complementary. 
I agree with Walsh and Dray that descriptive explanation may be justified even where 
no nomological claim is implicit. However, I disagree with their claim that 
descriptive explanation is a radically different sort of activity to causal-scientific 
explanation. Whilst it would be implausible to maintain that all description and use of 
concepts in historical writing implies causal claims, the case study accounts do 
demonstrate a striking interplay between descriptive and causal aspects. 
One clear example is provided by Cobban, in whose account the overall conceptual 
interpretation shapes our understanding of the causes and effects of the Revolution. 
The critical description of the divisions in pre-Revolutionary French society leads to 
the idea that peasant resentment of the rich, and the growth of capitalism, brought 
about the revolution. The same overall description provides an understanding of the 
outcome of the revolution: the fact that, in many ways, it was more obstructive of 
capitalism than supportive. Cobban's critical description serves to summarise and 
unify causal claims, relating to events both before and after the revolution. A primary 
use of descriptive explanation is, as Dray and Walsh suggest, the unifying effect of 
such a description. Yet what is unified are frequently causal claims themselves. In 
this typical case, causal and descriptive explanation are two, complementary, aspects 
of historical explanation. 
A second example is provided by Furet's explanation. His key concepts, `state' and 
`society', allow an understanding of why political life altered so rapidly and so 
fundamentally during the revolution. The concepts provide the basis for the implicit 
nomological claim that `alterations of the power 
balance between state and society 
tend to lead to extreme political upheaval'. But these key concepts also summarise 
39 W. H. Walsh, `Colligatory Concepts in History' 
(originally 1967) in The Philosophy of History, ed. 
Patrick Gardiner (Oxford: Oxford Unviersity Press, 
1974), 136 
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such causal claims as that the state's suppression of the traditional representative 
bodies of society (the parlements) came to profoundly influence the nature of 
revolutionary politics. Furet's interpretation is intimately related to implicit causal 
claims, and in part depends upon the plausibility of these claims. 
I now intend to make good my second claim: that there are multiple ways to 
`correctly' conceptualise causal claims in historical explanation. The following list is 
not intended to be exhaustive, though does seem to adequately explicate the differing 
nature of the eight case study explanations. It is by no means the case that a single 
historical account always utilises a single type of conceptualisation, though there is 
often a general tendency in a single account to use one or another. Indeed, it is 
possible for a single causal claim to be conceived in such a way that it may fit more 
than one of the following types. 
One way of conceptualising causes is to present cause and effect so that they exhibit a 
homological relationship. This is what Lefebvre does: the cause `the bourgeoisie had 
economic but not legal-political power' is, if explanatory, made so because there is a 
plausible, empirical law which connects this cause to the explanandum, the French 
Revolution. A variation of showing the explanans to connect nomologically is to 
present cause and effect is such a way that the terminology explicitly subsumes other 
cases. This is Skocpol's primary aim in conceptualising the causes of the French 
Revolution. Notice that an explanation may be fully nomological, without it thereby 
applying to any other cases. Perhaps the particular combination of laws operative in 
bringing about the French Revolution simply has not been instantiated in the case of 
any other historical event. Wider applicability is plausibly a virtue of laws, but is not 
necessary for a nomological approach. 
A second way to present causes is by showing there to be a rational link between 
cause and effect. In the terminology developed previously, such an explanation 
would be an `internal rational' explanation. Michelet attempts to explain the events of 
the French Revolution in such a way as to show that the Revolutionaries were 
justified in behaving as they did. Schama, on the other hand, disagrees: he takes it as 
a virtue of his explanation that he does not cite a rational 
link between the causes of 
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Revolution and the Revolutionary events. The Revolutionary origins are, for Schama, 
haphazard, chaotic, and frequently accidental. A variation on the conceptualisation of 
action as being rational is to conceptualise the action as being morally justified; an 
approach attempted by both Michelet and Lefebvre (though explicitly renounced by 
Schama and Cobban). 
Where it is considered that the only way to explain in history is to demonstrate the 
internally rational connection between actions, the approach comes into line with the 
Wittgenstinian-Winchian theory of social explanation previously introduced. Of 
course, one of the key tenets of that theory is that such demonstration of rationality 
cannot be the same activity as citing causes. My model of historical explanation 
depends on a rejection of this claim. We should recognise that, of course, not all 
(Winchian) interpretative description involves causes. The example given in chapter 
three demonstrates a non-causal interpretation: `why did that person exchange a piece 
of paper for some money? ', answered by describing what `cheque' means in our 
society, and in particular, the rules governing how cheques are treated by banks. Yet 
where the explanation is in terms of reasons, causes are presupposed. I have no new 
argument for this claim, but would be inclined to follow Davidson: 
`some philosophers have concluded that the concept of cause that applies elsewhere cannot 
apply to the relation between reasons and actions ... 
But suppose we grant that reasons alone 
justify actions in the course of explaining them; it does not follow that the explanation is not 
also - and necessarily - causal. ... 
it is necessary to decide what is being included under 
justification. It could be taken to cover only ... that the agent 
have certain beliefs and 
attitudes in the light of which the action is reasonable. But then something essential 
has 
certainly been left out, for a person can have a reason for an action, and perform the action, 
and yet this reason not be the reason why he did it. Central to the relation between a reasons 
explanation and an action it explains is the idea that the agent performed the action 
because 
he had the reason. 00 
There have been some who have regarded rational conceptualisation of cause as 
simply a special case of nomological conceptualisation 
in general. The rough idea 
would be that to describe a cause in the terminology of 
`reasons' is to claim that the 
agent had a belief B and a desire D, and that sometimes/ often/ always when agents 
40 Davidson, `Actions, Reasons and Causes', 9 
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have B and D they perform action A. Again, I am inclined to follow Davidson's 
assessment of the proposed reduction41. Whilst it is possible to formulate a sort of 
law which is equivalent to a claim that an agent acted for a reason, this law will be of 
a particularly weak sort; for very often agents have B and D and yet do not perform A. 
(As Davidson says: `what is the ratio of actual adulteries to the adulteries which the 
Bible says are committed in the heart? '42) Furthermore, explanations in terms of 
reasons seem far more convincing than an explanation in terms of the equivalent, very 
weak, law. 
A third means of conceptualisation is more contentious among historians; that of 
demonstrating a teleological connection between cause and effect. Hegel represents 
this approach most fully: his whole approach to historical explanation is centred 
around the need to `discover' teleology. Michelet advances a more cautious 
teleological approach, based on the natural pull of `national unity'. A `strong' 
teleological approach, by which I mean one which establishes the teleological law 
non-empirically, is intimately linked to a claim of `external rationality'. For Hegel, 
history must develop in broadly the way that it has, because the end point is the only 
truly rational way to think, behave, and organise our societies. Of course, such a 
claim of external rationality has fallen very much out of favour amongst historians 
since Hegel's time. Many historians now frame their explanations with the explicit 
aim of discouraging lingering notions of teleology in relation to the French 
Revolution; amongst them, Furet and Schama. A weaker teleological approach, 
where the teleological endpoint is established empirically, draws near to the 
nomological to the extent that the endpoint can be predicted according to laws. 
It may be thought that I need to say more to defend my claim that teleological 
explanation is comprehensible within my general understanding of historical 
explanation. Do I need to consider the extensive literature questioning the possibility 
of reducing intentional or teleological explanation to causal explanation? I think not. 
Suppose that intentional or teleological explanation is not able to be reduced to causal 
explanation in the manner suggested towards the start of the chapter. The 
difficulty 
41 Davidson, `Hempel on Explaining Actions', in Davidson, Essay's on . Actions and 
Events, particularly 
264 
42 Ibid., 264 
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for proposed reductions was that an intention might cause an action, but do so in the 
`wrong' way - i. e., accidentally. And it was (it is claimed) not possible to explicate 
what is the `right' way of causally intending something, without making use of the 
term being analysed: `intention'. But this conclusion is quite compatible with my 
understanding of explanation as causal and conceptual: it could even be argued that 
such a conclusion is to be expected. What is not suggested by a defence of the 
irreducibility of intentional or teleological explanation is that the latter types of 
explanation do not refer to the underlying causal structure, in some way. Such a 
defence does have the consequence that intentional or teleological explanation can't 
be analysed using only causal notions; but this is a consequence which I can be 
content with. 
Finally, causes are presented in such a way as to show that they are, in some sense, 
unified. Clear examples of such a means of conceptualisation have been provided in 
the context of colligatory explanation: describing causes such that they are seen to be 
part of a unified process is a common historical mode of explanation. Explanations 
which conceptually unify demonstrate the explanatory virtue of simplicity; at the 
least, they allow helpful summaries of why the French Revolution took place. And if 
no summary at all is possible, to what extent is the account really explanatory? Most 
historical accounts therefore unify to some extent, but a particularly clear example can 
be found in Furet's explanation. However, certain writers would deny that simplicity 
is particularly a virtue to be admired; Schama, for example, wants to chart the 
multiplicity of revolutions constituting what we think of as the French Revolution. 
I wish to emphasise again that these means of conceptualisation may be combined 
within a single historical account, and even within a single element of that account. 
In particular, the explanations classified initially as `narrative' rely on a multiplicity 
of types of conceptualisation; Michelet's narrative, for example, is to some extent 
teleological, rational, and unifying. This lack of distinction between the different 
modes of conceptualisation demonstrates that historical explanation differs by degree, 
not by kind. 
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As I have suggested, the above list will not be exhaustive. One possible way of 
conceptualising causes might be to present a causal chain as meaningful; an analysis 
which is suggested by, for example, Hayden White's philosophical approach. The 
reason I have not included `meaning' as a conceptual category is simply that, without 
further specification, the term is somewhat vacuous. Indeed, explicating what is 
meant by `meaning' in this sense is likely to lead to one of the conceptualisations 
already suggested: that the causal chain is rational, or teleological. 
Further types of conceptualisation may be more appropriate for non-historical 
explanations. One example is to demonstrate that the causal chain is familiar. In the 
context of my general analysis of explanation, we should regard the virtue of `making 
the explananda familiar' as one possible virtue of conceptualisation, but not the basis 
of a universal analysis of explanation. Lipton, for example, notes that `we often 
explain familiar phenomena ... surprise 
is often a precursor to the search for 
explanation, but it is not the only motivation. '43 But this observation raises no 
difficulties if we accept that presenting a familiar account is only one explanatory 
virtue amongst others. 
Explanatory type, exclusion and competition 
I have defended a conception of historical explanation such that explanations cite a 
relevant ontic relation (paradigmatically, a causal relation), which is conceptualised in 
a certain way (nomologically, rationally, teleologically amongst others). What 
remains is to tie this analysis clearly to explanatory exclusion and competition. 
Explanatory exclusion may result from incompatibility of explananda, explanans or 
claims of relevance. To understand exclusion due to relevance claims 
(PEES), we 
need to be able to claim that different types of historical explanation understand 
`relevance' in broadly the same way. It was for this reason that I have argued that 
even different `types' of historical explanation are causal, 
in a minimal sense. All 
a3 Peter Lipton, Inference to the Best Explanation (London: Routledge, 
1991), 29 
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historical explanation aims to pick out certain elements of the causal history of the 
explanandum, though the way that these elements are conceived varies widely. It is, 
therefore, the causal, rather than the conceptual, element of historical explanations 
which it is necessary to attend to in judging cases of exclusion over relevance claims. 
Given that the `type' of explanation is determined by the conceptual mode of the 
historical explanation, is it therefore the case that the type of explanation is of no 
interest when judging explanatory exclusion? No. The type of explanation, or mode 
of conceptualisation, often affects judgements of exclusion (specifically, PEE3) in two 
ways. 
Firstly, different types of explanation often lead the explanans to refer to 
correspondingly different aspects of the causal (in general, ontic) history. Most 
obviously, rational explanation focuses on reasons - psychological causes. Often, 
nomological explanation leads a historian to focus on structural elements - social, 
economic, political or geopolitical. If different elements of the same history are 
focused upon, contradiction between relevance claims are less likely: so long as there 
is no implicit claim that those elements are all there really is to the history. 
Secondly, different types of explanation often lead to correspondingly different sorts 
of target. In particular, the generality of the target is liable to vary according to 
explanatory type. Nomological and teleological explanations tend to lead to broader 
targets; a tendency clearly evident in Lefebvre's and Hegel's explanations. Narrative 
explanations, eschewing abstraction, tend to focus on a very specific explanatory 
target. In chapter five, I demonstrated how the notion of contrast space allowed us to 
understand this phenomenon of explanatory practice, and how similarity of target 
related to explanatory exclusion. 
Where explanations are not exclusive, they may still be in competition. (And I 
have 
noted that explanations may not be in competition, but may be exclusive. 
) Whether or 
not explanations are to be regarded as `in competition' 
is not so amenable to a precise 
explication as `exclusive explanation' has been shown to 
be. The phrase is somewhat 
vaguely applied. However, I have suggested that explanations are 
likely to be 
regarded as `in competition' when there 
is a similarity of explanatory target. In this 
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case, explanations compete according to the relative possession of explanatory 
virtues. These virtues may be of a familiar kind44, but it is advantageous that they can 
be seen to be connected to the previous claims which I have made concerning 
historical explanation. They are of three kinds. 
First, there are those which relate to degree of confirmation: confirmatory virtues. In 
particular, the explanation is good to the extent to which it can be argued that the 
explanans are (were) true. In historical practice, this type of argument is common; 
utilising historical evidence to demonstrate the likely truth of one's explanans (or the 
improbability of one's opponents'). Second, there are those which I will argue are 
ontological virtues; demonstrating that an explanation corresponds well to a way the 
world actually is. (This is where `importance' fits in, as I will argue in Part III. ) The 
difference between these two types can be seen in regard to the demand for causally 
relevant explanans: those explanans can be shown to be more or less likely to be 
causally relevant, and in addition can be shown to be actually more or less causally 
relevant. 
Third, there are the virtues which, I have argued, are not universally applicable as the 
first two types are. These virtues are connected to the different modes of description, 
outlined previously; for instance, in demonstrating a rational or nomological 
connection. If a historian attempts to give causes in a nomological manner, for 
example, then their explanation is virtuous to the extent that they are successful in 
doing this. I shall call the virtues corresponding to the modes of conception cognitive 
virtues. This third type of explanatory virtue is perhaps the most mysterious; the 
nature of these virtues, and the effect this has on explanatory competition, requires 
further attention. Though this is not the place for a detailed examination of these 
points, I believe it is appropriate to sketch a possible response. A more thorough 
examination would have to tackle the issue of how, and to what extent, historical 
concepts were empirically justified. This is an issue which I will consider in detail 
with relation to the specific virtue of citing `important' causes, in Part III, but not for 
explanatory virtues in general. 
44 For example: Martin, The Past Within Us, chapter three. 
Like me, Martin attempts to develop a list 
of explanatory virtues from a prior empirical examination of 
historical accounts 
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It might be thought that explanatory `cognitive' virtues cannot be justified by the 
historical record, and are therefore incommensurable. Kuhn suggested three distinct 
ways for theories to be incommensurable. Alongside incommensurability of 
observation and incommensurability of concept is the relevant sense for our purposes: 
incommensurability of methodology. In Kuhn's theory, this type of 
incommensurability results from the fact that the standards used to judge scientific 
theories (that they be, for example, simple, accurate and comprehensive) are 
themselves theory dependent. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, the background 
paradigm determines the interpretation of those standards; whether or not a theory in 
question can be considered `simple', for example. Secondly, the paradigm governs 
the relative weighting of one virtue against another: whether, in a particular case, 
theory A's advantage of being more simple will count for more than theory B's 
advantage of being more accurate. In general, the thesis of methodological 
incommensurability claims that there is no neutral way to judge and compare different 
theoretical approaches. 
It is likely that arguments similar to Kuhn's would apply equally to historical 
explanatory virtues; to the cognitive virtues, at any rate. Indeed, it seems that 
historical debate is in a still more perilous position than Kuhn's scientific debate. For 
not only do historians disagree over relative weighting and interpretation of virtues: 
unlike scientists, it is common to even disagree over what the virtues are. As we have 
seen, the fact that an explanation is, say, rational may be a virtue to one historian, of 
no consequence to another, and a reason for suspicion to a third. 
A conception of explanatory (at least the cognitive) virtues as incommensurable 
would naturally lead to a relativistic attitude to explanatory competition. Hayden 
White well exemplifies such a position: 
`These correlations of the tropological strategies of prefiguration with the various modes of 
explanation used by historians in their works have provided me with a way of characterizing 
the styles of given historians. And they have permitted me to view the various debates over 
how history ought to be written, which occurred throughout the nineteenth century, as 
'' essentially matters of stylistic variation ... 
45 White, Metahistorv, 427 
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I believe that we ought to avoid the idea that the explanatory virtues are purely of 
aesthetic or stylistic import. To do this, we have to consider what else the cognitive 
virtues could be based upon, other than simple intellectual need. One way of making 
clear the idea that explanatory virtues somehow correspond to an underlying reality is 
to tie all explanatory virtues to causal inference. An explanatory virtue, if it really is, 
is so because it reports something true about the causal history of the target. 
Arguments of this sort can be found in Barnes' and Rappaport's (previously cited) 
papers. However, given that I have already made it clear that my understanding of 
historical explanation requires both causal elements and further `cognitive' or 
`conceptual' elements, it will not be surprising that I wish to resist the claim that all 
explanatory virtues can be reduced to the causal. 
Perhaps all we can say of cognitive explanatory virtues in general is that they provide 
information about what brought the explananda about. `Information' is to be 
understood in three possible ways. In part, the way that causes are conceptualised in 
(hence, the cognitive virtues of) a historical explanation leads to empirically 
justifiable information about the causal history, as Barnes, in particular, argues46 
Most clearly, this includes information about the degree to which causes are unified. 
Such a claim is justified by similar information to straightforward causal claims. 
Secondly, cognitive virtues link the causal history in question with wider causal 
histories. Presenting a nomologically supported causal relation groups events under 
types in a certain way. The connection specified according to the law is not causal, 
but neither is it purely aesthetic: it is primarily a relation of similarity. Finally, 
cognitive virtues can simply present the causal history in an interesting way. In 
particular, cause and effect may be conceived as providing a rational justification 
under a particular conception, but not under another. It is frequently of interest to 
present the causal chain in this way, where it is possible. 
46 Barnes, 256-269 
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Summary of Part II: Analysis, exclusion, competition 
I present here the conclusions of Part H in a stark form, without the caveats and 
subtleties required for a more complete understanding of explanatory exclusion. 
A historical explanation is aimed at a contrastive target. In the case of the historical 
accounts considered here, that target is loosely `the French Revolution'. More 
precisely, the target is constituted according to those possibilities that the explanation 
should exclude - the contrast space. The nature of that contrast space determines 
which aspect(s) of the target event is relevant, which aspect(s) of the event's history is 
relevant, and what level of detail is required. As a general rule, the contrasts should 
be similar to the target event. 
As a minimum, the explanans should meet four criteria. (i) They should cite facts 
which are true. (ii) They should cite facts which are indeed explanatorily relevant to 
the target. (iii) The facts should not only be relevant, but should locate differences 
between the target fact and the contrast cases: there should be no correspondingly 
relevant fact in the history of the contrast cases. If we understand `cause' as `an 
empirically antecedent necessary, in the circumstances, for the explanandum 
phenomena', then we can replace `explanatorily relevant' in (ii) and (iii) with 
`causally relevant'. Finally, (iv) the causally relevant facts should be conceived of, or 
described, in an appropriate way. Such ways include demonstrating nomological, 
rational or teleological connection, or demonstrating the unity of various causal 
elements. 
Seemingly `different types' of explanation follow primarily from two variables in the 
above conditions. Firstly, explanations may differ in the type of targets presumed. 
They may be broad (Hegel) or narrow (Schama); they may be particular (Schama, 
Chartier, Cobban) or generalised beyond the particular (Skocpol). Secondly, 
explanations may differ widely in the way that causes are conceived, such that the 
explanation is, for example, more or less nomological, more or 
less teleological, and 
more or less simple or unified. 
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The principles of explanatory exclusion follow from the basic conditions of adequacy 
for historical explanations. Explanations strictly exclude one another where elements 
of those explanations are in contradiction. In particular: (a) The targets are 
inconsistent: such that either targets disagree over the truth of the respective target 
facts, or disagree over the falsity of the respective contrast cases. (b) The truths of the 
explanans are inconsistent. (c) The relevance claims (causal claims) of the explanans 
are inconsistent. A particular way for (c) to be realised is to demonstrate that the 
relevance claims of two explanations cannot be consistent because they are complete 
and independent explanations of the same target. `Complete' must be understood in 
the context of a contrastive theory of explanation. 
Actual historical practice, and ordinary intuition, dictates that we find a space for 
partial exclusion, in addition to strict exclusion. Clearly, explanations may contradict 
in any of the above respects to a greater or lesser extent. In addition, an important 
class of cases of partial exclusion is in the context of the aforementioned particular 
way for (c) to be realised; targets may be overlapping, rather than the same. This can 
be understood geometrically, according to the idea that contrast spaces may overlap to 
a greater or lesser extent. 
Competition between historical explanations is broader than simply exclusion, or even 
partial exclusion. In other words, two explanations may compete, and yet not 
exclude. Like the principles of exclusion, principles of competition can be seen to 
follow from the basic conditions of explanatory adequacy. Corresponding to (i), an 
explanation is better to the extent that it is likely that the explanans are true. 
Corresponding to (ii), an explanation is better to the extent that it is likely that the 
explanans are relevant. Both these virtues are epistemological. In addition, (ii) leads 
to the idea that an explanation is better the more relevant those explanans are: a 
seemingly ontological criterion, which will be the primary focus of Part III. 
Corresponding to (iii), an explanation is better to the extent that the causes cited have 
less correspondence to those in the history of the contrast cases. 
Finally, corresponding to (iv), an explanation is better to the extent that the causes are 
conceptualised in the correct manner. This latter criterion is, however, likely to be 
quite different to the remainder. This is for the reason that explanations differ over 
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what `correct conceptualisation' means, whilst they do not differ in substance over 
what `truth' or `relevance' of explanans is taken to mean. 
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Part III 
Chapter Seven: Importance 
In the final part I will examine a feature of historical explanations which plays an 
essential role in explanatory competition, as well as being of interest in its own right: 
the notion of explanatory importance. I take it that citing important explanatory 
features is a virtue of explanations. My aims in this chapter will be four-fold. First, I 
will argue that `importance' is a central virtue. Second, I will show that the adoption 
of a realist understanding (in a sense to be specified) of importance opens up a 
significant space for genuine competition between historical accounts, over and above 
providing more or less true explanations. Third, I will tackle various arguments 
against such a realist understanding, to show that there is no reason in principle why 
we should not understand historical importance in this way. Further, I will show that 
such an understanding makes sense of existing historical argument and assertion. In 
chapters eight and nine I will develop and defend a realist model of historical 
importance in detail. 
The concept of importance 
The notion of importance is a vital one for historical scholarship. As will be 
demonstrated towards the end of this chapter, historians tend to do more than just 
describe events and causal relations: in addition they make judgements of relative 
importance. `Importance' is a historical explanatory virtue in two related senses: an 
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explanation is better to the extent that it attributes historical events with the correct 
level of importance; secondly, an explanation is better to the extent that it mentions 
important events, and omits the unimportant. 
The locutions vary; I shall treat the following as fulfilling similar roles: `salient 
cause', `deeper cause', `causes' when contrasted with `conditions', `the cause', and 
`historical events' when contrasted with `non-historical' events. (The use of some of 
these phrases will become clear in the context of the arguments which follow. ) 
An alternative technique in ascribing importance to events or causes is to rely on 
pragmatic emphasis; related more to the second understanding of `importance as 
virtue', cited above. In this way, the historian tacitly demonstrates their judgements 
of importance through consistently emphasising event (or type of event) a, whilst 
ignoring event (or type of event) b. It will not always be obvious when such 
importance claims should be read into a historical account. Simply mentioning `x' or 
that `x caused e' can imply no disagreement with other accounts failing to mention `x' 
or that `x caused e', and which instead mention other facts. As I suggested in chapter 
four (in the context of the icy road and the tiredness of the driver leading to the crash), 
it is a commonplace that accounts can differ in what they mention without thereby 
contradicting. On the other hand, in many cases it is plausible to interpret an account 
which consistently emphasises a certain (type of) fact as thereby judging that fact to 
be important. An explicit affirmation of importance is not always necessary. 
In general it will surely be a delicate issue to discern where emphasis implies 
judgements of importance. Yet if we regard it possible that judgements of importance 
may be implicit, this has the advantage of making it possible to understand those 
philosophical debates relating to selection and interpretation in terms of `importance'. 
Descriptions and interpretations are, sometimes rightly, criticised not only for what 
they say but for what they don't say. Why is this? Not because of omission per se; 
for no account can mention everything, even where the topic is limited. A plausible 
answer is that criticism is justified where the description or interpretation has omitted 
something important. 
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Of course not all historical selection is grounded in judgements of importance; much 
will be based simply on demands resulting from the interests of and relevance to the 
intended audience, the need to provide examples of general historical claims, and the 
desire for anecdotes and interesting detail in the historical account. Yet, given that 
some selection decisions appear to be capable of being defended in more robust ways 
(by which I mean in ways which are not explicitly relative to interest), it is clear that 
there may be a role for using considerations of importance to ground choices of 
selection. Clearly, the question of what importance amounts to in historical 
scholarship thus has a bearing on the much discussed question of historical selection. 
The question which is the focus of the remainder of the thesis can be put in this way: 
is it possible that the notion of `importance' be the basis of an objective element of 
selection decisions? 
The notion of objectivity in historical accounts is also related to this issue. A realist 
notion of importance would go a long way towards defusing sceptical arguments 
against objectivity in history, since many such arguments proceed from the problem 
of selection. (Though no notion of importance would entirely answer worries over 
objectivity in history: at the very least, the question of whether historical facts can be 
evaluatively neutral would still remain. ) To provide one example: as part of his 
extended historical survey of the notion of objectivity in the American historical 
profession, Novick frequently cites concerns over selection. Commenting on the 
influential historian Charles Beard, Novick writes of the impossibility of having 
`neutral criteria for selecting among the multitudes of facts, or interpreting them, for 
which one needed an "a priori", and at least tacitly evaluative, frame of reference' 
I 
A realist understanding of `importance' - one which would allow historians to argue 
fruitfully and with the possibility of reaching a determinate conclusion - would 
provide a criterion to judge histories, beyond that of simply getting the facts right. 
For getting the facts right is clearly not sufficient for the production of objective 
histories; and it has been convincingly argued that it is not even necessary. I believe 
that Gorman demonstrates this feature of historical writing very succinctly, by 
juxtaposing three accounts of the life of Lord Haw Haw. The first two are factually 
1 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question " and the American Historical 
Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 254 
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correct, yet clearly biased; the third is entirely constituted by inaccurate propositions, 
yet provides a more `acceptable', or objective story2. 
The final concept I will mention whose fate is tied to that of `importance' is historical 
representation. A popular argument, given by, for example, Hayden White, is that 
historical representations are radically underdetermined by the historical evidence. 
Even if the facts are agreed upon (and, we could add, even if the causal relationships 
are agreed upon), there are many legitimate ways to historically represent those facts. 
This is so because there are many ways to align these facts in relation to one another; 
in particular, through exclusion, and through privileging. 
On the former, White states that `our explanations of historical structures and 
processes are thus determined more by what we leave out of our representations than 
by what we put in'3. The latter concerns `the privileged status given to certain events 
or sets of events in the series by which they are endowed with explanatory force, 
either as causes explaining the structure of the whole series or as symbols of the plot 
structure of the series considered as a story of a specific kind'4. If importance is a 
property of events which is determined in a non-pragmatic manner, then such 
alignments (exclusion and privileging) are restricted; insofar as importance 
judgements can often form the basis for such alignments. 
I hope I have shown that the question of what `importance' amounts to in historical 
accounts is, in general, absolutely vital. Yet the concept also relates to the overall 
project of this thesis: to make sense of explanatory competition between historical 
accounts. The understanding we have of `importance' will affect our understanding 
of the relationship between historical accounts, in the following ways. 
First, consider the consequences of an irrealist understanding of 'importance'. By 
irrealist I mean the thesis that `importance' is a property of entity x solely 
in virtue of 
the fact that an observer (or observers) regard(s) x as being important. Such an 
`' J. L. Gorman, `Objectivity and Truth in History', in History, and 
Theory, eds. Fay, Pomper, Vann 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), 326-327 
3 White, Metahiston,, 24 
Ibid., 25 
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analysis of `importance' will emphasise the indexical nature of the term: `for an event 
to be important means (only) that I'm interested in it'. The irrealist attitude might be 
more precisely specified as a `projectivist' attitude to importance as a property: the 
view that `beauty (or colour, or cause, or virtue) is in the eye of the beholder'5. One 
of the attractions of projectivism is its metaphysical economy: we need no 
metaphysically mysterious properties to ground the problematic concept, only the idea 
that our features of our mental nature (pleasure, the desire for regularity) are 
`projected' upon the world. We must examine whether the realist conception of 
importance can deliver an equally palatable metaphysical account: this will be a topic 
covered in chapter eight. 
If the irrealist view is correct, then differing importance-claims won't restrict the 
consistency of the historical explanations containing those claims. This is so because 
the differing importance claims do not really assign different properties to the same 
entity; even though their language may make it seem that they do. 
Second, consider the consequences of a realist understanding. By realist I mean a 
conception which allows the possibility that an entity's importance be judged 
independently of a particular point of view or interest. If this were the case, it would 
be possible that histories be better or worse with regard to importance-claims, in that 
such claims could correspond more or less well to the real importance of the event. 
My claims will be that judgements of importance can lead to substantive 
disagreement between historical accounts, and that they are a legitimate criterion by 
which to compare historical accounts as better or worse. The precise manner by 
which this happens will emerge over the course of this chapter and the next; but it is 
necessary to give a preliminary sketch of the realist position at this point. Danto 
provides a good starting point; whilst accepting that there are many possible meanings 
of `importance', he maintains that historical importance amounts to tracing the 
consequences of the effect: `to ask for the significance of an event, in the historical 
5 Though, it should be noted that in the field of meta-ethics the alleged 
inconsistency of projectivism 
and realism has been staunchly challenged. 
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sense of the term, is to ask a question which can be answered only in the context of a 
story ... 
[or] with what different set of later events it may be connected'6. 
I take Danto to mean that events are important to the extent that they are connected 
with later events. This notion of importance is best termed consequentialist, and is 
`realist' to the extent that `degree of consequence' can be understood in a realist 
manner. In addition it raises the possibility, which I will argue for, that the term is at 
least partially empirically decidable. In measuring importance by effects, we replace 
the more amorphous general concept of importance with the somewhat tighter 
concept of causal importance. The central problem for the realist is also thereby 
defined: how are we to use effects to measure importance? 
This question will be tackled directly in chapters eight and nine, where I will present a 
consequentialist model of causal importance in detail. The central feature of this 
model will be that a cause is important to the extent that, had that cause not taken 
place, the target-phenomenon would have been more different: the analysis is 
therefore counterfactual. What I wish to examine first, however, are arguments 
directed not at the detail of any particular realist proposal, but against the very idea 
that importance can be objectively equated with consequences. These arguments will 
also serve to set the challenges that the realist model should meet. 
Evaluative importance 
It is common to maintain that all selection, and judgements of importance, 
is relative 
to the historians' values. Notoriously, Weber attempted to argue that objectivity in 
the social sciences is possible, by recommending a clear separation of 
factual and 
evaluative judgements. Yet, if the `evaluative irrealist' is correct, 
importance 
statements are a class of judgements which are inevitably 
bound up with value 
6 Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1965), 
11 
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judgements. Therefore, presuming that questions of value cannot be settled 
objectively, disagreement over selection and judgement of importance is likewise not 
objectively decidable. 
The American historian Charles Beard has troubled historians to the present day with 
his argument that all historical selection is necessarily evaluative, and hence 
subjective: 
`Into the selection of topics, the choice and arrangement of materials, the specific historian's 
"me" will enter. " 
'we clarify the mind by admitting its cultural interests and patterns - interests and patterns 
that will control, or intrude upon, the selection and organisation of historical materials. '8 
More recently (in the 1950s), Walsh has agreed that judgements of importance are, at 
root, evaluative judgements; and Dray has argued that many, if not all, historical 
debates concerning causal weighting are tacitly evaluative9. The general point is 
easiest made through the provision of examples. Walsh notes that 
`it is not so very long since history books were filled with the doings of kings and queens, 
warring nobles and turbulent priests; they tended to concentrate on political and military 
happenings. Since Marx, or rather since the later years of the nineteenth century, the 
emphasis has shifted to economic and social history, and the main dramatis personae are no 
longer political figures but, for example, scientists and inventors, whilst the place of the 
successful monarch as hero of the story has been taken by the common people. '1° 
Political and military history had given way to economic and social history; history 
from above has been replaced by history from below. This seems true; the 
philosophical claim is that these changes reflect the changing value judgements of 
society in general, and hence of historians. 
Charles Beard, `That Noble Dream', in The Varieties of History, ed. Fritz Stem (Cleveland: Meridan 
Books, 1956), 324 
8 Ibid., 328 
9 For example, Dray's analysis of the debate between AJP Taylor and Trevor-Roper over the 
importance of Hitler's role in bringing about the Second World War reduces to evaluative judgements. 
W. H. Dray, `Concepts of Causation in A. J. P. Taylor's Account of the Origins of the Second World 
War' in History and Theory 17 (1978): 149-175 
10 Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 179 
197 
As with any response to an alleged counter-example, three sorts of reply are available 
to the realist: denial, re-interpretation, or acceptance of plurality. To deny the force 
of the counter-examples would be to argue that they are not justified examples of 
importance judgements. In this case, it could be maintained that whilst importance is 
always properly decided by the tracing of causal consequences, historians do 
sometimes allow their values to intrude in an inappropriate way. As a possible 
example, we could claim that the attention given to social elites in pre-twentieth 
century historiography was simply unjustified; though we are to hope that the 
concentration on `the common people' by today's historian is more justifiable in 
consequentialist terms. Whilst this response may be appropriate in certain cases, as a 
general tactic I find it unappealing, since it seems motivated by a purely a priori desire 
to analyse importance in consequentialist terms. Any example which is shown to rest 
on an evaluative basis is automatically rejected as unjustified. 
More plausible in general is the `re-interpretation' strategy. To follow this would be 
to claim that the examples are justified claims of importance, but that they can be, 
after all, justified according a consequentialist approach. For it remains possible to 
explain the historiographic changes as theory-driven changes, rather than value- 
driven. If this is possible, then these and similar changes in historiography can be 
justified according to consequentialist ideas. Perhaps the effect of the common 
people on the culture and politics of past societies began only recently to be 
reassessed. Perhaps (more plausibly) advances in socio-economic theory led to a 
realisation of the importance of these factors. Clearly detailed study would be 
required to discover whether the theory-driven or the value-driven story is more 
empirically adequate. 
Finally, the pluralist option remains: where the consequentialist accepts that there may 
be some genuine cases of evaluatively justified importance claims, though there are 
also non-evaluatively justified claims. Even if the force of Walsh's and similar 
counter-examples is accepted, the realist is free to believe in a kernel of objectively 
decidable importance judgements, whilst admitting that evaluative opinions affect 
other such judgements. This conclusion is, however, threatened by a second, more 
ambitious, evaluative argument of Walsh's. 
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Walsh compares the kind of realist-consequentialist strategy which I have outlined to 
the utilitarian principle of morally judging action. As well as having doubts over the 
`vagueness of the phrases' used in such a principle (a concern which can only be 
allayed by working through a realist model in detail), Walsh believes of the `realist' 
notion of importance that 
`as a formula for choosing between judgements of value, it is not itself a simple judgement of 
value; but equally, and still more obviously, it is not a straightforward statement of fact. You 
cannot, that is to say, establish its truth by finding out how things are. To subscribe to it is, in 
effect, to accept a certain moral outlook, the moral outlook of the Utilitarians. '" 
In other words, even if it were possible to render the realist methodology precise 
enough to be usefully employed - which Walsh doubts - the decision to use that 
methodology would still be a value laden one. 
Whilst the analogy with utilitarianism is intriguing, it misleads. The choice between 
different moral theories is clearly a moral decision, not a scientific one; no matter how 
`scientific' are the contents of those theories. In this Walsh is correct: the nature of 
the choice is not determined by the content of the theories. Yet Walsh goes astray in 
applying this analogy. With regard to `importance', he maintains that the choice of 
whether or not to use the consequentialist meaning is not a scientific matter; so must 
therefore be a moral one. 
The problem is that Walsh assumes a false dichotomy: that any choice is either a 
judgement of value, or a statement of fact. Yet the choice between philosophical 
analyses is one based neither (entirely) on values, nor (entirely) on facts. The way to 
arrive at philosophical analyses was the topic of chapter one. I favoured a broadly 
descriptive approach, relying on internal criticism to arrive at a reflective equilibrium, 
such that the practice is thereby shown to be rational or justified. 
" Ibid., 182 
199 
Intrinsic importance 
`For Meyer, those events are historical which have been efficacious, i. e. have produced 
consequences. For example, the philosophy of Spinoza was for a long time quite without 
influence, but later people became interested in it and it began to influence their thought. 
Hence from being a non-historical fact it became a historical one: it is non-historical for the 
historian of the seventeenth century but becomes historical for the historian of the eighteenth. 
This is surely a quite arbitrary and perverse distinction. For the historian of the seventeenth 
century Spinoza is a highly interesting phenomenon, whether or not he was read and accepted 
as a leader of thought; because the formation of his philosophy was in itself a noteworthy 
achievement of the seventeenth-century mind... . 
He [Meyer] sees that a mere past event taken in isolation cannot be an object of historical 
knowledge, but he thinks that it becomes one in virtue of its connexions with other events, 
these connexions being conceived by him in the positivistic manner as external causal 
connexions. This, however, begs the question. If the historical importance of an event is 
defined as its efficacy in producing further events, what constitutes the historical importance 
of those others? For he would hardly hold that an event becomes historically important 
through producing consequences themselves devoid of historical importance. If, however, the 
historical importance of Spinoza consists in his influencing the German Romantics, wherein 
consists the historical importance of the German Romantics? '12 
In this intriguing passage, Collingwood criticises a notion of importance which 
appears strikingly similar to the realist-consequentialist intuition outlined previously. 
Collingwood's criticisms lead him to view events as important intrinsically, rather 
than in virtue of the events' connections. Further examples seem to support the 
`intrinsic' notion, in addition to Collingwood's Spinoza. For Christians, the life of 
Christ is likely to be the most important set of events in history, and is so no matter 
what the consequences of those events amount to. The importance of an event, for 
Collingwood, derives primarily from the ideology of the historian and their 
contemporary society. He refers approvingly to `a new principle of selection based on 
the interest of the historian and of the present-day life of which the historian is a 
12 R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; originally 1946), 
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representative. ... The subjective element is an essential factor in all historical 
knowledge. ' 13 
The passage drawn from Collingwood suggests three distinct, though related, 
arguments against the consequentialist view of importance (excluding the general 
criticism of the `positivistic' [sic] reliance on the reality of causal connections). First, 
Collingwood charges the `connectionist' with circularity. Events can not be important 
only in virtue of bringing about other events; they must be important only in virtue of 
bringing about further important events. But if this is the case, we must have a notion 
of intrinsic importance with which to ground connectionist considerations, on pain of 
vicious circularity. Dray also provides the example of the American Civil War, 
stating that 
`the importance of the selected event - for example, the Civil War - depend[s] on the 
importance of something else, causally related to it - for example the legacy of bitterness in 
the South. For it seems odd to suggest that an event could be important by virtue of its 
relation to things that were not themselves important. ' 14 
I believe the premise to be challenged is that which denies that connections alone are 
sufficient to define importance. Causes may be important whether or not their effects 
are. There is a sense in which Collingwood is correct: in the recognition that since all 
events have effects, this alone cannot be sufficient to discern importance. The 
response, which will be incorporated into my subsequent model, is that magnitude of 
effect is the standard by which importance should be measured. 
Second, Collingwood points to an apparently unpalatable consequence of the 
`connectionist' view: that events change in importance over time. Spinoza would be 
important to a eighteenth-century historian, but not to one of the seventeenth-century. 
The only connectionist response to this claim can be to simply deny its force. An 
event's importance is constituted by its consequences; yet judgements of that 
importance may well vary dependent upon which point in the chain of effects the 
13 Ibid., 180 
14 W. H. Dray, On the Idea of Importance in History' in W. H. Dray, On History and Philosophers of 
History (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989), 77 
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historian finds herself. (This simple denial also serves to demonstrate how radically 
intuition can differ over the appropriateness of judgements of importance: a lesson we 
would do well to remember in the construction of `models' of importance. ) 
Third, counter-examples of the form of Collingwood's Spinoza challenge at least the 
universality of a realist-consequentialist analysis. The intuition is that such great 
thinkers are important in virtue of what they write, rather than in virtue of the effects 
of that writing. As in the previous section, three sorts of responses are available. The 
first (direct denial) reply would be to simply reject the intuition that examples like 
Collingwood's Spinoza are justified claims of importance. A second (pluralist) 
response would be to affirm the examples, but to claim that the realist- 
consequentialist view of importance may still be applicable in some, if not most, other 
situations. 
A third (re-interpretation) response would be to argue that the example can, in fact, be 
justified consequentially. In this case, it may be argued that we need to tweak our 
idea of `consequences'. It may be that not many people read Spinoza in the 
seventeenth century; but this need not count decisively against the `consequences' of 
Spinoza's thought. Perhaps we could weight the consequentialist measure so as to 
favour those ideas which have a really novel, or strong, effect on a few people, rather 
than a mild effect on many. 
More radically, we could include in the measure of consequences those effects upon 
the world of ideas (the `third world' of Popper and others); in that case the number of 
people interested in Spinoza may not count as much as the sheer novelty of Spinoza's 
thought. Whilst I would be disinclined to adopt the final option on metaphysical 
grounds, such considerations do demonstrate the radically underdetermined nature of 
`consequences'. Without further specification, the realist-connectionist idea provides 
little more than the form of an answer to requests for importance judgements. The 
model developed in chapters eight and nine needs to (and does) restrict the 
`consequences' to be considered to manageable respects. 
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Narrative importance 
Dray presents a number of further counter-examples to the idea that importance can 
always be picked out by considering causal consequences 15. What these examples 
have in common is that they suggest a connection between the ideas of narrative and 
importance: that an understanding of the narrative structure of an account may be 
necessary to properly comprehend historical importance. 
The first example suggests that importance may be derived from anticipation, rather 
than causation. Leonardo's flying machines may not have brought about later 
developments in flight, but are important nonetheless since they anticipate those 
developments. The second example suggests that important events are those which 
come at the beginning or ending of processes, or eras. The importance ascribed to 
`turning points' such as the First World War (or, for that matter, the French 
Revolution) can hardly be denied. 
In connection with these example, Dray also notes a potential anomaly in the causal- 
consequentialist idea of importance. The anomaly results from the fact that causal 
chains are without end, and are presumably transitive. Hence, in general, the further 
back in time an event, the more important it is likely to be, since the more causes that 
event will have. In addition, according to the casual-consequentialist understanding, 
in all cases where c causes event d, c will be more important than d: since all effects 
of d are also effects of c, yet c has additional effects (at least, d). Yet these two 
consequences of the consequentialist idea may well conflict with our usual 
understanding of historical importance. It is easy to imagine cases where later events 
in the same sequence are in fact regarded as more important than earlier ones. 
One way to interpret the first two types of example, and to avoid the anomaly, 
is to 
suppose that history is made up of narratives (or `processes' or similar). 
Examples of 
such narratives or processes might be `inter-war Europe', `the long nineteenth 
'5Ibid., 80-81 
203 
century', or, for that matter, `the French Revolution'. The importance of elements of 
a narrative will depend not simply on the temporal position of those elements, as a 
consequentialist idea would suggest. Consider fictional narratives: we intuitively 
locate certain points of those narratives as `key' episodes, based on an understanding 
of the narrative as a whole. We could then use the idea of `narratives' to supplement 
a consequentialist understanding of importance in such a way as to bring the 
philosophical model into line with the intuitions implied by Dray's comments. Whilst 
it will be unlikely that we are able to formulate strict rules to govern the relation 
between narrative structure and importance, the following suggestions provide a 
starting point: 
(I) Those events `bracketing' (at the start and end of) narratives will, in general, be 
weighted as more important than their consequences alone would suggest. This 
accounts for the seeming importance of `turning points). 
(II) Events would not generally be `credited' with the bringing about of events in a 
different narrative. Between narratives there would be a `break', such that events in 
one were not regarded as having consequences in another in the sense relative to 
judgements of importance. This accounts for the anomaly pointed out by Dray. 
Whilst I believe that a satisfactory solution could, in principle, be derived in the ways 
suggested above, such a solution would seem to count against a realist analysis of 
importance. Presumably, narrative structures do not really exist in the world: they are 
imposed on a series of events according to our need to find meaning in those events 16. 
It is, in any case, better to answer Dray's comments with the resources provided by 
the model of historical explanation already developed in this thesis. I have argued 
that causal explanation differs from simply citing causes in two ways. Firstly, causal 
explanations are always given with relation to a contrast space. The effect of 
choosing a good contrast space is to render large parts of the causal history of an 
16 For a support of this assertion, see Hayden White, `The Historical Text as Literary Artifact' 
(originally 1978) in History and Theory eds. Fay, Pomper, Vann: 15-33. However, for opposing 
arguments, see David Can, Tinie, Narrative and History (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986). 
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event irrelevant for the purposes of a causal explanation. This fact means that we 
don't have to maintain, counter to intuition, that earlier causes are always more 
important than later causes; simply because, given an appropriate contrast space, the 
earlier causes are often not properly a part of the causal explanation at all. 
Secondly, in a causal explanation causes must be conceived of in a certain way. 
Viewed purely causally, it can hardly be denied that a consequentialist notion implies 
that importance constantly increases as more effects are produced. Again, viewed 
purely causally, there is no place for `breaks' in the causal sequence. However, 
remembering that explanatory causes must be conceptualised only in certain ways, 
importance of causal explanations may differ from purely causal importance. Though 
the causal chain will have no breaks, a causal-nomological one, for example, may do: 
the `story' will break at the point where an appropriate law (at the historical level) 
cannot be cited. Likewise, if the mode of conceptualisation is the rational, then the 
`story' will break at the point where there is no rational explanation to link one event 
to the next. 
In general, a purely consequentialist idea of importance is more appropriate for 
comparing the importance of elements in different causal chains. Where we are to 
compare the importance of elements within the same causal chain, we should attend 
to the appropriate conceptualisation of that chain. The main point is that 
consequentialist importance should not be understood as a causal phenomenon per se, 
but in terms of causal explanation. 
Pragmatic importance 
Most pressing of all is the challenge to the realist conception of importance presented 
by a pragmatic understanding. Amongst irrealist approaches to importance, the 
pragmatic is a perennially popular means of specifying the general position; it is a 
tradition which stretches back (at least) to Mill. Mill's well known definition of `the 
205 
real Cause' leaves no room for the idea that one cause may be more important than 
another. I will quote Mill at length, since the views expressed have consistently found 
approval with a wider audience. 
`It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent, that this invariable 
sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of several antecedents; the 
concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, that is, to be certain of being followed 
by, the consequent. In such cases it is very common to single out one only of the antecedents 
under the denomination of Cause, calling the others merely Conditions. Thus, if a person eats 
of a particular dish, and dies in consequence, that is, would not have died if he had not eaten 
of it, people would be apt to say that eating of that dish was the cause of his death. ... The real 
Cause, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to 
give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. ... All the conditions were 
equally indispensable to the production of the consequent; and the statement of the cause is 
incomplete, unless in some shape or other we introduce them all. ... Nothing can better show 
the absence of any scientific ground for the distinction between the cause of a phenomenon 
and its conditions, than the capricious manner in which we select from among the conditions 
that which we choose to denominate the cause. However numerous the conditions may be, 
there is hardly any of them which may not, according to the purpose of our immediate 
discourse, obtain that nominal pre-eminence. '" 
Three of Mill's ideas should be emphasised, with regard to the idea of `importance': 
1: The only truly objective manner of selecting causes is to list all the antecedents of a 
given effect, which together constitute the `Real cause' 
2: There can be no `philosophical' or `scientific' basis for selecting members of this 
set as `cause' or `condition' 
3: Indeed, such is the `capricious' basis for selection, that almost any member of the 
set constituting the `Real cause' may be selected as `the cause' 
Of course, in practice we can't usually provide the `Real cause': the only reason, 
therefore, for selecting one antecedent over another as `the cause' can be pragmatic. 
17 Mill, Book 3, Chapter 5, Section 3 
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A similar conception of importance and selection can be found in Hart and Honore's 
influential theory of pragmatic selection'8. Their theory emphasises the fact that the 
cause which is chosen fulfils a particular pragmatic need. In particular, the cause is 
that which is abnormal, compared to a `normal' contrast. They make it clear that 
what is `abnormal' is dependent upon the investigator's own perspective and 
experience. David Lewis, likewise, makes it clear that he would analyse selection of 
`the cause' as a purely pragmatic choice19. It is no surprise to find that Van Fraassen, 
also, believes that importance is a purely pragmatic feature: 
`the salient feature picked out as `the cause' in that complex process, is salient to a given 
person because of his orientation, his interests, and various other peculiarities in the way he 
approaches or comes to know the problem - contextual factors. 120 
Mill's view has been a popular choice of historians in their more reflective moments. 
Stephen Rigby, for example, quotes Mill with approval, and draws the conclusion that 
`we, as historians, have no agreed criteria by which to distinguish `causes' from 
`conditions' 21. Further, Rigby, like Hart and Honore, lets all the work of defining 
importance be guided by the pragmatic understanding of contrastive explanation: 
`which factor we select as the `key', differentiating one in any particular situation will 
depend upon what we contrast that situation with'22. This interpretation seems also to 
fit Cobban's understanding of judgements of importance, quoted in chapter two. 
A related methodological position which has had a large impact on historical writing 
at certain times maintains that all selection is to be avoided. The thesis is 
philosophically equivalent to Mill's in that it agrees that all selection is arbitrary. The 
difference stems from the concern with the negative effects on objective historical 
writing of `capricious' selection procedures. 
18 H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honor&, `Causal Judgement in History and in the Law', 
in Philosophical 
Analysis and History, ed. W. H. Dray (New York: Harper and Row, 
1966) 
19 Lewis, `Causal Explanation', 183 
20 Van Fraassen, 125 
21 S. H. Rigby, `Historical Causation: Is One Thing more Important than Another? ' in History 
(1995), 
237 
22 Ibid., 238 
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Perhaps the most famous historian who advocated this doctrine is J. B. Bury, writing 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: by `patient drudgery' and 
`microscopic research' historians should act `in the faith that a complete assemblage 
of the smallest facts of human history will tell in the end'23. History should record the 
minutiae of the past, omitting nothing; even if this means that the only narratives 
which could, in practice, be produced cover an extremely narrow time span. Walsh, 
in commenting on the argument that selection cannot be realistically defended, and is 
therefore a `capricious' business, suggests that such concerns are not just of the 
nineteenth century: `I have seen historians so embarrassed by this argument that they 
have taken the heroic course of maintaining that history proper is not selective at 
all' 24. 
Of course, in this thesis I have myself argued that we should not deny that pragmatic 
features of explanation seeking often guides the selection of causes. Much of chapter 
five was devoted to the investigation and support of a contrastive theory of 
explanation, which is above all an attempt to develop a principled theory of pragmatic 
relevance. But the distinctive claim of the pragmatic irrealist is that this is all there is 
to selection. The pragmatist, inspired by Mill, points to the equal necessity of all 
causes which together make up the sufficient set (or `Real cause'), and claims on that 
basis that any selection between them is arbitrary. The consequentialist idea is 
precisely an attempt to locate some basis which can justify claims of greater or lesser 
importance, equal necessity notwithstanding. 
Historical Usage 
Before considering the consequentialist model in detail, it is valuable to examine the 
actual historical usage of `importance' in the histories of the French Revolution. At 
23 Quoted by Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophti, of History, 171 
24 Ibid., 177 
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the least, it is to be hoped that such histories demonstrate the application of some of 
the concepts of `importance' we have outlined. However, we can also hope for more 
than this from a descriptive survey. We can expect both suggestions of novel 
situations which may challenge the ideas already introduced, and suggestions of other 
means to recognise and argue for importance. I will examine five of the eight 
historians' explanations; a choice reflecting the interestingly different approaches to 
importance at work. 
Lefebvre 
Lefebvre chooses an `ultimate cause', or `deeper cause' of the Revolution (the socio- 
economic cause): terminology which clearly corresponds to an ascription of 
importance as we have understood it. The philosophical question to ask of Lefebvre's 
work is how this claim can be justified. 
As argued in chapter six, the explananda which is explained by Lefebvre's deep cause 
is not the French Revolution as such, but a socio-economic change of some sort, of 
which the French Revolution is one example. The socio-economic discrepancy cited 
by Lefebvre may be sufficient to explain a socio-economic change, though it is not 
sufficient to explain everything about this socio-economic change. The other relevant 
causes can only be invoked to explain why particular features of the actual change 
were present: `there would have been no French Revolution - such as actually took 
place - if the king, "handing in his resignation, " had not convoked the Estates- 
General'25. Thus, whilst all causes are necessary to explain the features of the 
Revolution, only the `deeper' cause is necessary to explain why there was a change at 
all. 
Is this justification equivalent to the consequentialist idea? It seems so. For the 
deeper cause is deeper precisely because without it, there would have been no social 
revolution at all. Without the other causes cited there would not have been the actual 
Revolution, but there would have been some sort of similar upheaval, presumably at a 
similar date. Thus the deeper cause has more of an effect. The idea that important 
25 Lefebvre, 2 
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causes are those which focus on essential features of the target event will receive 
further examination in chapter eight. 
Whilst, for Lefebvre, the breakdown of central power (CP) was not as important a 
cause as socio-economic factors, CP is regarded as pertinent. The reason for this is 
the ability of CP to explain a range of salient features of the revolution. For Lefebvre, 
CP explains the revolution's violence, and the fact that the revolution was `from 
below'. How are these salient features selected? Partly, this will be due to the focus 
provided by explicit or implicit contrast cases, as described in chapter five. Yet, the 
consequentialist approach may be relevant also to the selection of `pertinent features'. 
If it is not, then `pertinent features', and hence `pertinent causes', will be specified 
purely pragmatically. Again, we shall need to examine in chapter eight the relation 
between `pertinent' features of the target event, and importance of causes. 
Schama 
Schama's detailed narrativist approach, entailing a reluctance to summarise 
`fundamental' causes of the Revolution, might suggest a quite different understanding 
of importance. Yet, I would argue that such a difference is more superficial than it 
may at first appear. I will begin by commenting on the typical structure of Schama's 
narrative. 
Schama structures his narrative around exemplary events, which serve as symbols of 
wider themes. The selection of these events is not therefore based on the importance 
of the event per se, but on the importance of what the event can be made to represent. 
For example, Schama describes in some detail the launch of the first hot air balloon in 
the grounds of Versailles in 178326. Quite ingeniously, this one event is used to 
provide evidence for, and manifestation of, (at least) three major themes. 
First, the crowd gathered to watch the spectacle in Versailles symbolises the 
impossibility of ordering by the traditional principle of rank and seniority. Second, 
the ballooning is a symbol for the rise of the modem scientist-citizen-hero over the 
26 Schama, 123-131 
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traditional `foppish, ornamental courtier'27. Third, the ballooning demonstrates 
Rousseau's influence over the emotional life of the French; in particular, the crowd's 
mixture of delight and terror in the spectacle. Schama's narrative moves forward by 
using such exemplary events as the links between different themes. Clearly, 
therefore, the selection and privileging of many particular episodes and examples, like 
the inaugural balloon flight, is not based on a consequentialist method. 
However, what of the general themes, of which the particular examples represent? 
Whilst one of Schama's most central beliefs is that `the Revolution was a much more 
haphazard and chaotic event and much more the product of human agency than 
structural conditioning' 28, there clearly are general themes in his explanation. And 
Schama does, at times, attempt a defence of the importance of these themes. 
Defending the importance of the cultural change of the rise of Romantic sensibility, 
Schama writes that this was 
`of more than literary importance. It meant the creation of a spoken and written manner that 
would become the standard voice of the Revolution, shared by both its victims and its most 
implacable prosecutors. '29 
This defence proceeds by citing significant effects of the cause in question, the 
cultural change. In this typical example, then, Schama does implicitly rely on a 
consequentialist idea in order to defend the importance of a central theme. The 
difference between Schama and Lefebvre lies perhaps in two respects. Firstly, the 
sheer number of `important' themes in Schama stands in contrast to the single 
`ultimate cause' to be found in Lefebvre. Schama shows little inclination to attempt 
to rank the themes he introduces; his standard is simply either that the theme is 
important enough to be in the account, or it is not. 
Secondly, Schama emphasises the unpredictability and chaotic nature of the events of 
the narrative. In particular, Schama disagrees that `if the whole event was of this 
epochal significance, then the causes that generated it had necessarily to be of an 
27 Ibid., 125 
28Ibid., xv 
29 Ibid., 153 
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equivalent magnitude'30. This belief in unpredictability may not pose a fundamental 
philosophical problem for the consequentialist idea, but it does raise potential 
epistemic problems. For Schama's assertion implies that seemingly small causes - 
those insignificant at the time - may still have large consequences, and may therefore 
turn out, in the longer run, as more important. The intuition trades on a notion of 
`chaos' in its mathematical sense: the principle that minute initial differences in a 
system's state may lead to large subsequent differences. 
Whilst this will not undermine the principles of the consequentialist method, it may 
make its application more difficult, since in intuitively judging importance we surely 
must adopt heuristic principles which are broadly linear (non-chaotic). Given the 
enormous range of possible candidates for `important causes' of such a complex event 
as the French Revolution, it is natural, indeed inevitable, that we rely on such initial 
rules of thumb as assuming that those causes which appear to be `of epochal 
significance' are the most important. I shall return to this issue in chapter nine. 
Furet 
Furet's comments sometimes suggest a historian explicitly sceptical of the possibility 
of weighting causes. Furet, like Schama, prefers to see the revolution's causal history 
as fortuitous, and heterogeneous: rather than succumb to `the powerful attraction of 
single-cause explanations' 31 , we should see the revolution as 
`born of the convergence of very different series of events, since an economic crisis (a 
complex phenomenon in itself, involving agricultural, `industrial', meteorological and social 
factors) took its place alongside the political crisis that had begun in 1787'32 
However, like Schama, Furet can hardly avoid producing statements which, at least 
implicitly, rely on judgements of importance. I shall examine three quite different 
examples. 
30 Ibid., xiv 
31 Furet, 21 
32 Ibid., 24-25 
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As we have seen, one of Furet's central themes is that the revolution consisted of a 
struggle between state and society: `the Revolution mobilized society and disarmed 
the State; it was an exceptional situation, which provided society with a space for 
development to which it does not normally have access. '33 How does Furet defend 
the belief that this theme is central to an understanding of the revolution? Furet only 
provides one sentence as justification: 
`This type of analysis has the two-fold advantage of restoring to the French Revolution its 
most obvious dimension, the political one, and of focusing attention on the true break in 
continuity it wrought between `before' and `after', that is, a change in the ways of 
legitimating and representing historical action. '34 
This justification depends on a prioritisation of certain features of the Revolution: the 
political aspect of the Revolution, and the fundamental change in political ideas of 
legitimation. These `obvious' or `true' features fulfil a similar role to Lefebvre's 
`pertinent features', implying that the causes which explain these features are the most 
important. 
The second example is of a negative claim of importance. Furet suggests that 
emphasis on socio-economic causes should be minimised. The Marxist socio- 
economic interpretation of the revolution is mistaken because it 
`treats the most radically new and the most mysterious aspect of the French Revolution as no 
more than the normal result of circumstances', yet `neither capitalism nor the bourgeoisie 
needed revolutions to appear in and dominate the history of the major European nations in the 
nineteenth century 35 
The implicit argument is comparative: the socio-economic change (SE) cannot be 
very important in the case of the French Revolution, since many other countries had 
SE without a revolution. In other words, SE is not sufficient for the French 
Revolution, and indeed is far from being sufficient. Such a claim appears ideally 
suited to interpretation using a consequentialist idea. Furet relies on similar cases to 
the French Revolution to suggest what might have been the effect of SE without the 
33 Ibid., 24 
34 Ibid., 27 
35 Ibid., 24 
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other causes. These similar cases suggest that SE, on its own, wouldn't have had 
much effect, and therefore wasn't so important. Furet suggests a limited 
`counterfactual experiment' :a concept which will be central to chapters eight and 
nine. 
The third example is of a rather different sort, since it concerns the importance of time 
periods, rather than of events or causes. `If one defines the Revolution as the 
collective crystallisation of a certain number of cultural traits amounting to a new 
historical consciousness, the spring of 1789 is indeed the key period. '36 It can be the 
case that to judge time periods as more or less important is just as natural as to ascribe 
importance to causes or events. What justifies such judgements of importance of time 
period? As Furet makes clear, definitions are all important. Important time periods 
will be those where, according to one's definitions, the events of interest begin or end. 
`Events of interest' may, clearly, be specified in many different ways. But one way is 
according to the idea that the occurrence of causes of importance also signifies an 
important period of time; another is according to the ideas suggested in the section on 
`Narrative importance'. 
Skocpol 
Skocpol does not, in general, give much attention to relative importance. Instead, she 
chooses to follow Mill in restricting causal explanation to the practice of listing 
necessary antecedents of a jointly sufficient set. However, there is one passage where 
Skocpol attempts to defend the overall `statist' approach, through a particular type of 
importance-claim: 
`Perhaps especially because the factors that they consider are indeed an important part of the 
story, Marxists have failed to notice a crucial point: Causal variables referring to the strength 
and structure of old-regime states and the relations of state organisations to class structures 
may discriminate between cases of successful revolution and cases of failure or non- 
36 Ibid45 
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occurrence far better than do variables referring to class relations and patterns of economic 
development alone. '37 
Skocpol's claim is that those causal variables which are correlated with the presence 
of the effect to a greater degree are the most important variables. This probabilistic 
formulation is not one which I have so far considered: is it not a candidate for a 
promising realist understanding of importance? 
In general, it is not. The reason that it appears appropriate for Skocpol's needs is 
because the target of Skocpol's explanation differs in an important way to those of the 
other explanations considered. Skocpol's main aim is to develop a general 
understanding of social revolutions; the understanding gained of any particular 
revolution is a secondary goal. And to decide upon the relative importance of causes 
in bringing about a type of event, it does seem entirely appropriate to rely (at least in 
part) on information concerning the frequency that causes are present. If inadequacy 
of state structure is a cause of four of five social revolutions, and volatile class 
relations are a cause of two of five social revolutions, then inadequacy of state 
structure is the more important cause of social revolutions in general. 
However, Raymond Martin has demonstrated that it is an error to suppose that similar 
considerations can determine the importance of a particular event38. Imagine that we 
have the same information as suggested in the previous paragraph, concerning the 
frequency of causes in bringing about five social revolutions. Now imagine a sixth 
revolution, which is accompanied by both inadequacy of state structure and volatile 
class relations. Given only this information, is it possible to say which of the two 
causes was the more important cause of this sixth revolution? According to the 
frequency measurement, we should be able to; yet this seems implausible. We would 
surely have to know, in particular, how profound the factors relating to state structure 
and class relations are in this particular case. 
We should not, therefore, expect a frequency measurement of causes to be capable of 
allocating causal importance in the case of particular events. This is not to say that 
37 Skocpol, 34-35 
38 Raymond Martin, `On Weighting Causes' in American Philosophical Quarterly 9(4) (1972), 291- 
292 
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noticing the frequent correlation of a type of cause with a type of effect may not be of 
help in spotting which particular cause might be important. However, whilst the 
frequency measurement may provide heuristic help, it is no analysis. 
Hegel 
We have already examined Hegel's theory of historical explanation in outline 
(chapters two and six). What is relevant to note at this point are the consequences of 
this approach for judgements of historical importance. The concept is not alien to 
Hegel; he states that judgement in regard to the `importance and unimportance of 
facts' is `the most basic category in historical judgement'39 
Hegel's philosophical system, in particular the emphasis on the centrality of the 
development of Spirit (hence, freedom), shapes historical importance. Given that 
Spirit does develop over time, and that, Spirit is the most philosophically central 
concept, the development of Spirit is also historically most important. In this respect, 
Hegel appears to be a good demonstration of an `intrinsic' conception of importance, 
in the sense explained previously. In a similar way to the importance of `the life of 
Christ' to Christians, `the development of Spirit' is important to Hegel for ideological 
or philosophical reasons. Crucially, these reasons are not justified empirically; 
whereas the heart of the consequentialist idea is that importance is an ascription which 
is capable of empirical support. 
However, at other points, Hegel's judgements of importance are more amenable to a 
consequentialist understanding. In terms of explanatory target, Hegel's approach to 
the French Revolution and importance is very similar to Lefebvre's. Just as for 
Lefebvre, for Hegel the central cause of the Revolution is that which guarantees that 
there will be a revolution of some sort; even though that cause alone is not sufficient 
to explain the French Revolution as it actually was. Corresponding to Lefebvre's 
Marxist cause in Hegel's explanation are the philosophical ideas of the 
Enlightenment 
- particularly, Kant's - which 
led to a new conception of freedom. 
39 Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 14 
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Tasks for chapters eight and nine 
The explication of historical practice concerning judgements of importance has raised 
interesting ideas. In the main, it appears that the consequentialist notion of 
importance is a good explication of the practice of Lefebvre, Schama and Furet, who 
represent seemingly widely differing approaches to importance. Skocpol takes a 
different approach, resulting from general, rather than particular, nature of her 
explanatory target. 
Not all selection and judgement of importance can be defended according to the idea 
of causal consequence. Nor should we want to: we should be able, at least in 
principle, to agree with those reviewers of Schama's account who complain that his 
principles of selection are `unbalanced'. The important point is really to be able to 
defend the appropriateness of a standard according to which comments such as these 
can be judged. However, it would be implausible even to claim that all judgements of 
importance of historical particulars can be justified consequentially. Hegel's 
approach shows that the consequentialist idea will not fit all historical judgements of 
importance: though even in Hegel's case, the idea is not without use. 
The major purpose of considering both historical usage, and also the general 
arguments against a realist-consequentialist notion, has been to raise issues for that 
notion to content with. These issues will set the framework for chapters eight and 
nine. In summary, they are: 
(i) To develop an account of importance which is as metaphysically palatable as the 
irrealist (proj ectivist) alternative 
(ii) To defend the selection of causes as potentially more important on the basis of 
empirical evidence; rather than, as Mill et al. assert, purely pragmatically; or as Walsh 
asserts, purely on the basis of the values of the historian; or as Collingwood asserts, 
purely on the basis of `intrinsic' (philosophical or ideological) features 
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(iii) To provide some content to the idea of `consequences', so that we know which 
are to count in measuring importance 
(iv) To understand the relation between the selection of `essential', `pertinent' or 
`obvious' features (as in Lefebvre's or Furet's account) of the event to be explained, 
and judgements of importance 
(v) To understand whether and how the consequentialist model can justify other 
potential ways to analyse importance; for example, the approach suggested by an 
explication of Lefebvre's judgement 
(vi) To question the practical applicability of the consequentialist idea; particularly in 
relation to Schama's assertion that the relevant factors are many, varied, and not 
necessarily those which initially appear to be of `epochal significance' 
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Chapter Eight: The Counterfactual Model 
We have seen how causal importance relates to explanatory competition in general. 
The crucial philosophical question is to what extent `importance' is an objectively, 
and preferably empirically, decidable property. In chapter seven I presented 
objections to a realist notion of importance, and, consequently, problems which a 
realist model should answer. In addition, I examined the use of importance implicit in 
the chosen historical explanations. A consequentialist notion of importance well 
explains much of this usage. In the examination of historical practice, we also find 
certain broad suggestions as to how such usage can be defended, and, once more, 
problems which a realist or consequentialist interpretation must face. 
Implicit in judgements of the causal importance of particular events is the idea that the 
event's importance is proportional to the extent of that event's effect. Whilst this idea 
is hardly contentious, and may even appear almost tautological, I believe it becomes 
more interesting once the implicit concepts in that idea are explicated. In any case, 
given only this simple core idea, and assuming that we are able to make sense of the 
phrase `the extent of the event's effect', much of what has been written on importance 
in history - specifically the arguments considered in chapter seven - should therefore 
be rejected. 
The Counterfactual Model, or CM in what follows, states that: 
Let c= the causal event whose importance is to be judged 
e= the effect of c which frames the question of c's importance 
x= the counterfactual event which results from c's absence 
Then the principle states that 
(CM) c is causally important to the extent that c makes a counterfactual 
difference; 
where the extent of a counterfactual difference 
is proportional to the difference 
between x and e 
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There are two major philosophical issues to arise from CM. Firstly, we need to 
understand what it means to say that a state of affairs would have happened had c not 
taken place. Secondly, we need to understand what it means to say that two states of 
affairs are more or less different. Before tackling these issues, I shall discuss CM in 
relation to contrastive explanation; and will compare CM to other potential realist 
analyses of causal importance. 
As a preliminary, I wish to make three clarificatory points. First: what does `frame 
the question of c's importance' mean? Simply that instead of providing a measure of 
the overall importance of c, CM provides a judgement of c's importance in bringing 
about e. Our discussion of importance is thereby restricted, and made more tractable: 
we have turned from importance and selection in general (at the start of chapter 
seven), to causal importance in particular (as chapter seven proceeded), to causal 
importance in relation to a given effect. This is certainly the notion which is required 
in evaluating the multiple French Revolution histories, since the comparison is 
between accounts which rate factors as more or less important in leading to the French 
Revolution. Yet I believe that even this more limited understanding of importance 
can be of consequence to wider ideas, if only by providing the possibility of a kernel 
of objective content to the former, broader notions. 
Second: on the connection between causal discovery and causal importance. It is 
natural to defend the citing of a cause, c, as bringing about effect e by stating that `if c 
hadn't happened, then e wouldn't have happened'. In other words: c makes a 
counterfactual difference to e. This was similar to the idea of `cause' defended in 
chapter six: that c was an empirically necessary antecedent, in the circumstances, for e 
(there are, however, differences to these formulations, which I shall not detail here. ) 
CM is an extension of this idea. Indeed this idea of discovering causes can be 
incorporated as a limiting case of CM; since where c is not a cause, x and e are 
identical -c makes no difference at all. 
An advantage of showing CM to be an 
extension of our normal causal-inferential reasoning is to show, at least prima 
facie, 
that CM presents a plausible mechanism for judging importances. 
1I am careful to say that CM is to extend our normal account of the 
discover, of causes; rather than 
that CM is to extend our normal account of the analysis of cause. 
For, if %e are to analyse causation 
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Third: CM should be primarily interpreted as providing a comparative measure of 
importance, rather than an absolute one. The notions of `making a difference' and, by 
implication, `being similar to' are problematic enough when understood 
comparatively (`c1 is more different to e than c2 is to e'). To extend these 
measurements to an absolute scale would appear to be at least implicitly comparative. 
An absolute measure of importance seems hard to justify, and in any case is not 
required in the context of this thesis' focus on comparison of explanations. 
The Counterfactual Model and contrastive explanation 
Given that contrast has been shown to be such a significant part of my understanding 
of historical explanation in general, it is of interest to question the relationship 
between the notion of importance, understood according to CM, and contrastive 
explanation. 
Contrast can aid the understanding of CM in two ways. In CM, we should interpret e 
and x (the outcomes) as states of affairs, which are understood with reference to, 
usually implicit, contrastive alternatives. This has the advantage of dealing with 
certain cases in which it may seem that CM leads to rather odd judgements of 
importance. Certain very general causes, such as c3 `the presence of oxygen' clearly 
make a large difference (given that there would have been nothing like the French 
Revolution, had c3 not existed), yet are not regarded as being historically important. 
However, as I demonstrated in chapters three and five, it is likely (given a typical set 
of contrast cases) that such very general causes are excluded as irrelevant, through a 
failure to meet the Difference Condition. 
In addition, the cause is best understood according to contrastive specification. For 
example, there is a clear difference in efficacy between `France having Britain as a 
geo-political competitor (rather than another country like herself)' and `France having 
itself as that which makes a counterfactual difference, then the explication of counterfactuals which 
follows would lead to circularity. I understand that the distinction between 'causation' and 'discovery 
of causation' could appear problematic from an empiricist standpoint. I believe the 
distinction can be 
drawn successfully, but that this is simply too large an issue to introduce here. 
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Britain as a geo-political competitor (rather than fragmented states such as the Holy 
Roman Empire)'. 
As well as applying a contrastive understanding to CM, an appreciation of CM can 
enrich the understanding of contrastive explanation. Though the selection of a similar 
set of contrasts can narrow down explanatorily relevant factors, it is still likely that 
there will be more than a single relevant difference between fact and foils. For 
example, whilst relevant answers to the question `why was there a revolution in 
France, rather than in England? ' will be significantly less numerous than to `why was 
there a revolution in France? ', there will still be a number of possible responses. In 
such a case, CM selects between these differences on the basis of which made the 
most difference to the explanandum-phenomenon, and so can augment the contrastive 
explanation. 
But there is a more radical way that we can envisage CM affecting contrastive 
explanation. I have not said much about how contrasts are selected in the 
interpretation of an explanation seeking question, except that the choice is primarily a 
pragmatic one, guided by such general principles as that the contrasts should be 
similar to the explanandum. Yet it is not unreasonable to suppose that such a choice 
be also partly based on more defensible reasons. CM can help make sense of this 
choice: the features chosen are those which make more difference to the event being 
explained. As Lefebvre claimed, for example, it is reasonable to suppose that the fact 
that the Revolution was a social change is more fundamental to it than the fact that it 
started in the summer of 1789. 
If this is justifiable, then `features of the event to be explained' may be regarded as 
amenable to an analysis according to CM, just as `causes of the event to be explained' 
are. And this is what we should expect, given that it is usually possible to identify a 
particular cause with a particular feature, or set of features, of the effect (in other 
words, causes are generally causes of features of an event, rather than an event per 
se). Allowing the selection of contrasts to guide CM, and considerations akin to CM 
to guide the selection of contrasts, demonstrates the interplay between interest and 
importance. If this is the case, where should the line be drawn: to what extent should 
the choice of contrast be governed by considerations of importance? 
I am afraid that 
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it seems unlikely that a general answer to this question can be provided. The point to 
be emphasised is simply that some choices of contrast, and hence choices concerning 
which aspect of the event should be explained, are defensible according to CM; and 
indeed, must be so, if CM is to have much scope. 
The Counterfactual Model: comparisons 
To demonstrate the flexibility and analytical power of CM, it is of interest to compare 
the model to five alternative criteria for justifying claims of causal importance. The 
five criteria considered have been selected for two reasons. They have been proposed 
in the literature, and they (like CM) refer to features of the cause which are plausibly 
objectively decidable: meaning not purely pragmatic nor evaluative, but at least partly 
empirically justifiable. I do not claim that it is impossible to reduce certain criteria to 
others, and indeed we shall see that common issues are raised. However, they are 
considered as they are because they have been suggested in quite different contexts. 
The first alternative means of assessing importance is via judgements of probability. 
Martin develops two complementary definitions of importance. The first, `D 1', is 
similar to my model, CM. The core of Martin's second definition, `D2', is that 
(D2) a factor A is more important than a factor B in bringing about P, if the 
probability of a factor of type-P is greater given A than it is given B. 
2 
Both D2 and CM admit of degree: respectively, the probability may be raised to a 
greater or lesser extent; and there may be more or less of a difference. 
It might be 
thought that `c made more of a difference to e' and `c raised the probability of e more' 
are equivalent. Martin believes the two ideas to be 
different: he speaks of `the two 
senses "`of more important" that we set out to analyse'3 
(although he doesn't say why 
2 Martin, `On Weighting Causes', 298 
3 Ibid., 299 
223 
he believes this). I agree with Martin that D2 and CM are not equivalent; I disagree 
that there are two senses of importance at work here. CM can do the whole job. 
Imagine asking whether the most important cause of the President's election (el) is 
that she had the support of the centrist party (c6), or that she had the support of the 
leftist party (c7). Let us suppose that the support given by these parties was equal, in 
terms of delivering the same number of votes; but that both were necessary for the 
President's election (both are causally efficacious to some degree). Given just this 
information, c6 and c7equally raised the probability of el, and c6 and c7made the 
same degree of difference to el. In this case, therefore, D2 and CM coincide in their 
judgements of causal importance. 
Now, however, add the additional fact that if the President had not had the support of 
the centrist party (CO, not only would she have lost, but she would have also suffered 
further negative consequences; which might include not being nominated for the next 
election. However, had the President not had the support of the leftist party (c7), she 
would have lost, but suffered no further consequences. In this case, D2 would still 
regard c6 and c7as equally important, on the grounds that they equally raise the 
probability of el. 
Yet, given the additional information, CM would regard c6 as more important than c7, 
on the grounds that the situation where c6 didn't occur would have been more 
different than the situation where c7 didn't occur. The reason for the difference is that 
CM takes into account not only the causal effect of c6 and c7, but also the implications 
of the differing situations where the effect fails to occur. And it seems clear that CM 
gives the answer which matches intuition: that in the modified scenario, the support of 
the leftist party was more important than the support of the centrist party. 
A measure of importance can be derived from a concept which has already been 
discussed in chapters four and five, that of a `complete explanation'. We might think 
that causal histories which are more complete thereby point to causes which are 
correspondingly more important. Interpreting `complete' as `sufficient' (which I have 
suggested is part of a reasonably plausible explication of `complete explanation') 
would imply that causes which are more nearly sufficient are thereby more important. 
There is, however, no need to conduct a comparison of CM and a `sufficiency' 
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analysis of importance, since the latter is equivalent to Martin's D2. This can be 
appreciated through the realisation that a cause is sufficient for an effect to the extent 
that it raises the probability of that effect. A fully sufficient cause increases the 
probability of the effect happening to 1. 
However, given that Martin's D2 and CM are very similar, this raises the interesting 
possibility of analysing completeness in terms of CM. For a start, CM will be able to 
provide an insight not only into what a complete explanation amounts to, but also 
what is meant by a more or less complete explanation. This would be an advantage in 
understanding relations of exclusion between actual historical explanations, since a 
role for partial completeness seems necessary in interpreting KPEE (just as I argued, 
in chapter five, that we should make space for `partial overlap of explanatory target'). 
In that case, the analysis of CM will have a bearing on explanatory exclusion in 
addition to explanatory competition more generally; but this is not an aspect of CM 
which I will examine in any detail. 
A somewhat different attempt to connect importance to features of probability can be 
derived from Hitchcock's `probabilistic relevance' test (PR)4'5, which itself owes a 
large debt to Van Fraassen's contrastive treatment of explanatory virtue6. The key 
idea is that an explanation is salient (which I take to be equivalent to the importance) 
to the extent that it limits a set of contrastive possibilities. Specifically, the 
explanatory salience of c is proportional to 
(number of contrastive possibilities remaining once c is taken into account) 
(number of contrastive possibilities before c is taken into account) 
For example, I and my friend wish to go out to dinner. There are three contrasting 
options: French, Italian, and Thai. We end up eating Italian. My preference was to 
eat something European, my friend's preference was to eat pasta. In this case, 
according to PR, my friend's preference is explanatorily more relevant than mine, 
4 Hitchcock, (especially) 603-604 
5 This idea was discussed as a possible replacement of Lipton's Difference 
Condition for explanatory 
adequacy in chapter three; there I argued that PR should not replace the 
Difference Condition. But, 
given the emphasis on explanatory salience, perhaps PR is 
better interpreted as a test of causal 
importance, as I have done at this point. 
6 Van Fraassen, 146-151 
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since theirs limits the possibilities from three to one, whilst mine limits the 
possibilities from three to two. 
There is no doubt that the idea of limiting possibilities can be a guide to importance; 
yet we should not treat PR as an analysis of importance. Consider a case in which my 
preference for European food is very strong, whereas my friend's preference for pasta 
is a mere whim, easily overridden. In that case, it might well be appropriate to cite 
my preference as more important than my friend's, despite the relative probabilistic 
relevance of each. 
A further problem with PR as an analysis of causal importance, or explanatory 
salience, is that if the contrastive possibilities are not `correctly' enumerated, then the 
criterion will lead to unintuitive results. To change the example: imagine assessing 
the importance of the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in bringing about the First 
World War according to PR. If we were to regard the set of possible outcomes (the 
contrast set) as 
{(nothing happens), (local conflict takes place), (war breaks out between Austria and 
Russia), (world war breaks out)} 
then the assassination restricts the possibilities from four to (the latter) three. This 
would accord the assassination with some salience or importance, but not much. 
However, it is easy to see that the judgement of importance might be skewed through 
selection of different possibilities: if the set was 
{(no Austrian reaction at all), (Austria is upset but takes no action), (a strongly 
worded Austrian letter is sent to Serbia), (world war breaks out)} 
then the assassination would restrict the possibilities from four to (the last) one, and 
would therefore count as extremely salient; just as salient as, for example, the fact that 
there was a long term arms race between Austria and Serbia. 
The fourth alternative realist means of analysing historical importance is via the 
contrasting notions of precipitant and pre-condition. The former refers to causes 
which occur a relatively small time before the effect; loosely, those which 
`tri gger' 
the effect. The latter refers to causes which began a relatively 
long time before the 
effect; those which provide the necessary structural 
background for the occurrence of 
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the effect. A popular opinion is that pre-conditions are causally important, 
precipitants less so. Morton White considers the view that this principle is 
axiomatic7, and Martin defends the idea through connection with his previously cited 
principle D2: his argument for D2 is that this principle is required to elucidate the 
intuition that pre-conditions are more important than precipitants. 
I agree that we usually regard pre-conditions as more important than precipitants. It is 
only natural to place, for example, long term socio-economic or intellectual 
transitions at the heart of an account of the origins of an event such as the French 
Revolution, rather than the particular accidents and decisions immediately preceding 
the event8. However, I disagree with M. White and Martin that such a preference for 
pre-conditions is always correct. Consider, for example, Skocpol's claim, quoted in 
chapter two, that the key fact requiring explanation is `the specific political crisis that 
launched the French Revolution. '9 And, in any case, I disagree that we need a 
separate motivation to CM to account for this typical preference. 
What we mean by `pre-condition' and `precipitant' could be specified according to 
simply the length of time that the causal feature had been present, but such a 
definition does not appear to capture the reason why we would be inclined to regard 
pre-conditions as generally more important than precipitants. Instead, I suggest that 
the terms be specified more precisely according to the following schema. Effect e is 
brought about by a combination of precondition S (S for `structural') and precipitant 
P1. However, it is the case that alternative precipitants, P2, P3 ..., could 
have 
combined with S to produce an outcome not too dissimilar to e; for example, they 
might lead to something very like e but dated a few months earlier or later. Crucially, 
the situation for S and for P is not symmetrical: there are no alternatives to S which 
could easily be imagined, that would have brought about an effect similar to e. This 
seems a reasonable way of explicating the difference between pre-conditions and 
precipitants, and demonstrates the situation to be a special case of comparing causes 
having readily available functional equivalents with those which 
do not. 
7 Morton White, Foundations of Historical Knowledge (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1965), 134-141 
8 That is, as long as we can argue both that such long term changes took place and 
that they were 
causally relevant at all; facts which are disputed 
by some, most notably Schama. 
9 Skocpol, 52 
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If this is an accurate explication of what is meant by pre-condition and precipitant, 
then CM is able to subsume the above case; so long as certain terms in CM - most 
notably `absence' - are understood correctly. The wrong way to interpret `absence' 
would be to suppose that had P1 not taken place, there would have been no precipitant 
at all. For if this is the case, the importance of P1 and of S will be equal. The correct 
way to interpret `absence' is to use the idea that, had P1 not taken place, it is likely 
that one of P29 P3 ..., would have occurred instead. If this is so, then the absence of P1 
would make relatively little difference; therefore, the judgement of importance 
suggested by CM would concur with the intuition that the pre-condition was more 
important than the precipitant. An advantage of this explication in terms of CM is 
that it does not guarantee, a priori, that pre-conditions are more important than 
precipitants. Whether this is so depends on the relevant, empirically informed, 
counter-factual judgements. For this explication, more needs to be set about the 
notion of `absence'; this will be a major element of chapter nine. 
The final realist analysis of importance to be considered is that which claims that 
important causes are those which are robust. Whilst the socio-economic conditions of 
pre-Revolutionary France may be considered robust causes, the decisions of the King 
may not be: for that reason, the former may be considered the more important cause. 
Such an analysis is best treated in a similar manner to the treatment of pre-conditions 
vs. precipitants. 
A robust cause is one which would remain causal in similar contexts. A non-robust 
(fragile) cause would be unlikely to remain causal even if the situation were only a 
little different. Let us imagine that socio-economic changes, occurring over the 
course of roughly a century, are deemed more important than the foolish equivocation 
of the crown during the years 1788 and 1789. We might defend this judgement by 
pointing to the stability of the former cause. It was more likely that the former, rather 
than the latter, cause would exist in a range of close, or relevant, possible situations. 
Defined in the above way, robust causes correspond in general to pre-conditioning 
causes (and non-robust to precipitating). This is so because there are usually 
fewer 
plausible functional alternatives to robust causes, just as there are 
few or no plausible 
functional alternatives to pre-conditioning causes. To the extent that an analysis of 
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importance in terms of robustness corresponds with this idea, it can be subsumed by 
CM in the manner demonstrated in the previous section. 
I have aimed to demonstrate that CM can account for, and subsume, alternative 
`realist' analyses of causal importance. These alternatives may provide heuristic 
benefit in the search for important causes (in a similar manner to the frequency 
analysis as a guide to particular importance, discussed in chapter seven). I do not 
want to suggest that there are not some cases which are very neatly accounted for by 
one or other of the alternative suggestions considered. However, the generality of 
CM demonstrated in this section provides an argument for its analytical role, in 
addition to its potential use as a methodology guiding justifications of causal 
importance. 
Counterfactuals as implied experiments 
The task for the remainder of this chapter will be to outline an account of 
counterfactuals which is both philosophically and practically appropriate, and to show 
how this account renders CM plausible. In this section I will first suggest why we 
should be concerned with an analysis of counterfactuals at all. I will then give my 
`implied experiment' account of counterfactuals, and the reasons why this account 
should be adopted. 
We might think that an analysis of counterfactuals is not what is needed for our 
purposes, since our interest is in how counterfactuals could be used, rather than how 
they should be analysed. I have some sympathy with this protest, especially in the 
context of the present study which primarily aims to use philosophical concepts and 
resources to tackle a pressing historiographical problem, rather than to enter analytical 
debates over the nature of these concepts. Indeed, the account which 
I develop wti ill, it 
must be admitted, fall short of being a complete analysis of counterfactuals 
in general. 
Yet I will reject the overtly pragmatic emphasis on method alone, 
for three reasons. 
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Firstly, as I argued in chapter one (with respect to Martin's adoption of the Deductive- 
Nomological analysis), analyses are not normatively neutral. It is a mistake to 
suppose that the analysis of a concept can be entirely divorced from the methodology 
which utilises that concept. Rather, analyses should be developed within a framework 
set by methodological understanding. It is certainly the case that methodology is 
constrained by the analyses at work. 
Secondly, and as a corollary of the first point, it is likely that an analytical 
investigation will produce issues which have an important bearing of the use of that 
concept. At the very least, this possibility should not be ruled out a priori. In what 
follows, I shall argue that there are points of debate in the literature dealing with 
analyses of counterfactuals which finds resonance in issues relevant to the practical 
use of counterfactuals. In particular, the traditional analytic problem concerning 
cotenability, and the doctrine of `No Gratuitous Difference', are both relevant to the 
applicability and use of counterfactuals (as shown in chapter nine). 
Thirdly and most importantly, it is a fact that analytical worries can interrupt practice. 
Scepticism over the possibility of counterfactuals being anything more than `a web of 
hazy imaginings, fantasy and the subjunctive mood" OÖ leads, quite naturally, to the 
exclusion of counterfactual reasoning from `rigorous' historical debate. The textbook 
Historians 'Fallacies is particularly critical of the use of counterfactuals in history: 
`The fallacy of fictional questions ... consists 
in an attempt to demonstrate by an empirical 
method what might have happened in history, as if in fact it actually had ... 
There is nothing 
necessarily fallacious in fictional constructs, as long as they are properly recognized for what 
they are and are clearly distinguished from empirical problems. ... 
But they prove nothing 
and can never be proved by an empirical method. '" 
Even a defender of the use of counterfactuals in history, Raymond Martin, worries 
that `whatever the problems with counterfactuals, we seem to be stuck with them' 
12 
We need to be able to show that it is reasonable to suppose that counterfactuals can 
be 
lo Robert Musil; quoted in the introduction to Virtual History: 
Alternatives and Counterfactuals, ed. 
Niall Ferguson (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 4 
11 D. H. Fischer, Historians' Fallacies. Towards a Logic of 
Historical Thought (London: Routledge, 
1971), 15-16 
12 Raymond Martin, `Causes, Conditions and Causal Importance' 
in History and Theory 21 (1982), 70 
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both decidable in principle, and that they can actually be known, over at least a large 
range of historical cases. 
My main concern in the following investigation of counterfactuals is the question of 
how far counterfactual decidability can be grounded in an objectively defensible 
manner. A secondary task will be to connect analytic and practical concerns. I will, 
throughout, limit my attention to the sorts of counterfactuals which might be required 
in CM; I will not, for example, focus upon `counter-legals' (counterfactuals whose 
antecedent supposes an alteration of physical law). 
My starting point is to focus on the relationship between antecedent and consequent. 
I shall suggest that that relationship is causal. From this intuition can be developed an 
attractive way to understand counterfactuals: as imaginary, or `implied', experiments. 
The same facts that make ordinary experiments true or false give counterfactuals their 
truth values - namely, causal laws and causal regularities. This causal knowledge 
needed to assess implied experiments is arrived at by actual experiment. Thus, actual 
experiments produce knowledge of causal generalities, whilst counterfactuals 
(implied or imaginary experiments) are parasitic upon such knowledge: in much the 
1 same way that a prediction is parasitic upon experimental knowledge3. 
More precisely: a counterfactual asserts that an implied experiment leads from 
antecedent to consequent, where the antecedent `sketches' the initial conditions of the 
experiment, and the consequent `sketches' the outcome of that experiment. This 
implied experiment involves, paradigmatically, the move from initial conditions 
(which include, but are not exhausted by, those specified in the antecedent), via 
relevant causal laws, to an outcome. The truth or falsity of a counterfactual statement 
is determined by the match between the implied experiment outcome and the 
counterfactual consequent. 
13 Indeed, IE implies that counterfactuals and predictions are symmetrical: that 'e will happen if c 
does' 
(asserted before c took place) and `e would have happened if c had' (asserted after c failed to take 
place) are equivalent. This is an idea which Edgington challenges (Dorothy 
Edgington, 
`Counterfactuals and the Benefit of Hindsight', 2002, unpublished). She uses `switch' counterfactuals, 
such as the lottery example: `you would have won had you selected ticket 
938' and `if you select ticket 
938 you will win'. In `switch' cases, there seems to be an asymmetry: whilst the counterfactual 
is 
appropriate, the prediction is not. Nevertheless, Edgington's challenge 
is not irrefutable; the intuition 
can plausibly be denied (by maintaining the prediction to be correct, though strange). 
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Symbolically, the Implied Experiment account of counterfactuals (EE) states that: 
Counterfactual S (if A had been, then C would have been) is true if and only if: 
(i) Implied experiment IE (experimental initial condition IC to experimental 
outcome 0) is correct and 
(ii) IC is a satisfactory development of A and 
(iii) 0 is a satisfactory development of C 
This account can be seen to work well when considering simple counterfactual 
statements. Consider the assertion that `if I dropped my glass on the hard floor, then 
it would break'. We would go about deciding upon the truth of this statement by first 
imagining the antecedent situation of the glass being dropped, then combining this 
fact with relevant laws (laws concerning gravity, properties of solids, perhaps 
chemical bonds), and properties of the items involved (that the glass is a fragile solid 
and so forth). These facts lead (deductively or probabilistically) to a situation 
predicted by the consequent - that the glass breaks. 
What are the conditions for the correctness LE, the implied experiment? As I have 
suggested, the paradigm case of correctness is when IC can be conjoined with relevant 
laws, and can be shown to deductively lead to 0. This is the case in the above 
example. That is certainly sufficient for the correctness of IE, yet I do not wish to 
claim that it is necessary. 
As the counterfactual situations considered become more complex, and the laws 
involved less easy to guess, the notion of determining the implied experiment 
according to deductively applied laws must be relaxed. This is on pain of restricting 
the account to only very simple counterfactuals, such as the dropped glass. The most 
obvious way to make the assessment of counterfactuals more tractable is to replace 
(knowledge of) `relevant causal laws' with (knowledge of) `approximate empirical 
regularities'. It does not matter, for the purposes of IE, whether or not such 
regularities are really laws: in other words, whether they are, to use Mill's 
terminology, general or derivative laws. 
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Whilst we must be mindful of such potential errors as mistaking correlation for 
genuine causation, the need to supplement strict laws with regularities is nonetheless 
necessary; both in common practice of deciding counterfactuals, and for the implied 
experiment model. It is important to notice, however, that the desired objectivity of 
the approach remains. According to EE, our assessment of a counterfactual can be no 
better than the match between (i) the regularities we use to assess the counterfactual 
situation, and (ii) the actual regularities governing the appropriate implied experiment. 
And both the degree of fit between (i) and (ii), and the nature of (ii) itself, are mind- 
independent facts. 
Indeed, I think that the implied experiment account should be properly interpreted in a 
still broader manner. In certain situations it is permissible to assess an implied 
experiment on the basis of simulation. In gaining scientific knowledge there are (at 
least) two ways to proceed: we can apply to our topic in question a theory which has 
already acquired plausibility in other contexts; or we can model the topic in question. 
For example, both a developed theory of aeronautics and a wind-tunnel can be useful 
in attempting to understand the mechanics of a particular aircraft14. Similarly, I 
suggest that implied experiments may be understood and assessed by modelling or 
simulation, just as they are by theory. (To appropriate Putnam's well known 
question: how do we know that square pegs can't fit into round holes? Certainly not 
through the application of a complete, low level theory! ) 
This extension is, I believe, necessary in order to appreciate the full extent of 
counterfactual reasoning, and in order to distinguish the implied experiment account 
from other analyses, particularly the meta-linguistic (discussed in the next section). 
Such an extension does, however, make it difficult to provide strict, and specific, 
conditions for when an implied experiment be considered correct. 
The only fully 
general criterion that can be given is that an implied experiment is correct where 
the 
corresponding actual experiment is correct. 
14 This example is drawn from Stich and Nichols 
(Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols, `Folk Psychology: 
Simulation or Tacit Theory' in Mind and Language 7 (1992): 
35-71). Their topic is the question of 
whether our folk `theory of mind' is really a tacit theory, or 
is rather a method of simulation. 
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The implied experiment model of counterfactuals has a number of attractions, 
particularly insofar as CM is concerned. Most importantly, scepticism concerning the 
decidability of counterfactuals can be allayed. Even amongst those theorists who 
have attempted to employ the notion of counterfactuals to ground historical practice, 
such scepticism has been evident (in, for example, the work of Hawthorn15, Martin16, 
and Hammonds 7). Using the implied experiment model, we can say that as long as 
the experimental initial condition is properly specified, and we have the correct kind 
of experimental knowledge (theoretical or stimulatory), then counterfactuals are 
philosophically and practically decidable. 
A second advantage to the implied experiment account is, therefore, that the sources 
of methodological difficulties concerning counterfactual decidability can be clearly 
pinned down. Difficulties may be due to the specification of initial facts, or to a lack 
of knowledge concerning relevant laws or regularities. Chapter nine explores each of 
these issues. Thus the implied experiment account also helps us to understand under 
what conditions counterfactual reasoning does become dubious. Hammond, for 
example, is forced to maintain that `beyond a certain point it doesn't make historical 
sense, and perhaps doesn't make philosophical sense, to persist in weighting 
causes) 18; yet this point is not located. I shall argue in what follows that certain 
counterfactuals do indeed lack epistemological (historical) and, less often, 
philosophical sense; but using the implied experiment model we can give a good 
explanation as to when this should be so. 
Thirdly, the implied experiment account is psychologically compelling - it serves as a 
general account of counterfactual decidability, but also (in a very general sense) as a 
phenomenologically realistic methodology. There are clear similarities with certain 
psychological accounts of counterfactual reasoning; for example, Nichols! Stich/ 
Leslie/ Klein's `off-line simulation' model19. This treats counterfactual reasoning as a 
15 Geoffrey Hawthorn, Plausible Worlds: Possibility and Understanding in History and the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 
16 Martin, `On Weighting Causes' and `Causes, Conditions and Causal Importance' 
17 Michael Hammond, `Weighting Causes in Historical Explanation' in Theoria 43 (1977): 103-128 
18 Ibid., 118 
'9 Shaun Nichols, Stephen Stich, Alan Leslie, David Klein, `Varieties of Off-Line Simulation' 
in 
Theories of Theories of Mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 53-59 
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mental process beginning with a pretend belief X, which is then processed using our 
normal mechanisms of inferential reasoning. These mechanisms are conducted `off- 
line' (in other words, outside the agent's actual situation), in order to find out what 
would follow from X. This topic has intriguing parallels with the question of 
counterfactuals, particularly in the discussion of `off-line simulation' as a means of 
explaining and predicting others; such an idea seems close to my notion of an implied 
experiment. 
A final advantage is that the implied experiment account provides an description of 
counterfactuals in terms of what are (or at least, would seem to be) markedly less 
mysterious entities: matters of fact, and causal laws, regularities or properties. In 
comparison to the `Possible Worlds' theory of counterfactuals, considered in the next 
section, counterfactuals are kept firmly in this world. To Lewis' question of what we 
refer to when we talk about `ways things could have been'20, we reply that we refer to 
facts about this world (events, laws, and so forth), mentally arranged in a manner 
different to that in which the facts were actually arranged. 
Alternative analyses of counterfactuals 
Whilst the term `implied experiment' is my own, as is to be expected the general 
approach of the account bears some similarity to other analyses of the 
last 50 years. 
Mackie makes use of the notion of supposition; "`if P, Q" is to assert Q within the 
scope of the supposition that P'21. Indeed, in spelling out what 
he means by 
`supposition', in a non-trivial way, Mackie takes the term to mean `envisaging the 
'22 possibilities and consequences in question. 
The implied experiment account is also similar in certain respects to 
Goodman's 
analysis, which has since been known as a Meta-Linguistic analysis 
(henceforth 
20 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwells, 1973), 84 
21 J. L. Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973), 93 
22 Mackie, 100 
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ML)23. ML maintains that a counterfactual states that an argument of a certain kind 
exists, or perhaps that a counterfactual is such an argument, in outline. The relevant 
argument is one whose premises include the antecedent proposition, in addition to 
other initial conditions and laws of nature; and whose conclusion is the consequent. 
True counterfactuals refer to a valid argument of this kind: this is why they are nieta- 
linguistic entities. Note that the same sort of items appear in both IE and ML: in 
particular, initial conditions and laws of nature. 
However, the implied experiment account does disagree with ML. Most 
fundamentally, they disagree over the reference of counterfactual statements. In IE, 
counterfactuals refer to implied experiments - models, simulations; in ML, 
counterfactuals refer to arguments. Under the implied experiment model, arguments 
are merely the clearest means of assessing implied experiments. To focus entirely on 
arguments is to illegitimately restrict the scope of counterfactual reasoning. As I have 
argued, it is often the case that counterfactuals are decidable, even where we do not 
have precise knowledge of the laws driving the relevant system. 
In addition, ML faces a number of serious problems due to its focus on arguments. 
The notorious problem of cotenability is one: discussion of which must wait until 
chapter nine. Related is the fact that ML has great difficulties in properly accounting 
for the asymmetry in counterfactuals. Why is it that `if the glass is dropped, then the 
glass breaks' is a sensible counterfactual, whilst `if the glass breaks, then the glass is 
dropped' is not? For, given a sufficiently detailed account of the glass breaking, and 
relevant laws, it is not implausible to suppose that an argument could be constructed 
leading to the fact that the glass was dropped. A further problem is that ML 
encourages a view of counterfactuals which is insufficiently empirically sensitive. 
Counterfactuals' decidability should rest on the same entities as actual empirical 
investigation; and such entities can, and do, alter as science progresses. 
The latter two comments suggest a parallel between ML and the 
Deductive- 
Nomological (D-N) analysis of explanation. I suggest that the difference 
between : `1L 
and IE is analogous to that between a D-N analysis of explanation and an 
ontic 
(causal) conception of explanation. The D-N analysis explicates explanations 
in 
23 Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 7-8 
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terms of arguments, propositions, and deductive relationships; ML explicates 
counterfactuals in the same way. The major problems of the D-N model concern its 
difficulties in accounting for explanatory relevance, and for explanatory asymmetry. 
This is so since the provision of a D-N argument is no guarantee for explanatory 
relevance, as we saw in chapter three. The problems of relevance and asymmetry 
remain even if the D-N model were to be relaxed so as to require high probability 
rather than certainty. Analogously, the problems with ML remain whether deduction, 
or just probabilistic likelihood, is required in order to secure the truth of the associated 
counterfactual. 
The ontic conception of explanation proposed a very simple solution: that 
explanations trace whatever entities are actually involved in bringing about the event 
to be explained (usually, and loosely, causes). In the same way, the implied 
experiment analysis of counterfactuals does not place any particular a priori 
restriction upon what items should be included in a counterfactual, for these will 
depend upon our actual inferential mechanisms (as the implied experiment mirrors 
actual experiments). 
The major alternative to ML is the Possible Worlds (hereafter PW) analysis of 
counterfactuals, initially proposed by Stalnaker24 and Lewis25. Although there are 
variations between different PW models, in particular between Stalnaker's and Lewis' 
analyses, the points I wish to make concern the general features of a PW account. For 
this reason, it is sufficient here to specify the PW analysis as follows: `if it had been 
the case that a, then c would have obtained' is non-trivially true if in the most similar 
world to ours in which a is true, c is also true26. 
The first point I wish to make is that, simply as stated, PW is free of content: in the 
sense that it cannot actually deliver a judgement concerning which counterfactuals 
should and should not be asserted. This claim is not contentious - 
Lewis is quite iii 
24 Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry (Cambridge, Mass: Bradford Books, 1984) 
25 Lewis, Counterfactuals 
26 Two of the more salient differences between Stalnaker's and 
Lewis' versions of PW are: (i) that 
Lewis admits of ties between close worlds, whilst Stalnaker 
does not; and (ii) that whilst Lewis 
describes PW in terms of measures of similarity between worlds (as I have 
done), Stalnaker speaks of a 
selection function between worlds. 
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agreement27 - yet is of consequence. For there to be content to PW, we must supply 
content to the notion of `similarity'. Indeed, depending on the similarity function, P«' 
could give results entirely in accordance with ML: if the function is defined such that 
changes of law always produce a less similar situation than changes of fact. 
Because the similarity function is unconstrained, the use to which counterfactuals are 
put in CM is problematic. Recall that the aim of CM was to demonstrate that 
historians can disagree over causal importance in a manner where argument is 
appropriate; where the differing ascriptions of importance are not just `different'. Yet 
PW provides no guidance as to which counterfactuals are properly assertable. To do 
this, the similarity function must be constrained. 
If the required similarity function was closely related to our intuitive judgements of 
similarity, then we could at least demonstrate a conceptual advance: from 
counterfactual judgements to similarity judgements. But this is simply not the case: 
`similarity' turns out to be largely a term of art. This is best seen by considering the 
notorious `Nixon' example28: `if Nixon had pressed the button there would have been 
a nuclear holocaust' should come out true. Yet, is it not the case that a world which 
suffers a holocaust is less similar than one where Nixon presses the button, but the 
mechanism fails? Under the PW account, this would lead to the counterfactual being 
deemed false. 
In response, Lewis suggested29 that the following priorities be adopted when judging 
`similarity'. The least similar worlds are those which differ widely in terms of law. 
Next most important in judging difference are large differences in particular matters 
of fact; followed by small violations of law. The least important aspect of similarity 
lies in small differences of particular fact. It is clear that using these vague principles 
charitably could lead to judgements which match intuitions concerning such examples 
as `Nixon'. But the important point is that any content given to the similarity 
function 
is derived from our pre-existing intuitions concerning which counterfactuals are 
acceptable, and which not. Of course, this intuitive basis should play a role 
in the 
analysis of any concept; yet we need more for the application of 
CM. 
27 For example, David Lewis, `Counterfactual Dependence and 
Time's Arrow-' (originally 1979) in 
David Lewis, Philosophical Papers Volume II (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 41 
2 
28 First raised by Kit Fine, `Review of David Lewis, 
Counterfactuals' in ,% find 
84 (19 7 _5), 
45 
29 Lewis, `Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow', 47-48 
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In short, we need the possibility of normativity in our judgements of causal 
importance; a normativity that is absent from the PW analysis of counterfactuals. 
Any content PW can provide is based either on intuitive notions of `similarity, which 
leads to incorrect judgements; or entirely on pre-existing counterfactual judgements. 
It does nothing to normatively ground such judgements. We need an account which 
delivers plausible general rules for the decidability of counterfactuals, such that 
specific counterfactual statements can be judged according to their fit with those 
rules. Further, I think that it is not enough for those rules to be constructed only in 
such a way that they fit with existing judgements of counterfactuals; we should expect 
those rules to suggest why those judgements are the way that they are. 
I would argue that the implied experiment account should be relied upon as the means 
to justify judgements of counterfactual correctness. This model fits with the wide 
range of historical counterfactuals which we intuitively wish to assert, delivers 
tangible results, and can be seen as normatively binding in the right way. 
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Chapter Nine: The Counterfactual Model: Defence 
In chapter eight I presented the Counterfactual Model (CM) of causal importance. 
CM is an attempt to specify the intuition that important causes `produce more of an 
effect'. I have argued that CM is able to subsume alternative conceptions of causal 
explanation. However, to establish its plausibility, it is necessary to investigate the 
analytical components of CM: counterfactual and degree of difference. The latter 
notion will be the subject of the penultimate section of this chapter. The task of 
examining historical counterfactuals was begun in chapter eight, in which I made a 
case for the Implied Experiment (IE) account of counterfactuals. In the first three 
sections of this chapter, I continue the investigation into IE, through a critical 
consideration of key aspects of that model. 
Is the Implied Experiment model an analysis? 
I have attempted to defend IE over the more traditional analytical approaches to 
counterfactuals, at least with regard to their use in grounding historical 
counterfactuals. The major advantages of IE are, first, that it is a model which can be 
normatively binding: thus it can account for the fact that counterfactuals can be right 
or wrong; second, that it is broad enough to be able to potentially justify the way that 
counterfactuals are actually asserted. Further advantages will be discovered through 
consideration of the topics of the present chapter. 
However, we must also question whether IE is really in direct competition with 
ML 
(the metalinguistic analysis) and PW (the possible worlds analysis). 
In other words, 
to what extent is IE an analysis? Regarded as an analysis, a 
first concern with IE is 
that it doesn't cover all counterfactuals. In particular, counter-legals are 
impossible to 
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resolve, due to the fact that IE requires the use of actual laws and causal regularities in 
deciding upon counterfactual outcomes. It may be possible to develop an approach, 
broadly in keeping with IF, such that counter-legals can be understood: by, for 
example, using actual laws (etc. ) except for those explicitly regarded in the antecedent 
as differing from actual laws. However, whether or not this is possible, there is a 
more serious difficulty for IE. 
It is awkward to specify both what precisely an Implied Experiment is, and under 
what conditions it is correct, without using counterfactual terminology. When is an 
implied experiment correct? My answer, in chapter eight, was that an implied 
experiment is correct where `the corresponding actual experiment is correct'. But, 
surely, the point is that there is no corresponding actual experiment: should we not 
therefore be more forthcoming in rephrasing the above to `... the corresponding actual 
experiment would be correct'? And: what do we refer to when we refer to 
counterfactuals? I answered, `to facts about this world (events, laws, and so forth), 
mentally arranged in a manner different to that in which the facts were actually 
arranged'. Again, it is plausible to suppose that the phrase `actually arranged' 
suggests a pre-existing implicit understanding of the notion of a counterfactual 
alternative. 
I won't attempt to refute the thrust of this criticism; I think it is true that, analytically, 
IE must be supplemented by a more general notion of counterfactuals. Therefore, IE 
should be regarded as a normative explication of our counterfactual practices, rather 
than a fully fledged analysis. However, two caveats. First, I take it that, analytical 
shortcomings notwithstanding, EE performs a vital role within the model of historical 
importance given by CM. Second, the analysis which `frames' IE can be specified 
quite minimally. 
As in PW, I believe that it is necessary to suppose that counterfactuals are, in the most 
general terms, ways of selecting between possibilities. However, these possibilities 
need not be regarded as fully fledged `possible worlds'. My preferred approach 
will 
be to treat counterfactuals as propositions which select an appropriate world-line 
from 
those which diverge from the actual world at a point just priori to 
the time referred to 
by the antecedent. `Appropriate' is - in the case of historical counterfactuals, 
at an`' 
rate - to be specified 
by IE. EE therefore retains the starring role in the analysis of 
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counterfactuals, even if it is not the whole story. 
receive further attention in the following section. 
The role of `world-lines' will 
The Initial Condition, or experimental situation 
There are two main elements of the Implied Experiment account of counterfactuals 
which require further investigation. First, the `initial condition' (IC) of the 
experiment; second, the extent to which the `experiment', and hence the 
counterfactual, yields definite and knowable outcomes. The former is the subject of 
this section. 
I will approach the role of IC through the parallel issue of cotenability. This issue 
was raised by Goodman, in discussion of his own analysis of counterfactuals: ML. 
The issue of cotenability is, in Goodman's terms, `the problem of relevant conditions'; 
what premises should be included in a counterfactual argument? Consider the 
plausible counterfactual claim: 
DEM: `If Germany had won the Second World War, Britain would not now be a 
democracy' 
Considering that ML requires the deduction of the consequent, clearly more premises 
than `Germany won the Second World War' are required. We also need such 
statements as `Germany was a dictatorship', and `The German war aims included 
alteration of governments', if the deduction is to have any chance of being valid. 
Yet not all facts can be used as premises in a counterfactual-argument. For a start, 
`Germany did not win the Second World War' should be excluded, even though 
it is a 
fact. For if premises of this sort were admitted, then any counterfactual whatsoever 
should be true: since the premise, together with the antecedent, 
forms a contradiction; 
and a contradiction logically implies any conclusion we would care to name. 
But 
there are also other facts which, though not in logical contradiction with 
the 
antecedent, should not be asserted as premises in the counterfactual argument. 
If facts 
of this sort were admitted, we would again be in the unfortunate position 
of having to 
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affirm that many intuitively false counterfactuals were, according to ML, true. For 
example: 
DEM2: `if Germany had won the Second World War, and her war aims included 
alteration of governments, then Germany would not have been a dictatorship' 
looks odd, to say the least. Yet it is perfectly acceptable, according to ML, as long as 
the fact that `Britain is now a democracy' is included as a premise. This can be 
justified if we suppose that that `Germany won the Second World War', `The German 
war aims included alteration of governments', and `Germany was a dictatorship' are 
jointly sufficient to imply that Britain is not now a democracy. Given that we have 
assumed that it is, one of the other premises must be denied. 
Cotenable premises are those which can, and should, be properly asserted in a fully 
specified counterfactual-argument, alongside the explicit antecedent. DEM and 
DEM2 illustrate the bad counterfactuals that can result from adopting premises which 
are not cotenable. There are three related questions which fall under the heading of 
`the problem of cotenability'. First, under what precise conditions are premises 
cotenable? Second, is it possible to state these conditions without using 
counterfactual terminology? Third, there is the question of back-tracking (raised by 
DEM2). Whilst counterfactuals usually assert the dependence of future events upon 
past events, under what conditions, if ever, should the past be said to be 
counterfactually dependent upon the future? 
Goodman, notoriously, failed to answer these questions in a satisfactory manner. For 
this reason, he doubted whether counterfactuals would feature as part of a mature 
scientific world-view. I will leave the metalinguistic analysis in trouble at this point, 
and instead apply the analogous questions to IE. EE doesn't treat counterfactuals as 
implied arguments, but implied experiments; so it doesn't talk in terms of 
`providing a 
complete set of premises'. However, it does require IC: `the experimental 
initial 
condition', which, in many cases, will appear to be quite similar. 
Just as a full set of 
cotenable premises is required by ML, a properly specified 
initial condition is 
required by IE. And, just as a counterfactual antecedent 
does not state all the 
premises required for an assessment of counterfactuals according 
to NIL, I made it 
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clear in chapter eight that, according to IE, the initial experimental condition is only 
`sketched' by the antecedent. 
In terms of IE, the key point to recognise is that implied experiments can only be 
assessed to the extent that we are provided with a tractable experimental situation. In 
other words, if we are asked `what happens if... ', and that `if is not properly 
specified, then no answer is possible. The tractable experimental situation is rarely 
provided explicitly. In the case of DEM, for example, `If Germany had won the war' 
is ambiguous; it could be read as `Germany defeated Britain, Russia, and the US', or 
it could be read as implying only a European victory. It is highly likely that which 
scenario is envisaged will affect the counterfactual outcome. 
The potential for ambiguity goes to the heart of the Counterfactual Model. The initial 
experimental situation is referred to in CM as an absence: `the counterfactual situation 
that results from c's absence'. But there are many possible ways for something to be 
absent: for an absence leaves a further, positive situation. By imagining the absence 
of `the success of the D-Day invasions', we might imply that the invasion succeeded 
one day later, one year later, one decade later: or perhaps not at all. 
I suggest that there are three core ideas which relate to construction of the initial 
condition of the implied experiment, which together answer the analogous `problem 
of cotenability' as it applies to IE. First, for the construction of a reasonable implied 
experimental situation, much needs to be stipulated. Whilst we often aren't very 
explicit about what precisely we wish to be imagined upon asserting a counterfactual, 
we should be able to fill in the relevant gaps if called upon to do so. 
In chapter eight, I argued that not only is the effect to be understood contrastively, 
but 
often the cause should be, too. To recognise the contrastive nature of 
the cause under 
examination will often resolve the ambiguity at a stroke: 
for we do not deal with the 
cause `Germany winning the war', but `Germany winning 
the war (rather than just 
defeating European countries/ rather than failing completely)'. 
Contrastive choice is 
primarily governed by pragmatic considerations; this 
is therefore an example of 
stipulation. 
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Of course, many aspects of the initial experimental condition will not affect the truth 
of the counterfactual (whether Germany won the war on a Tuesday or a Wednesday, 
for example), so there is no need for the initial condition of an implied experiment to 
be infinitely detailed. Still, it is fair to say that the use of historical counterfactuals 
will generally require careful specification of the initial situation, above and beyond 
the bare outline sketched by the antecedent in question. 
The second and third features of the construction of IC serve to limit the pragmatic 
emphasis of the first. Second, whilst we are free to stipulate what the `absence' of c 
amounts to, certain interpretations are more natural than others. In particular, recall 
from the discussion of precipitants and preconditions that `absence' had to be 
interpreted in an appropriate way, if CM was to be able to subsume the insights from 
that alternative analysis of causal importance. In that case, it was envisaged that if 
cause c was not the case, another event d would most likely have performed as a near 
functionally equivalent cause. The `absence of c' should, in that case, be interpreted 
as the positive instantiation of d. 
Third, Lewis has argued that there are premises (or features, in terms of IE) which we 
are not free to simply stipulate away. Such features are empirical facts grounding the 
truth of the counterfactual, and so must be included in the specification of the initial 
conditions. Lewis' example' `if I had looked in my pocket, I would have found a 
penny' should not be resolved by stipulating whether the counterfactual contains the 
fact that `there was (or was not) a penny in my pocket'. Rather, whether or not there 
was a penny is an empirical fact which should be incorporated into the counterfactual, 
and which should therefore ground the truth or falsity of that counterfactual. 
The correct response is that counterfactuals can be stipulated in any way, but that 
excessive manipulation produces odd counterfactuals, and negates the purpose of 
counterfactuals such as Lewis'. How is `excessive manipulation' to be understood? 
Primarily, I suggest, according to the idea that, implied experiments should not, in 
general, incorporate those facts which are in logical or causal contradiction with the 
explicit antecedent. This principle is hereafter referred to as `no causal contradiction'. 
This idea provides a possible definition of cotenability: cotenable features are those 
1 Lewis, Counterfactuals, 68 
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which are not in logical or causal contradiction with the antecedent. This is why 
DEM2 should be rejected: `Britain is now a democracy' is an effect of `Germany won 
the war' and the other two causes mentioned, so should be rejected. (It is likely that 
Goodman could not accept this rather simple answer due to prior philosophical 
commitments, and due to the emphasis on linguistic, rather than ontic, items. ) 
The `no causal contradiction' rule leads to two difficulties. First, whilst `no causal 
contradiction' clearly establishes the outlines for formulating a satisfactory 
experimental situation, the problem of analysis - that counterfactual terminology is 
required in the explication of the condition - reoccurs at this point. One of 
Goodman's problems with cotenability was that `to establish any counterfactual, it 
seems that we first have to determine the truth of another'2, since his definition of 
cotenability was that cotenable premises `would not be true if A [the antecedent] 
were0 . 
`No causal contradiction' is not so blatant; it defines cotenable features as those which 
are not in contradiction with the antecedent. Yet, once we note that the antecedent 
doesn't actually have any effects, it is clear that the circularity in the definition 
remains. To properly specify `no causal contradiction', we must state that premises 
which fail the test are those which are in contradiction with the effects the antecedent 
would have had. A non-circular definition of cotenability in terms of PW can be 
provided. However, I will argue that the formal nature of PW counts against the 
substance of such an answer (just as, in chapter eight, I argued that the formal nature 
of PW counted against its ability to ground counterfactual decidability). 
Lewis defines cotenability of x with antecedent 1 at a world i `if and only if x 
holds 
throughout some (D-permitting sphere around i; say also that x is cotenable with' at 
i 
if x holds throughout every sphere around i, whether or not is entertainable. 
'4 The 
latter clause refers to the cotenability of a necessary truth with any antecedent. 
The 
former, of more interest to present purposes, states (roughly) that x 
is cotenable i ff .v is 
' Goodman, 16 
3Ibid., 18 
4 Lewis, Counterfactuals, 69 
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present in the nearest 0 world. However, whilst PW provides the form of an answer 
to the problem of cotenability, it does not provide any content: despite Lewis' claim 
that `a metalinguistic theorist who rejects the foundations of my definition of 
cotenability may yet find that the definition offers some guidance about which 
premises are cotenable with which antecedents'5. To demonstrate this inability, it is 
sufficient to show that where we do supply some minimal content to `similarity', it 
leads us astray in judgements of cotenability. 
Heller6 argues that it is not the most similar worlds, but the relevant ones which 
should be used to judge cotenability (and whilst relevance is certainly not unrelated to 
similarity, it cannot be reduced to it). His example is `if quail had not made tracks 
there, there would not have been any tracks of that kind there'. The counterfactual is 
surely false: for maybe a pheasant would have produced tracks of that kind. Yet a 
world where the quail is absent requires less of a `miracle' (and is therefore more 
similar) than a world where the quail is absent and a pheasant appears. Heller's 
example shows that the antecedent world is not so much that which is closest to our 
own, as simply that which is relevant. And, given that such a notion of `relevance' is 
a primitive notion, PW can provide no answers to any particular question of 
cotenability. This emphasis upon relevance fits well with the emphasis I have placed 
upon pragmatic stipulation of an explicit experimental condition as part of IE. 
A further example is provided by Kazez7: Stressa gives birth to an intellectually 
disabled child. Stressa is under a great deal of stress, she drinks, she smokes, and she 
is poor. The only possible medical reason for the birth of an intellectually disabled 
child is that Stressa drank. Yet, using the PW account of counterfactuals, 
it would 
turn out that stress is a relevant cause. This is so because it is plausible to suppose 
that the closest (most similar) worlds in which Stressa's life is not stressful are also 
those in which Stressa did not drink. Therefore, according to PW, the counterfactual 
`if Stressa's pregnancy had not been stressful, it would not have produced the 
birth of 
an intellectually disabled child' is true. Once again, the 
lesson is that the closest 
Ibid., 70 
6 Mark Heller, `Might Counterfactuals and Gratuitous Differences' in 
Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 73(1) (1995), 93-94 
' Jean Kazez, `Can Counterfactuals Save Mental Causation' in Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 
73(1) (1995), 84 
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worlds are not necessarily those worlds which should be used to ground the 
counterfactual. The relevant world would have been one wherein Stressa was 
stressed, but did not drink. `Stressa' also demonstrates the relevance of a notion of 
`no causal contradiction', which provides the intuitively correct response in this case. 
The initial condition should include all facts which might affect the outcome, so long 
as they are not in causal contradiction with the antecedent: we should, therefore, 
include Stressa's drinking in the experimental situation. 
The `no causal contradiction' principle leads to a further problem. I noted that the 
principle holds only in general. Consider again DEM: should we not, therefore, 
include in the experimental situation the fact that the Russians had captured of the 
Reichstag in 1945, whose effects do, after all, contradict the antecedent? Or 
Germany's failure in the Battle of Britain? Certainly, such scenarios seem, at best, 
implausible: to imagine Germany's ultimate victory is not to also imagine the actual 
defeats that Germany suffered. Yet, there must be a limit to the `no causal 
contradiction' rule, or we are faced with a problem which we might term the `problem 
of unravelling' - that once one fact is supposed to be otherwise, all causes of that fact 
are also supposed to be otherwise. If this is the case, then past events are 
counterfactually dependent upon future events: thus counterfactuals always `back- 
track'. This contravenes our usual insistence that, whilst `back-tracking' is possible, 
it is not the norm. 
It may be fair to assume that, for most counterfactuals, it is not relevant whether or 
not back-tracking occurs. For the purposes of working through a counterfactual 
outcome using IE we might as well assume that the counterfactual 
in question hasn't 
entirely `un-ravelled', but it doesn't really matter. However, there are counterfactuals 
where it does matter, such as: 
DEM3: `if Germany had won the Second World War, there would have 
been more 
radiation present today' 
I imagine that such a counterfactual (if true) is made true 
by the fact that, had 
Germany won the War, they would have developed the atomic 
bomb, and it is likely 
that a limited nuclear war would have taken place. 
In this scenario, Germanys 
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winning the war 'back-tracks': the causal history of Germany's victory 
counterfactually depends on that victory. 
The primary response to the issues of back-tracking and unravelling should be to 
restate the need for explicit stipulation when providing initial experimental situations; 
where back-tracking is a possibility, the context should be made clear. This insistence 
on the need for a pragmatic limitation to back-tracking counterfactuals can be 
defended, if we recall a feature of contrastive explanations: that a well chosen contrast 
limits relevant causal history. Those parts of the history of the target-fact which 
corresponds to causes in the history of the contrast cases is irrelevant, and 
presupposed. Hence, in a given contrast case, much causal history will be 
presupposed, and hence not amenable to alteration by back-tracking. 
Using the notion of `world-lines', suggested in the previous section, allows a general 
conception of the role of back-tracking in specification of the counterfactual initial 
condition. The general intuition to be followed, whose details should be provided by 
stipulation, is that counterfactual scenarios are supposed to diverge from the actual 
world at some point shortly before the time of the antecedent. There is a 'ramp' 
leading to the fork pointed to by the antecedent: 
Counterfactual world-line 
Actual world history 
Counterfactual A `Ramp': A Time of antecedent: 
and actual counterfactual thereafter counterfactual 
histories are back-tracks diverges 
alike 
In summary, an implied experiment is only possible where a tractable experimental 
situation is provided. Primarily, this is achieved according to pragmatic stipulation 
of 
the necessary details, much of which can be achieved according to a precise 
contrastive focus. However, two non-pragmatic rules 
limit the application of pure 
stipulation. First, the `absence' of a cause should 
be understood such that we give 
consideration to what is most likely to have taken the place of 
that cause. Second, in 
general, facts which are not in logical or causal contradiction 
to the antecedent should 
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feature in the experimental situation. To provide a non-circular definition of the 
initial situation, we must say that an appropriate world-line is selected: where 
`appropriate' is to be understood with reference to the above three features. 
Decidability 
A major requirement in explicating CM is that counterfactuals be decidable. By this I 
mean that, where there are different opinions about the truth value of a counterfactual, 
one opinion will be right, and the other opinions will be wrong. Moreover, there will 
be available, in principle at least, evidence or reasoning which should persuade those 
others, if they are rational, that their opinion was wrong. The primary reason for 
adopting the implied experiment account of counterfactuals - as opposed to, 
particularly, the possible worlds analysis - was to ensure that historical 
counterfactuals are indeed decidable in this sense. (Note that other conceptions of 
`decidable' are possible, notably those which are `realist' in a more extreme sense. 
For example, we might claim that there exists a truth-maker for every counterfactual, 
whether or not anyone can obtain evidence to support it, or reason convincingly about 
it. There seems no need to attempt to justify such a strong conception as this. ) 
The core claim is that, where counterfactuals are decidable, IE provides the correct 
result. EE suggests that to the extent that we can approximately model a historical 
situation (perhaps using laws, perhaps not), counterfactuals can be correctly framed 
about that situation. Given the background of the implied experiment account, it is 
possible to examine in more detail possible reasons why it might not be possible to 
correctly formulate definite counterfactuals. Such reasons can be broadly termed 
epistemic - limitations resulting from our lack of the relevant 
kinds of knowledge - 
pragmatic - where we don't want the counterfactual to 
be definitely decidable - or 
ontic - limitations resulting from, in some sense, the counterfactual 
situation itself. In 
order to defend IE, for each of the cases below I shall need to either explain 
how IE is 
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the best analysis to account for the decidability, or argue that the counterfactual 
should not be regarded as decidable at all. 
"`You talk about our position, the left flank weak and the right flank too extended. " he went 
on. "That's all nonsense, there's nothing of the kind. But what awaits us tomorrow? A 
hundred million most diverse chances which will be decided on the instant by the fact that our 
men or theirs run or do not run, and that this man or that man is killed. "' 8- Tolstoy 
Epistemic deficiencies may lead to limitations in our ability to decide whether 
counterfactuals are true or false. It may be that there are too many variables to 
consider in modelling the historical situation. What often amounts to the same thing, 
it may be that the counterfactual situation heralds too great a departure from actuality 
to be resolvable. In part, problems may be limited by proper specification of the 
experimental situation, considered previously. However, it is reasonable to suppose 
that problems may remain. The following example demonstrates both of these 
epistemic difficulties concerning decidability: 
`If there had been no nation states, there would not have been a revolution' 
In addition, we may simply lack the relevant experimental knowledge to understand 
the implied experiment. For example, if we know nothing about the King's 
psychology, then the following cannot be judged: 
`If the King hadn't had a bad day hunting, then he would not have summoned the 
Estates-General' 
Epistemic limitations will affect the decidability of counterfactuals. 
Under IE, 
counterfactuals mirror both predictions and experimental simulations, so 
to the extent 
that these activities are not possible due to a lack of empirical 
knowledge, neither will 
be our judgement of the corresponding counterfactuals. 
It is the case that Ne will 
often claim that `it would have been likely that e', rather 
than `it would have been the 
case that e': the likelihood in the former locution 
is a measurement of subjective 
probability. However, we should note that 
IE is more permissive than, in particular, 
8 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, 828 
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ML, in that knowledge of strict historical laws is not necessary to decide upon 
counterfactuals. EE at least allows counterfactuals to be as decidable as we intuitively 
understand them to be. 
Various heuristics are available in judging epistemically complicated counterfactuals. 
These heuristics will be similar to the usual experimental heuristics which deliver 
empirical knowledge. For example, Pork argues that comparable cases are often of 
use in helping to judge complicated historical counterfactuals: 
`confronted with the problem of justification of the counterfactual statement, historians 
usually intuitively try to find for a comparison some other real situation ... which in some 
important respect is similar to the possible situation reflected in the counterfactual claim ... '9 
Pork's strategy bears similarity to Mill's Method of Agreement, in which the causal 
factor is discovered by comparing two examples which exhibit the same outcome, and 
treating the common antecedents as potential causes. 
In chapter seven, we saw that Schama believed that events of `epochal significance' 
need not follow from causes of the same significance: hence such a dramatic event as 
the French Revolution might follow from seemingly insignificant causes. As I 
suggested, this idea implies that history might be chaotic, in the sense of the 
mathematical theory of chaos1. ° 
Chaotic systems are those which require only a small alteration in initial conditions to 
produce a large change in the end state. The most well known example is, of course, 
the butterfly's wings: in a chaotic system, whether or not the butterfly flaps its wings 
on one side of the world may affect whether or not there is a tornado on the other, It 
is believed that the earth's meteorological system is a chaotic system. Whether or not 
history is a chaotic in the precise sense, it seems undeniable that small causes may 
have large effects. This might be thought to raise difficulties for JE, since it implies 
that we should have less confidence in our initial assessments of which cause made a 
greater difference than we actually do. 
9 A. Pork, `Assessing Causal Importance in History' in History and Them, 24 (198 5), 66 
10 For an excellent introduction of chaos theory and its philosophical implications, see 
Peter Smith, 
Explaining Chaos (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 
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Two remarks are appropriate. Firstly, this is an epistemic difficulty for IE (an d hence 
for CM), in the same sense as the previous examples, and hence raises similar issues. 
Given that chaotic systems are understood primarily by modelling, not by the 
application of strict laws, IE is a good position to account for any possible 
counterfactual judgements we can make about chaotic systems. Secondly, we can be 
reasonably confident that most historical systems do not exhibit the sensitive 
dependence on initial conditions apparent in chaotic systems; if only because when 
we do highlight such dependence it is as the exception, not the norm. If historical 
systems were chaotic in a thorough-going way, then the practical applicability of 
judging historical counterfactuals would indeed be rather drastically restricted. 
Weaknesses in the specification of the experimental situation can affect decidability. 
Whether or not a counterfactual back-tracks affects the outcome of that 
counterfactual: in the case of DEM3, for example. Hence, the issue of back-tracking 
is also relevant to decidability, and so the extent of back-tracking must be made clear 
as part of the specification of the initial condition. In general, I have claimed that, to 
the extent that the initial situation is not fully specified, the resulting counterfactual 
may not be decidable: between certain outcomes, if not completely. As I have argued, 
the experiment cannot have a determinate outcome if the experimental scenario is not 
properly specified. 
Being under-specified in this way is not always a failing of counterfactuals, however. 
For example, recall the example discussed in chapter seven. The question was 'why 
did my friend and I eat Italian (rather than French or Thai)? '. `My preference for 
European food' limited the possible outcomes from three to two; whilst the competing 
cause `my friend's preference for pasta' limited the possible outcomes from three to 
one. The latter cause in this case would, if judged according to CM, not yield a single 
outcome. The antecedent `if my friend hadn't wanted to eat pasta then ... 
' (supposing 
that this absence amounted to my friend having no preference) could 
be completed 
either by the consequent `we would have eaten Thai', or `we would 
have eaten 
French'. It must therefore be recognised that certain counterfactuals are 
framed 
which can only be properly completed by disjunctive states of affairs. 
This is not a 
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limitation of IE, but a recognition that we don't always want counterfactuals to lead to 
a single outcome. 
There are also reasons that counterfactuals may not be decidable which are not due to 
epistemic shortcomings, nor due to the formulation of the initial counterfactual 
situation. The relevant causal processes of the implied experiment may be 
indeterministic. If the implied experimental situation involves genuinely 
indeterministic causal processes, then there will be no definite fact of the matter as to 
the consequent which should follow the antecedent. At best, such consequents must 
state that `there was a x% chance of situation S'. The probability referred to in such 
counterfactuals will be objective probabilities, rather than the subjective probabilities 
referred to in cases of epistemic limitation. Just as it is hard to know whether history 
is really chaotic, it will not always be an easy matter to distinguish empirical 
deficiencies from genuine indeterminacy of causation. 
In short, there are three ways that counterfactuals may not imply a single, definite 
outcome. In each we would say `it might have been the case that ... 
', though `might' 
performs a different role in each. Counterfactuals may be hampered by 
epistemological shortcomings, in which case the `might' is subjective. 
Counterfactuals may be hampered by indeterminacy of causal mechanism, 
in which 
case the `might' is objective. And counterfactuals might 
be framed with the intention 
of leading to a disjunction of possible outcomes, 
in which case the `might' derives 
from pragmatic features of stipulation of the initial conditions. 
It is an advantage that 
EE allows us to recognise these three types of `might' counterfactuals 
which do occur 
in our subjunctive reasoning. 
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Similarity 
`Similarity, ever ready to solve philosophical problems and overcome obstacles, is a 
pretender, an impostor, a quack'" 
After a long examination of the counterfactual element of CM, the remainder of the 
chapter is devoted to the second potentially problematic concept in CM: degree of 
difference. CM requires a comparative judgement of difference between states of 
affairs, of the type `x is more different to e than y is to e'. It seems philosophically 
permissible to assume that `similarity' is the antonym of `difference', and therefore to 
focus analytical efforts on the former notion. Despite my reservations concerning the 
use of similarity between worlds to ground counterfactual truth values, it is necessary 
that we consider the concept at this point in CM; even if similarity is to play no 
substantive role in the counterfactual element. I shall consider two criticisms: first, 
that similarity should be abandoned in favour of `identity in certain respects'; second, 
that similarity is too subjective a notion to ground the normative judgements required 
by CM. 
We need to know whether similarity is a concept which can be relied upon to 
do the 
philosophical work required by CM. Some examples are certainly easier to accept 
than others; notably, situations where quantitative measurement 
is available and 
appropriate. We can count numbers of votes, numbers of people 
born and who have 
died, and government finances: it seems an easy matter to state that the situation 
where the President gains 45 votes is more similar to the situation where she gains 
50 
votes than it is to the situation where she gains 35. If 
it is possible to discern that 
cause A contributes x to the effect, and cause B contributes y, and 
if we can 
quantitatively measure x and y, then the similarity 
judgement may seem easy to come 
by. 
" Goodman, 437 
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However, this is not always (or even often) possible; if CM were limited to 
quantitative cases it would be a disappointing theory indeed. Of more importance to 
note, though, is that even where quantitative features are available, it may not be 
appropriate to rely upon them. To use Martin's example12: Senator X controls five 
votes, Senator Y only his own vote. The counterfactual resulting from Senator X not 
voting is more different to what actually happened than is the counterfactual resulting 
from Senator Y not voting to what actually happened. Or is it? What if Senator V's 
vote has other sorts of consequences, say that it carries a great deal of respect from the 
press and public? If that were so, whether the vote(s) delivered by Senator Y or 
Senator X was more important would depend on which features were deemed to be 
relevant to the similarity judgement. There is no reason to suppose that quantitative 
features should automatically take precedence. 
The example suggests that, to be able to judge similarity, we need to know , hich 
features of the comparison situations are relevant. It might be thought that the logical 
end-product of such an idea would be the conclusion that similarity does no work, 
relying entirely on prior judgements of relevance. This is the conclusion of 
Goodman's reductive analysis of similarity'3 
Goodman provides seven `strictures' on similarity, but there is a common theme of 
reductive analysis to his critique. This is that similarity cannot ground philosophical 
analyses, or solve philosophical problems; rather, `similarity' itself depends on other 
philosophical concepts to the extent that it is philosophically superfluous. In 
particular, Goodman argues that similarity between tokens x and -y 
is only applicable 
once we also state the respect in which x and y are alike. But, to state the common 
attribute is to do all the descriptive work; to state in addition that the tokens are 
similar is unnecessary. 
Goodman's example uses tokens of the letter `a': letters which are of 
different sizes, 
fonts, upper or lower case, and so forth (A, a, a, A). We wish to say 
that these tokens 
are all similar. Yet without specifying the sense in which the tokens are 
similar, the 
claim is empty. What is comprehensible (is not empty of content) 
is the statement 
12 Martin `Causes, Conditions and Causal Importance', 71 
13 Goodman, 437-446 
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that `all the tokens are similar in being `a's'. However, this is simply a long winded 
(and philosophically misleading) way of saying `all the tokens are `a's'. 
This has a clear application to the material in case studies concerning 'important 
properties'. Recall that Lefebvre and others based, to some extent, their judgement of 
causal importance upon the relative importance of the different properties of the event 
to be explained. For example, Lefebvre maintained that it was pertinent that the 
revolution was instigated `from below', and that it was violent. If Goodman is 
correct, specification of `pertinent' features entirely sets the respect by which the 
historical (and counterfactual) situations are to be compared. Similarity, and hence 
CM, can do no work in establishing anything about the importance of a cause; since 
once the respect has been specified, the situations are either alike or not alike. 
We need to recognise that judgements of similarity must be, and are, constrained by 
specification of the `respect' according to which the items are to be compared. 
Indeed, CM incorporates this idea directly, through the necessity for an event, e, 
which `frames the question of c's importance'. Given that `e' is to be understood 
contrastively, the respect according to which the similarity judgement is to be made 
can be quite precise. The relevant dimension of similarity is that by which the target 
fact and the contrasts differ. 
For example, suppose that we wish to assess the importance of Ce: `France not 
having 
an entrepreneurial culture in the late eighteenth century'. How similar 
is the outcome 
resulting from the absence of this cause to the actual outcome? It 
is almost 
impossible to say, and by extension, almost impossible to compare to another 
judgement of similarity resulting from the absence of a competing cause. 
However, 
we are given more than this to work with according to 
CM. If the contrastive effect 
which frames the judgement of ce's importance is `why 
did France, rather than 
Britain, not go through an industrial revolution in the eighteenth century? 
', then the 
relevant aspects for the similarity judgement will 
be specified: they are those by 
which France and Britain differ. It is likely that the resulting similarity 
judgement 
will judge ce to be highly important, since the counterfactual 
situation draws close to 
that of the foil: Britain's being industrialised. 
However, if the contrastive effect 
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which frames the judgement is `why did France, rather than Britain, go through a 
revolution? ', then it is unlikely that the counterfactual difference will be so great. 
What I will dispute, with respect to Goodman's argument, is the contention that 
similarity does no work at all, and should be replaced by `identity in certain respects'. 
Whilst examples may seem to support the claim that similarity reduces entirely to 
identity of type, I believe that this is generally not the case, and in particular, not the 
case when comparing complex states of affairs of the sort required by Ctl. Consider 
two examples: (1) a similarity comparison between two objects; the Goodman-like 
claim being that the objects are similar only to the extent that they share some same 
property, say, colour. (2) Comparison of two historical situations (such as the French 
nation with and without a pre-existing entrepreneurial culture); the Goodman-like 
claim being that the situations are similar only in respect of, say, their economic 
aspects. 
The claim I wish to make is that even granting `Goodman-like' restrictions, similarity 
is still doing real work. This is because, whilst the `respect' in which the items are 
similar has been stated, these `respects' are still too broad to eliminate genuine use of 
similarity. Shared colour, in the case of (1), can be thought to refer to many more 
detailed properties; thus to claim that object x is more similar to z than y is to z in 
respect of colour is not to analyse away `similarity'. Likewise, in the case of (2), 
`economic aspects' is a broad term, encompassing trade, fiscal policy, industry, 
income, and more. 14 
One option for a reductive critic of the use of similarity judgements would be to move 
to a more extreme position. A defender of Goodman could allow that the above 
examples (colour and economic aspects) indeed do not serve to analyse away 
`similarity', but are therefore incomplete as they stand. What would be needed are 
examples which specify the exact properties which the tokens share, rather than such 
general aspects as `colour'. I grant that this is a possible response; however, such a 
14 It is interesting to note that parallel arguments can be constructed for concepts other 
than 'similarity' 
The question of whether it is possible to point to `progress in history' 
is often raised; a common reply' ºs 
to note that to judge progress we have to specify the kind of `progress' vve mean. 
This is surely, correct 
- we do require some sort of idea as to what our attention should 
be focused upon. But, as I ha' e 
argued above, this is not to analyse away `progress'; for no matter what aspect is 
selected, there ý%ill 
still be a number of more detailed aspects which still require weighting according 
to a more detailed, 
but still irreducible, standard of `progress'. 
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position is far less intuitively appealing than Goodman's original position, and it 
might be doubted whether it could be carried through in practice. It seems that even if 
we are to accept Goodman's request that similarity claims be qualified, a substantive 
role for similarity judgements remains. 
There is a further reason why we should be dubious of Goodman's reductive 
argument. Goodman's attempt to analyse `similarity' in terms of `type' appears to 
mirror Wittgenstein's famous `rule-following' argument, wherein the status of rules 
(including those constituting what we mean by `types') are challenged. Many have 
interpreted Wittgenstein's argument as an attempt to demonstrate that the successful 
application of a rule requires an understanding of similarity. This point has been 
raised by Gentner and Medina: 
`[Wittgenstein] argues that following a rule cannot consist simply in being guided by a 
representation of the rule (e. g. `+2'). Such a representation by itself does not determine 
unequivocally how to continue the number series, for it can be interpreted and applied in 
various ways (e. g. as `x +2 if x< 1000, otherwise x+ 4'). Wittgenstein emphasises that rules 
are not self-interpreting: a rule does not contain within itself what counts as a correct 
application to each new case. ... Wittgenstein's point 
is that, in order to be cognitively useful, 
rules have to be supplemented with standards of similarity for their application. 
"5 
If Wittgenstein's argument is successful, interpretation of `type' relies on judgements 
of `similarity' just as much as vice versa. 
Whilst the notion of similarity has not received a great deal of attention 
in the 
philosophical literature, it has attracted a good degree of interest 
from psychologists. 
Debate here has focused on whether similarity, or rule-following, 
is the cognitively 
prior activity; and (more relevant to CM) whether similarity 
is a concept that can be 
used in explanation of cognition and behaviour. 
Much of the literature has 
emphasised the fact that similarity judgements are too 
flexible and unconstrained to 
ground any other cognitive activity: a claim which, 
if true, would be problematic in 
relation to the task which similarity is 
intended to perform in CM. 
15 D. Gentner and J. Medina, `Similarity and the 
Development of Rules' in Cognition 65 (1998), 
288 
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In many ways, similarity judgements do appear subject to great variation. After all, 
there is very little that can be stated axiomatically concerning similarity judgements; 
Hahn and Chater16 suggest (the only) three plausible candidates. First, similarity is 
maximal for identity. Second, similarity is graded. Third, similarity is some function 
of common properties (the precise function cannot be specified). Within this 
framework there is room for much flexibility. 
The way that similarity judgements change according to an array of pragmatic factors 
has often been noted in the psychological literature. To summarise: Tversky' 7 shows 
that judgements vary according to what else is in the comparison set. The similarity 
of a to b can differ when asking `how similar is a to b, compared to c' to `how similar 
is a to b, compared to d'. Tversky also argues that similarity is not transitive, and thus 
depends on the order the tokens are presented. Sloman and Rips' 8 show that 
judgements vary according to the type of task being performed. Goldstone19 shows 
that they vary according to what `heading' the tokens are put under. His example is 
of `children' and `jewellery'; which were thought to be not very similar until placed 
jointly under the heading `things to be rescued from a burning house'. Goldstone also 
reports that a judge's age affects similarity, as does their technical expertise. 
This could be worrying with regard to CM, due to the possibility that similarity 
judgements are subject to at least the same variation as are judgements of causal 
importance. However, we can mitigate the impact of experimental evidence that 
similarity is context dependent, in two ways. 
Firstly, there is opposite empirical evidence: that similarity 
judgements are - to some 
extent - `hard-wired'. As Goldstone states, 
`it is difficult not to notice the similarity 
between a 400 Hz tone and a 402 Hz tone, or two shades of red'20. 
It is an oft noted 
fact in the psychological literature that judgements of categorisation 
and judgements 
16 Ulrike Hahn and Nick Chater, 'Similarity and 
Rules: Distinct? Exhaustive? Empirically 
Distinguishable? ' in Cognition 65 (1998), 206 
17 A. Tversky, `Features of Similarity' in Psychological 
Review 84 (1977): 327-352 
18 S. A. Sloman and L. J. Rips, `Similarity as an 
Explanatory Construct' in Cognition 
65 (1998): 87- 
101 
19 R. L. Goldstone, `The Role of Similarity in 
Categorization: Providing a Groundwork' 
in Cognition 
52 (1994): 125-157 
20 Goldstone, 136 
260 
of similarity diverge. The best evidence is derived from experiments where the 
subjects were asked to group objects according to specific criteria. The similarities 
between the objects which were irrelevant to the subjects' task were shown to still 
significantly slow such groupings. The conclusion to draw is that similarit\ 
judgements are, to some extent, primitive and inescapable. 
Secondly, much of the results reported above pose no concerns for similarity 
judgements, in the context of CM. The fact that we have accepted that similarity 
judgements in CM are conducted `according to certain respects' makes some of the 
psychological evidence irrelevant in assessment of CM. We can. and should, take on 
board both Tversky's claim that similarity judgements vary according to what else is 
being compared, and Goldstone's claim that similarity judgements vary according to 
the `heading' that the items are placed under. 
Likewise, Sloman and Rips' claim that similarity judgements vary according to the 
type of task can be discounted with respect to CM: for, in the context of Chi, all 
similarity judgements are performances of the same task. Finally, to the extent that 
similarity is theory dependent, we should not be concerned. For C`1 aims to show 
that judgements of importance are, in a sense, theory dependent: that our ascriptions 
of importance can be better or worse depending on our grasp of the system under 
examination. For the purposes of CM, if the similarity judgements of the expert and 
the novice diverge, we should trust those of the expert. 
I conclude that similarity is a cognitive strategy which cannot 
be analytically reduced 
to `identity in certain respects', and which can be shown through empirical 
experiment to be pragmatically variable, yet also sufficiently stable. 
This is especially 
so given the use to which `similarity' is put 
in CM: for the similarity judgement 
required by CM are constrained to a large 
degree. There is no one rule to decide 
similarity; it is precisely this flexibility which allows similarity 
to be applicable to 
complicated situations as much as to perceptual aspects 
of objects. 
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Conclusions 
I have examined a realist method for determining importance; to the extent that this 
has been successful, I have also described a common way for historical explanations 
to conflict in a substantive manner going beyond a simple disagreement in explanans. 
I believe I have demonstrated that it can be successful, even though we must subject 
that claim to limitations and provisos. However, even modest success is sufficient to 
refute the sceptical and relativist claims of Mill, Walsh et al concerning importance. 
The method has focused on degree of effect as the judgement which underpins claims 
of importance. `Degree of effect' has in turn been analysed counterfactually. The 
counterfactual model of importance (CM) has been shown to subsume competing 
accounts, and to provide results which generally agree with (and explain) both 
intuitive and historical claims of importance. 
CM required examination of two key terms: `counterfactual' and `difference' (or its 
converse, `similarity'); the presence of either of these could potentially be regarded as 
a source of scepticism over CM. I have defended a new explication of 
counterfactuals, the Implied Experiment account. Using IE, we should regard 
counterfactuals as referring to an initial experimental situation (specified, in part, by 
the antecedent), and its subsequent development (where this development is 
understood by analogy with actual experiments). I have argued that this yields a 
notion of counterfactuals such that they admit of substantive and rational defence; 
historical competition over causal importance may also, thereby, be considered in 
terms of substantive and reasoned debate. I have defended a flexible, yet constrained 
understanding of similarity. 
It can hardly be denied, however, that `importance' can 
be used in ways not covered 
by CM. Sometimes morality plays a part: we may select those causes which were 
most blameworthy, for example. Sometimes, `intrinsic', non-empirical, 
reasons are 
relevant: as in the case of Hegel's historical account. 
And there will doubtless be 
other reasons for ascribing importance in particular cases. 
There is clearly a place for 
`personal' importance, in addition to the `objective' importance explicated 
above: 
what is important in an individual's life, 
for example, is not a matter of consequences, 
'1 6 
but of simply what is felt to be important. The significance of Cm is in demonstrating 
that there is an objective notion of importance, which is used frequently by historians. 
and which, in a public discipline such as history, can be recommended as an 
appropriate way for historians to decide upon and to justify judgements of 
importance. 
A recurrent, underlying, issue of Part III has been the nature of philosophical analysis. 
In particular, there have been two key analytical steps in the preceding argument, each 
of which could be challenged on the basis of the type of analysis at work. (i) 
Importance in general was analysed in terms of the degree of effect brought about; 
and hence in terms of counterfactual difference. (ii) Counterfactual decidabilit`' Was 
analysed in terms of an implied experiment. The common question faced has been to 
what extent we should replace rough and ready judgements with precise rules. I have 
attempted to do this to some extent, though not to claim that all practice reust fall 
under those rules. To this extent, I have attempted to follow the broad 
recommendations of a `family resemblance' method of analysis. 
The thesis as a whole has, I hope, added to the understanding of competition between 
historical explanations. Treating historical explanation as the activity of tracing 
causes of an aspect of an event, which are conceptualised 
in certain ways, has allowed 
my treatment to be flexible, yet able to deliver definite results. 
I have paid particular 
attention to the role of causal claims in leading to explanatory exclusion 
and, through 
the Counterfactual Method, to competing claims of historical 
importance. To he 
better able to comprehend these two fundamental relations 
between historical 
explanations represents advance enough 
for now. Further investigation could, and 
should, focus attention on the role of conceptual categorisation 
in competition 
between historical explanations. But that task will 
have to wait. 
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